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Summary 
 
This thesis is primarily an anthropological and historical study of transformations of labour 
regimes in Macedonia within the context of a changing political economy. This process can 
largely be situated in the “transition” from a socialist to a market-based economic model; a 
process which was never only about transforming the “economic” but touched upon every 
intimate aspect of people’s lives. It is through these changes, and the reconceptualization of 
what work ought to be about, that we can explore larger questions of class identity, 
alienation, morality, personhood and the operations of power and social reproduction in 
contemporary Macedonian society. As such, this thesis is offered as a contribution to the 
traditional, yet, in the case of Macedonia, under-researched, themes of social and economic 
anthropology. My primary fieldsite and object of investigation, is the small township of 
Shtip, in eastern Macedonia, where I investigate the changing role and social status of 
industrial workers in the national economy, and the everyday working lives of garment 
labourers in one of Shtip’s largest garment factories.  
The historical chapters of this thesis analyse the making of an industrial working class within 
socialist Yugoslavia, and the subsequent attempts at unmaking the values, social relations and 
forms of personhood, that grew up within the specifics of Yugoslav socialism. I approach 
“class” through the indeterminate interplay of social, cultural and economic factors, and 
highlight the enduring cultural importance of embedded, relational forms of personhood. As I 
move towards more current events, and particularly the ethnographic chapters, I focus more 
strongly on the responses of industrial workers to such changes. I deal not only with specific 
practices, but also with questions of the “imagination”, or how workers, experience, and 
reflect on these wider changes in ways that keep open the possibility of rearranging social 
relations at the workplace, and beyond. In doing do, I propose that struggles over the 
definition of personhood, rather than class conflict, are at the forefront of debates about what 
work ought to be about. Also, I suggest that the outcome of these struggles has not been to 
challenge subordination and social inequality in itself, but to challenge the specific kinds of 
inequality and subject categories introduced by the transition to a neoliberal market economy 
(Dunn 2004). 
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Chapter I: Labour Studies and Anthropology in Macedonia 
 
1.1 Introduction: Anthropology in Macedonia 
The spread of social and cultural anthropological research in Macedonia has been a 
relatively recent development. This is perhaps as it should be, given that Macedonia 
itself is a “recent” addition on the world map. Its first appearance as a unified political 
entity took place in 1945, as one of the six constituent republics of Socialist Yugoslavia; 
its second appearance in 1991, as it exited Yugoslavia to embark on the road of 
independence. As it turned out, it was the trials and tribulations that the country faced 
upon this road that suddenly attracted the attention of Western anthropologists and 
shaped their research interests1. It is of little surprise then that the vast majority of the 
extensive anthropological research that has been generated over the past three decades 
by local and foreign anthropologists, has been centred on questions of ethno-national 
identity politics (see Brown 2003; Cowan & Brown 2000; Danforth 1995; Ellis 2003; 
Karakasidou 1997; Duijzings 1997; Janev 2011; Schwartz 1996; Trpeski 2013). Unlike 
in most other Eastern Bloc countries, researchers interested in Yugoslavia’s transition 
were justifiably less concerned with transformations in property rights and market 
encroachment, and more with the ethnic conflicts that defined the demise of the 
Yugoslav federation. Within a very brief time span, Yugoslavia had thoroughly lost its 
academic attraction as an economic experiment of worker self-management that 
intrigued sociologists and developmental economists from socialist and capitalist 
                                                          
1
 I do not wish to suggest that ethnographic research was entirely absent prior to Macedonia’s 
independence. The contributions of local and regional researchers during socialism have been well 
documented by Dimova and Risteski (2013), and Risteski (2011). Their work, however, has been 
developed within the evolutionary framework of a Victorian “scientific ethnology” that dominated 
ethnology departments in Yugoslavia and Macedonia well into the nineties, and have often served to 
perpetuate myths of national origins (see Bošković 2005). Publications by English and American trained 
anthropologists during this period are exhausted by a few scattered studies on social structure, ritual and 
kinship systems in north-western Macedonia, namely by Obrebski (1977; posthumously published paper 
based on fieldwork done in the 1930´s); and the more consistent work of Rheubottom (1976; 1980).   
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countries alike (see Horvat, Marković and Supek 1975; Bockman 2011: 100). Instead, it 
transformed into an export industry for studies of cultural interaction and conflict 
management; a topic of great interest in the dawning era of globalization and 
transnational politics.  
In 1993, during the heat of the Bosnian conflict, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace decided to republish its 1914 report that investigated the historical 
roots of the Balkan wars of 1912-13, which suddenly brought to life ideas that very little 
had changed in the Balkans in the intervening 80 years (Todorova 1997: 4). Timeless 
historical animosities were once again seen to be resurfacing from beneath the thin veil 
of the socialist propaganda of brotherhood and unity. Post-independence Macedonia 
was not exempt from becoming the object of such myopic frameworks. Interethnic 
tensions were on the rise, especially after changes in the constitution in 1991 that sought 
to define Macedonians as the exclusive “constituent nation” and Albanians, who 
comprised a quarter of the population as a “minority” with a different set of rights and 
obligations (see Brown 2000: 129). In order to add legitimacy to the new state, a newly 
reinvigorated Macedonian national history sought to condense disparate events scattered 
over more than two millennia, into a single unified narrative.  External relations with 
neighbouring Greece were soured by the dispute of the country’s name and flag, which 
was perceived in Greece as a direct claim on historical and national symbols celebrated 
as inalienably Greek (ibid: 124; Danforth 1993: 4). In the heat of events, the 
“Macedonian problem” appeared once more rooted in competing Balkan nationalities 
that, as Churchill once famously quipped, “produce more history than they can 
consume.” 
Anthropologists were quick to respond to the task of challenging such simplistic models 
that took national identities for granted. In their edited volume on Macedonia, Cowan 
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and Brown (2000) for example approach the question of identity through the structural 
metaphor of inflection. They assert that whatever meaning or direction a signifier 
possesses cannot be extracted from variations in the isolated acts of its enunciation. 
Instead we must locate its positioning within the larger spatiotemporal context where 
inflection is determined by the opposition of signifiers within that context. Establishing 
the elusive meaning of utterances such as ‘Macedonia’ or ‘Macedonian’ would thus 
depend on locating where one is speaking from (the spatiotemporal trajectory) as well 
as to whom the utterance is directed. As the structural interplay of signifiers varies so 
does the context and meaning of seemingly identical utterances, thus creating a 
multiplicity of inflections that are often conflicting and volatile. What the authors aim to 
achieve by deconstructing such categories is to “unsettle assumptions of fixed, stable 
ethnic and national categories, and the constituencies defined by them” (Cowan & 
Brown 2000: 22). This also needs to be complemented by questions of power, and an 
analysis of who benefits (or loses) from the creation and reproduction of such 
essentialist categories. Similarly, for Danforth, the task of the anthropologist is to 
“dereify the nation, to deconstruct and expose nationalist myths of the nation waiting, 
Sleeping Beauty like, to be awakened from its slumber” (1995: 15). Brown’s (2003) 
historical ethnography of nation making in Macedonia follows up on this commitment. 
He examines the relationship between “national history, identity and politics” and 
particularly the dynamic but non-determining role of state in the making of this history 
(ibid: 21).  
More recent publications have continued to build on the topic of identity politics though 
with an expanded focus that ties the national with other factors. The recent edited 
volume by de Munck and Risteski (2013) is thematically organized around the 
interconnection between symbols and practices and the conditions under which ethnic 
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identities become more or less ambiguous as they intersect with questions of gender, 
nationalism, religion and the environment. Ilka Thiessen’s (2007) book “Waiting for 
Macedonia: Identity in a Changing World,” for example, focuses on a group of young 
female engineers through which she explores how young people question and remake 
their identities at the crossroads of gender, nationality and class. She also raises some 
important questions regarding modernity, particularly by looking at the urban-rural 
conceptual divide, and various consumption activities and practices of reshaping the 
body through which distinctions of being “modern” or “European” are generated, often 
in relation to the ethnic Other (122). Through her work with Albanian families in 
Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, Neofotistos (2010) has examined the various ways in 
which derogatory ethnic slurs for Albanians, become co-opted and re-valued by 
Albanian men in order to create social distinctions that allow them to “make claims 
about the worth of themselves and other members of their ethno-national community” 
(ibid: 902). 
Similarly, through her research with Albanian and Macedonian families in the north 
Macedonian town of Kumanovo, Rozita Dimova (2006; 2010) has explored some of the 
connections between ethnicity and class by analyzing changes in patterns of 
consumption. She suggests that the rise of ethno-national differences in Macedonia 
“need to be analyzed by stressing the rearticulation of class [and] ethnicity” within a 
changing political and economic climate (2010). One of the key sentiments she picked 
up at the outset of her research among the Macedonian families was an acute feeling of 
loss. The primary implication in this discourse was the loss of class privileges 
accumulated during the Yugoslav communist period when ethnic Macedonians 
occupied the vast majority of managerial and administrative positions, and enjoyed a 
comfortable state sponsored lifestyle.  
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Such studies have certainly accomplished the much needed task of broadening our 
understanding of the operations of identity politics in a society so deeply permeated by 
their dynamics. However, my own research will veer away from the emphasis placed on 
ethno-national “identity” as the most salient social marker in contemporary Macedonia. 
Not because I think it is irrelevant, but as Keith Brown (2010) has recently warned, 
because there lies a danger of their transformation into a class of “gatekeeping 
concepts” that relate all aspects of ethnographic knowledge in Macedonia back to the 
question of ethnic and national identity (see also Appadurai 1986: 357); to the expense 
of determinants that may prove to have very little to do with national belonging. In a 
play of metaphors, Brown has suggested that we might do well to analytically and 
methodologically “re-envisage the stuff of Macedonian ethnography as routes rather 
than roots and as constituted from transnational relations rather than contested national 
essence” (2010: 833). He juxtaposes two seemingly unconnected events: the death of a 
migrant from Macedonia on a sinking ship in Baltimore in 1907 and the deaths of two 
Macedonian contractors in Baghdad in 2004 at the hands of Islamic militants. What 
links the lives of these men separated by ninety-seven years and thousands of miles is 
that they all became “entangled in the workings of globalized labour regimes, shaped by 
the particular dynamics of empire” (ibid: 821). This example highlights the enduring 
significance of global flows of capital for the lives of ordinary Macedonians.  
I find the focus on “labour regimes” particularly inspiring and believe it can offer fresh 
perspectives that can broaden our understanding of the social and cultural lives of 
people in a country that appears to be caught up in a state of permanent economic and 
political “transition”. The significance of global labour regimes, of course, does not 
have to be studied transnationally. After all, most people become “entangled” in the 
workings of global capital without the need to leave their respective places of origin, 
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and this has certainly been the case for most people in Macedonia who got caught up in 
the great neoliberal transformation. My particular interest in the question of labour arose 
from the under-researched, yet ever-present, public debates about the declining 
conditions of industrial work in Macedonia. The garment sector in particular has 
received by far the biggest amount of media attention. Reports dealing with the 
mistreatment of workers and violations of basic labour rights have become the most 
common associations with work in the industry. “Slavery”, “exploitation” and 
“feudalism” were but some of the disturbing labels that people regularly used to 
describe to me their perceptions and experiences of the garment industry. Most often, 
this discourse was accompanied by nostalgic narratives of bygone socialist times.   
The overall ambient was one of declining fortunes and a worsening of living standards 
that almost appeared to roll back time. Dimova’s focus on the “loss” of privileges 
captures an important dimension, but one cannot avoid the feeling that it is essentially 
about the loss experienced by upper middle class Macedonians (the voices in her 
research are predominantly architects, economists, physicians etc.) After all, the vast 
majority of people during socialism did not enjoy the privileges of managerial or 
administrative positions. Also, not all those who did enjoy privileges during socialism 
lost out in the transition, nor does the discourse of “loss” necessarily bounce off the 
ethnic Other. The people I spent time with in Shtip spoke of a different kind of loss, in 
which the Other was usually the former socialist technocratic-managerial elite that 
became the new class of nouveaux riches industrialists. The emergence of this new class 
did not just signal the “loss” or transfer of material wealth from “workers to capitalists”, 
but a moral crisis that threatened the very integrity of the moral self. I will expand on 
this notion later on. Suffice it to say here that there are strong indications that questions 
of class, culture, power and personhood can be explored outside the confines of the 
16 
 
“ethnic” and that this exploration can yield, I hope, a new understanding of the social 
and cultural lives of ordinary Macedonians.  
To follow up on this investigative shift, I believe that a research project that focuses on 
the everyday experiences of labour in and around the workplace can build on and 
contribute to the existing literature on Macedonia by engaging itself more widely with 
ethnographic studies of post-socialism and theories of labour, production and alienation. 
My thesis will focus on everyday experiences of “manufacturing consent” and 
negotiating change in the relationship between workers, employers and the state by 
looking at the garment industry. This involves the shaping of new conceptions of work 
through practice, but also on how labour figures in the historical imagination of people 
that have seen such practice take place under different political economies, such as 
Yugoslav socialism and post-independence free-market capitalism. What is the role of 
this socialist legacy in the ongoing transformations and operations of class, personhood, 
culture and power within the context of a changing political economy and the overall 
decline in the material and symbolic position of workers? What does it mean to speak 
critically of class exploitation in a country that not so long ago took pride in the 
ideology and achievements of a socialist workers’ democracy? What does neoliberal 
capitalism stand for in Macedonia today, and what is the nature of the inner struggles of 
its implementation? How is social and economic change and inequality accepted, 
challenged and negotiated? How are we to define these categories, and how useful are 
they for the social analysis of the everyday life of workers? We can begin by looking at 
some of the historical debates surrounding class, culture and power and introduce some 
definitions that will be used throughout the thesis. 
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1.2 Approaching Labour Studies: Class, Culture and Power 
Most anthropological and sociological studies of labour, ever since the days of 
Gluckman's research on the African industrial revolution, have been either influenced 
by Marxist ideas or somehow compelled to engage in debates with them.  Gluckman's 
own analysis of tribalism in rural and urban environments, was informed by a 
teleological reading of Marx that assumed both the linear development of industrial 
modernity and an organic unity between class (position in the relations of production) 
and social identity. His analysis betrays the conviction that, once under way, the wave 
of industrial modernization is irreversible. It would override tribal and ethnic identities 
and create new forms of urban and unionized organization and wider associations based 
on class and occupation (1963: 69). This mythical one way journey towards progress 
and modernity reflected some of the experiences and history of early British 
industrialization, casting little doubt on where the road led (Ferguson 1999: 6).  
Such crude economic reductionism was not to remain unchallenged for long even 
within debates among Marxists. It soon became evident that the global spread of an 
industrial workforce does not in itself create the conditions for class consciousness or 
solidarity. Revisions were needed and some of the more influential ones came from the 
French structuralist thought of Louis Althusser. Althusser's writings had the effect of 
liberating Marxist theory from sterile models of economism and technologism that 
reduced history to a singular evolutionary process. His reading of Marx emphasized that 
the general social contradiction in Marxism, i.e. the class struggle embodied in the 
antagonism between labour and capital, does not in and by itself establish the conditions 
for social revolution. On the contrary Althusser writes, 'the Capital-Labour 
contradiction is never simple, but always specified by the historically concrete forms 
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and circumstances in which it is exercised (Althusser [1969] 2005: 101; original 
emphasis); in other words: 
“the ‘contradiction’ is inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is 
found, inseparable from its formal conditions of existence, and even from the instances it 
governs; it is radically affected by them, determining, but also determined in one and the 
same movement, and determined by the various levels and instances of the social 
formation it animates; it might be called overdetermined in its principle” (ibid: 101).  
What Althusser is saying here is that there is no “pure” form of class antagonism; the 
latter is always immersed in local “customs [and] specific … traditions” all of which are 
“specified by the internal and external historical situation” (ibid: 106; original 
emphasis). The economic base (i.e. the structure or mode of production comprised of 
the forces and relations of production) remains determinant but only in the last instance, 
in the long run of History. In the meantime our task is to investigate the specific 
relationship between this base and the superstructure (the State, the legal, political and 
ideological apparatuses) in its changing historical circumstances, and identify the 
obstacles to achieving class consciousness (ibid: 111-2). Althusser's best known 
contribution to this project is his essay on “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” 
(1971), where he addresses the role of religion and the state - expressed through such 
mechanisms as the police, the church, education or the various bureaucratic 
manifestations of civil society - in the reproduction of class inequality. The reproduction 
and supply of labour power, he famously insisted, did not just require the reproduction 
of its skills, but also, “at the same time, reproduction of its submission to the rules of the 
established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the 
workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for 
the agents of exploitation and repression” (1971: 132-133). What ideological 
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apparatuses do, is establish the ideological system within which subjects can recognize 
themselves in the subject categories required by capital. Althusser dubs this act of 
recognition, “interpellation, or hailing” which can be portrayed using the commonplace 
hailing such as “Hey you there!” 
“Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed 
individual will turn round. By this mere one hundred-and-eighty-degree physical 
conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was 
'really' addressed to him (sic), and that 'it was really him who was hailed' (and not 
someone else)” (Althusser 1971: 174-5). 
Althusser’s great contribution was to point the way in which language and ideology 
determine social practice by shaping subjectivity and his writings influenced a 
generation of thinkers who found in his treatment of class, ideology and consciousness a 
fruitful analytical approach to the relationship between local cultures and class 
hierarchies. Nonetheless, his assumptions about the top down homogenous operations 
of ideology proved to be as controversial as the implicit claim that only through 
(Althusserian) philosophy could a critique of ideology be made possible, and that it 
alone possessed the theoretical and scientific tools to demystify knowledge that would 
otherwise relapse into ideological tantrums. In his model, ruling elites prepare subject 
categories in advance and use state apparatuses to recruit subjects, and they recruit them 
all (ibid: 174). The subject has no power to respond to the call with variation or to even 
reject it altogether. Yet Althusser’s closed structural model never quite explains why the 
hailing work so well and reach its target unvitiated. It is precisely this gap between the 
hailing and the internalization of the call that is exploited by his critics as the space that 
opens up the possibility for resistance where one can rebel, elude or ignore the 
interpellation. 
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For example, Willis' (1981) ethnography of a West-Midlands school in the UK shows 
how local working class “lads” learn to value local traditions of manual labour above 
middle class “clean” office jobs (148). They relied on alternative definitions of respect, 
work and sociability that challenge, or, “penetrate” the ideology of disciplining school 
structures that emphasize educational achievement and “modern” white collar skilled 
work. On the one hand, these forms of resistance simultaneously reproduce gendered 
patterns of inequality as well as play into the hands of international capital dependent on 
the willing supply of manual labour. In Willis words “it is in the form of creative 
penetrations that cultures live their own damnations and that … working class kids 
condemn themselves to a future of manual work” (1981: 174; my emphasis). Local 
culture thus presents itself as a 'false consciousness', tainted by the ideology of the 
dominant and offering a false sense of empowerment that ends up in the service of 
international capital. Drawing on Althusser and Gramsci, central to Willis’ thought is 
the notion of consent as an instrument for the reproduction of uneven relations of 
production (Gramsci 1992: 266). 
Departing from Althusser however, Willis does not approach ideology as total and 
unidirectional (top to bottom), but instead demonstrates how the “lads” are capable of 
subverting official dogma. By demonstrating the capacity for “partial penetrations” 
Willis remains open to the possibility for cultural practices to make more substantial 
challenges to the ideology of the dominant by the “reordering of social signification” 
(Willis 2000: 36). For Willis, any breaks or reversals in the “ideological chain” always 
carry “important connections with, and crucial reproductive functions with respect to, 
the rest of the social system” (Willis 1981: 179). In other words, cultural penetrations, 
albeit partial, find their reflections in the larger whole of which they are a part. This is 
an important point for this thesis, in which I will pay specific attention to the 
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relationship between class and culture; or, the way in which the culturally informed 
practices of industrial labourers often impede the operations of market rationality by, for 
example, valuing mutuality over individuality. But before I proceed, we need to develop 
this idea in more detail.  
 
1.2.1 The Idea of a “Moral Economy” 
This reference to the possibilities of culture acting as a platform for resistance has been 
more developed in the writings of E. P. Thompson and James C. Scott, particularly 
through the concept of “moral economies”. Thompson is perhaps the most responsible 
for popularizing the term through his analysis of the bread riots of eighteenth century 
England, where he challenged the idea that they could be reduced to price increases and 
actual deprivation. Instead, he highlighted the popular consensus among the rioters 
(colliers, tinners, weavers and hosiery workers) about what is right and wrong in their 
social sphere. “Rioting” says Thompson, cannot be explained away as mere “rebellions 
of the belly” that reduces people to biological machines that spontaneously erupt into a 
mob whenever food prices go up (1971: 77). People certainly go hungry but what they 
do when this happens is always modified by “custom, culture and reason” that offer 
legitimacy to their actions in the face of hunger (ibid: 78). Consequently, eighteenth 
century crowds were not only informed by the belief that “defending traditional rights 
and customs” but also “that they were supported by the wider consensus of the 
community (ibid). Notions of ‘need’ and ‘reasonable price’ were at the centre of their 
moral value system in which economic activities were also integrated (Hann 2010: 190). 
Opposition to capitalism did not take place on strictly economic terms (exploitation of 
surplus labour etc.) but as a “resistance to capitalism’s innate tendency to reduce all 
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human relationships to economic definitions” (Thompson 1979: 84) - a resistance to the 
annunciation of homo economicus (ibid).  
James Scott picked up on Thompson’s lead and was one of the first to employ the 
concept of moral economy as an analytical tool in his study of peasants in Southeast 
Asia, where he emphasized a strong communal ethic which prioritized the subsistence 
of all members of the local community (Hann 191: 2010; Scott 1976: 1-4). Scott did not 
necessarily see peasant culture as a holy grail that, when disturbed, immediately 
provokes peasants into open rebellion against the elites. He was rather more concerned 
with the specific conditions under which the moral and the economic may converge 
with other social factors and historical circumstances to inspire rebellion (Scott 1976: 
4). He did however treat local peasant culture as a repository of values where ideas and 
representations of “an alternative moral [and just] universe” or a “dissident subculture” 
that unites its members into a human “community of values” are preserved and nurtured 
(ibid: 240).  
For both Scott and Thompson however, the idea of a moral economy presumes a shared 
consensus between members of the community regarding the values it espouses. 
Moreover, in both cases we are dealing with subjects of a Marxist analysis whose moral 
economy constitutes a nexus of beliefs and practices conducive to progressive action 
against the powers that be. In other words, one can easily deduce the language of class 
conflict and interest from this formulation and, as Edelman notes, Thompson considered 
the concept of moral economies to have little currency outside of a wider framework of 
conflictual class relations (Edelman 2012: 60). Thompson’s understanding of class is far 
from rigid and he defines the latter in terms of a process rather than a finished product - 
hence the emphasis on “Making” in his celebrated “The Making of the English Working 
Class” (1964). To refer to a lengthier quote: 
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“Class is a social and cultural formation (often finding institutional expression) which 
cannot be defined abstractly, or in isolation, but only in terms of relationship with other 
classes; and, ultimately, the definition can only be made in the medium of time – that is, 
action and reaction, change and conflict. When we speak of a class we are thinking of a 
very loosely defined body of people who share the same categories of interests, social 
experiences, traditions and value-system, who have a disposition to behave as a class, to 
define themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in relation to other groups 
of people in class ways. But class itself is not a thing, it is a happening” (Thompson 
1979: 85).  
This definition of class allows Thompson a number of strategic advantages. Firstly he 
treats social and cultural phenomena on an equal footing with the economic and does 
not necessarily see the latter as determinant “in the last instance”, hence his emphasis on 
a wide range of factors that define the social body of a class. What Thompson insists on, 
is maintaining his opposition to any form of reification of the notion of “class” as an 
entity in-itself that we can take for granted by mere virtue of its economic position in 
the relations of production. If we do so, we allow language to lead us into fetishistic 
discussions of “classes” doing this or that and “forget exactly where agency lies, not in 
class but in men (sic)” (1979: 86). The emphasis on acts of everyday human agency is 
precisely what distinguishes Thompson from Althusser’s concern with the all 
pervasiveness of ideology and the institutions of the elite. Workers and peasants are, 
Thompson says, quite capable of having an “ideology” of their own, one that more often 
than not refuses to fit in with the designs of the powerful and as such is important for 
“the way in which class relations are negotiated” (1991: 344).  In other words, the 
traditions of “dead generations” need not weigh “like a nightmare on the brains of the 
living” (see Marx [1852] 2000: 229) and might in fact carry the seeds of progressive 
politics. We can see much of this process coming to life in contemporary Macedonia 
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where the widespread refusal to internalize the principles of homo-economicus draws 
upon past experiences of the moral economy of socialism. Workers often rely on their 
experiences of alternative economic orders to critically reflect, and comment upon, the 
material and symbolic decline of the socialist working class that brought about a wave 
of precarity and the emergence of new elites. More often than not such reflections entail 
a moral commentary on the ethics of the neoliberal turn, which is largely experienced as 
transgressive and a violation of established norms and values of mutuality and equity.  
 
1.2.2 Polanyi and the Concept of “Embeddedness” 
But if Thompson’s neo-Marxist approach has opened up the category of class to 
historical and social analysis, it has been less productive in its treatment of culture. The 
emphasis on consensus and a fluid yet binding system of values that somehow manages 
to pit “poor” against “rich” does open his approach to criticism. Being a system of 
beliefs and practices one can easily deduce that a moral economy can be conducive to 
reactionary, nationalist behaviour among members of the same “class”. Owing mainly 
to the difficulty of disentangling culture from Marxist notions of class, Thompson’s 
“moral economy” has lost much of its original meaning wherever it has not fallen out of 
use altogether. Conversely, anthropologists have found a much more enduring 
intellectual influence in the figure of Karl Polanyi. In his seminal work, The Great 
Transformation, Polanyi, much like Thompson, argued against the formalism of 
neoclassical economists that saw economic activity as inherently independent and 
detached from the wider moral networks of “society”. Polanyi relied on a great deal of 
anthropological literature to demonstrate that in societies where market driven economic 
models had not yet prevailed, economic activity is integrated into the wider value 
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system of a given society and linked to local ideas of reciprocity, redistribution and 
householding (2001: 57). The purpose of economic activity in this pre-market 
dominated system was to satisfy substantive human needs and not to maximize the self-
interest of the individual. This type of socially embedded economy was, he argued, the 
“natural” state of things, and that the emergence of “self-regulating” markets was the 
result of a concentrated effort by states to create such an institution.    
Consequently, Polanyi interpreted the history of 19th and 20th century Europe as a pull 
and tug struggle between market forces on the one end and social forces on the other. 
The crucial difference with Thompson however is that for Polanyi, “society” stands for 
something altogether more politically multifarious than the notion of “class struggle” 
can bear. The ideology of self-regulating markets does not so much wage a class war as 
it threatens to destroy the very fabric of society by disembedding economic activity 
from the socially defined needs of human beings (Polanyi 2001: 151). The inherent 
tensions in the “double movement” between market and society and the disembedding 
of the economy, can produce a variety of responses only some of which can be 
“socialist-progressive” in nature, whereas others can be profoundly reactionary and 
nationalistic. “Fascism”, Polanyi writes, “like socialism, was rooted in a market society 
that refused to function” (ibid: 248). It was itself a response to issues that “transcended 
the economic sphere and begot a general transformation of a distinctively social kind” 
(ibid).  
Anticipating Polanyi, Marcuse already in 1934 described the worldview of fascism as “a 
great reservoir for all the currents that have been deluging ‘liberalist’ political and social 
theory since World War I” (Marcuse [1934] 2009: 1). For illustration Marcuse draws 
attention to a quote from the Nazi educationalist Ernst Krieck: 
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“Blood rises up against formal understanding, race against the rational pursuit of ends, 
honor against profit, bonds against the caprice that is called ‘freedom’, organic totality 
against individualistic dissolution, valor against bourgeois security, politics against the 
primacy of the economy, state against society, folk against the individual and the mass.” 
Marcuse of course writes from a Marxist perspective and his main intention here is to 
demonstrate that the anti-liberal element of fascism is peripheral and that fascist 
ideology only succeeds in reviling the merchant by leaving intact the “foundations of 
the economic order” (ibid: 7). The point which remains is that it would be misleading to 
assume that as soon as the “moral” enters the economic process it is somehow 
inherently opposed to the amorality of market forces. Indeed, as Max Weber (1992) 
famously argued, they may not necessarily be two different things to begin with.  
To draw on a more contemporary post-socialist example to illustrate this point, we can 
briefly turn to Hann’s study of the decollectivization of agriculture in Hungary (2010: 
195). Namely, the initial collectivization process by the Communists was viewed by 
most villagers as a violent intervention in the established norms of private property. The 
Independent Smallholders’ Party (ISP), which enjoyed great popularity for its 
opposition to the collectivization process in the forties, was eliminated during the 
harsher years of socialism, only to re-emerge in the nineties with a revived agenda for 
the restoration of private ownership. By this time however the agricultural community 
had mixed emotions about how to handle the de-collectivization process. Many had 
been nostalgic about the socialist arrangement which allowed for individuals to prosper 
as a result of their hard work, yet provided a cushion for the weaker labourers. The 
supporters of privatization argued for the return of pre-collectivization plot boundaries 
and stressed the moral and emotional attachment to their patrimony. As a result the ISP 
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split into several factions and many of its former members now vote for extreme right 
wing parties (Hann 2010: 195).  
What Hann demonstrates is that there is no reason to assume that popular culture and 
“traditional value-systems” are either a binding or a progressive force in opposition to 
capital. In my own work I often found workers confronting the negative consequences 
of the neoliberalist transformation by resorting to a variety of “moral” strategies that 
relied on national sentiments, as much as on a culture of patriarchy and metaphors of 
kinship, which often acted against their corporate class interests and facilitated the 
reform of the welfare state and the dominance of economic elites. In other words, 
whereas the moral operations of “society” can prevent the emergence of the “purely 
economical” they are less likely to prevent the relative alienation of economic 
institutions within the wider relations of production (Mollona 2009: 43). To understand 
this we need to have a deeper look at the ways in which economic practices operate 
within and throughout the symbolics and politics of culture.  
 
1.2.3 Culture and Domination in the Work of Pierre Bourdieu 
The main advantage of Polanyi’s approach is that it allows for a much more politically 
open-ended analysis of the interplay between social and economic factors in a given 
setting. It is precisely this interplay that informs the sociological writings of Pierre 
Bourdieu, who treats every form of social practice, including economic, as inseparable 
from the wider “social order in which all human practice is immersed” (Bourdieu 2005: 
1). This much corresponds to the Polanyian notion of “embeddedness”, however for 
Bourdieu the main political field is not located in the “double movement” but within the 
social structures of which economic practice partakes, or what he terms habitus.  
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By habitus, Bourdieu means the inculcation of sets of durable dispositions (habits) that 
lead to particular practices that in turn (re)produce the conditions for their reproduction 
(1977: 78). These dispositions do not lead to some conscious submission to rules,  but to 
an unconscious and tacit compliance with  the doxa of a social order, by which he 
means the naturalized and unquestionable social arrangement that denies the very 
possibility of imagining alternatives (ibid: 164). This structuralist argument is not 
entirely circular and Bourdieu allows for the possibility of heterodoxy as a challenge to 
doxa, against which the established order must respond by reasserting itself in a new 
orthodoxy. However, by forcing the established order to speak in its own defence, 
orthodoxy by implication posits the guardians of tradition as simply one possible option 
among others and is itself “a necessarily imperfect substitute” for doxa (ibid: 169).  
The habitus of social life appears in different forms relative to the particular social 'field' 
it animates. A field is a system of social relations (political field, religious field, 
philosophical field etc.) in which institutions or individuals compete for certain prizes or 
stakes whose value is set by the field's internal logic (Bourdieu 1995: 72). The 
scholastic field would thus prescribe the highest value to scholastically certified cultural 
capital which is irreducible to the specific interests and capital generated in another field 
(e.g. philosophers do not compete for prizes that interest textile workers etc.) (ibid). The 
accumulation of these prizes increases the overall “symbolic capital” of an agent. 
Symbolic capital is a form of power not recognized as power which allows one to make 
“legitimate demands for recognition, deference, obedience or the services of others” and 
enhances one’s capacity to define and defend the orthodoxy, i.e. the rules of the game 
within a specific field (Swartz 1997: 90). Each field has its own antagonism between 
those in power that defend orthodoxy and those that aspire to subvert the power 
structure hence introducing heterodoxy. But as long as the antagonists are in tacit 
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agreement about “what is it that is worth fighting about” they share the same state of 
doxa with all the unquestioned presuppositions they unwittingly accept (ibid: 73). 
We should point out three important points that characterise Bourdieu's ideas. Firstly, 
his mechanistic and economistic treatment of culture which he engages with in ways 
similar to those in which a Marxist tradition would engage with material economies, i.e. 
the central role of culture in maintaining social hierarchies. Secondly, because of his 
mechanistic and practice oriented approach Bourdieu is not terribly concerned with 
questions of consciousness, representation and imagination (Bourdieu 1994: 267-8). 
The actions of individuals need not be validated at the level of consciousness, but by a 
tacit compliance with all “that which goes without saying”; with the rules and principles 
of a game whose very foundations are never challenged by the “partial revolutions” of 
heterodoxy (1995: 73). Lastly, with consciousness side-lined, centrality is given to the 
bodily practice and the way in which social structures are inscribed onto and appropriate 
the body which is thus rendered capable to engage with and appropriate its social 
surroundings (1977: 89).   
It is obvious that Bourdieu is not terribly sympathetic to Marxist visions of a unified 
working class, conscious of its shared interests and acting 'for itself' to achieve these. 
The mechanisms of the habitus and the atomization of the social cosmos into various 
“fields”, each with their own logic, where individuals compete for different types of 
capital (cultural, economic, social, symbolic), have profound implications for his 
understanding of class. According to Bourdieu, ‘class’ cannot be defined only by a 
subject's position in the relations of production, or by occupation, but by a whole gamut 
of factors including gender, social and ethnic origin, age and geographical location, all 
of which determine principles of selection and exclusion, without necessarily being 
formally stated (1998: 102-3). Consequently, any attempt to define the contours of the 
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social category of say, textile workers, by focusing only on occupation at the expense of 
all other factors can lead to crude analytical errors and obscure the extent to which the 
class ‘is becoming “feminized” or “masculinized”, growing older or younger’ more or 
less educated etc. (ibid).  
Moreover, he finds the Althusserian treatment of ideology as similarly unproductive 
insofar as ideology, even in its various socio-historical manifestations is always of and 
presupposes the state and insofar as those manifestations are in the long run, 
overdetermined by the economic structure. Rather than a grand analysis of “ideology 
and state apparatuses” Bourdieu is more concerned with the specific mechanisms by 
which culture informs the everyday practices of people, or the way in which symbolic 
power structures and legitimates a particular social reality. Even though the symbolic 
can be used to legitimize economic exploitation it is not reducible to the economic. 
Rather, “symbolic practices deflect attention from the interested character of practices 
and thereby contribute to their enactment as disinterested pursuits. This misperception 
legitimizes these practices and thereby contributes to the reproduction of the social 
order in which they are embedded” (Swartz 1997: 90).  
Bourdieu’s approach is particularly useful for my analysis of the symbolic struggles 
taking place in the terrain of post-socialism in order to legitimize and normalize 
emerging distinctions, but also for the way in which workers articulate “class” as 
something that transcends a shared position in the relations of production. While at a 
certain level workers do recognize their shared fate on the assembly line, they juggle 
this commensurability with distinctions between workers that arise on the basis of 
gender, ethnicity, education, tastes and mannerisms and age. Women for example are 
usually seen as docile and passive by male co-workers, hence unfit for political action. 
University educated workers who mourn having to do long hours of manual labour do 
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not necessarily identify with the plight of semi-literate workers of a peasant origin. 
Horizontal solidarity, where it does occur, is not a taken for granted product of a shared 
class identity but a fleeting negotiation of differences and hierarchies that become more 
or less relevant in different contexts. Likewise, vertical relations between dominant 
classes and workers are not by definition antagonistic and require a great deal of 
symbolic and cultural legitimation that involves all sides. By following the operations of 
symbolic power we can explore how and when certain distinctions between persons 
based on economic, social and cultural capital are constructed, normalized and 
challenged. The owner of the factory where I did my fieldwork, for example, engages in 
a particular set of practices that distinguish him in terms of dress, social movements, 
consumption patterns that create a sense of distinction and class separation from 
“common” workers without necessarily provoking antagonisms. In other words, class is 
something that is often experienced, articulated and embodied in ways that cannot be 
reduced to economic factors.  
 
1.2.4 Foucault and the Productivity of Power 
The overbearing power of culture and its central role in the reproduction of structures of 
domination in the work of Bourdieu, deals a heavy blow to any conceptualization of 
politics as an arena where the down-and-out always seem to be conjuring up values, 
identities and practices that keep outflanking the capitalist rear-guard. However, the 
main weakness of Bourdieu’s powerful conceptual strategy is to be found precisely in 
his overemphasis on power as a reproductive force and his insufficient attention to the 
productive capacity of power. This latter point has been the key concern in the work of 
Michel Foucault for whom power is never merely repressive. Foucault approaches 
32 
 
power as “a productive network that runs through the whole social body” and works, or 
is “accepted” because it “produces things, induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, 
produces discourse” (Foucault 1984: 61). Resistance, insofar as it occurs, does not stand 
in opposition to power but operates through and within existing systems of power and 
repression. Framing the argument in this way allows Foucault to treat modern power as 
a decentered conglomerate of affiliations, antagonisms and exchanges where the task of 
governing is reduced to carving out the space and defining the techniques of 
intervention into what is already a more or less self-creating sphere (Burchell 1993: 
267). In fact the very notion of a Centre of Power (government) is made redundant in 
favour of a field of interaction between the self-regulating practices of individuals and 
the rationality that informs the guiding hand of government. In Foucault’s words:  
“… if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization … 
He has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of 
individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual 
acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the 
techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination. 
The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they 
conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government” (in, Lemke 2002: 
52-3). 
Power, or the power to govern is reduced to the guidance of self-governing individuals; 
the carving out of the limits of possible action of subjects which is itself a process 
where subjects are active participants instead of passive recipients. This approach has 
been adopted by Aihwa Ong in her classic ethnography of spirit possessions in a 
Malaysian shoe factory where she explores the friction between encroaching global 
neoliberal regimes of power and local culture. Through this interplay of the global and 
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the local Ong seeks to challenge Marxist assumptions that relations of production have 
an over-determining effect on the identity of workers, and focus instead on the 
“imaginative life [on] the factory floor” (Ong 1987: xiv).  When looking at the lives of 
shop floor workers, Ong suggests that “cultural concepts are not the mere 
epiphenomena of class power or cultural values but are constituting knowledge/power 
systems producing the ‘truths’ whereby we live our lives” (1987: 180). 
 
A brief summary of her ethnographic argument will be made here in order to tease out 
some the themes that will inform this thesis.  
As a response to growing social tensions over the distribution of power in Malaysian 
society in the seventies, the Malaysian government decided to implement various 
agricultural and industrialization programs that drew Malay men and women away from 
the traditional village compounds and into urban schools and foreign owned 
manufacturing plants. Because they were perceived as cheap and easily controlled 
labour, within a decade almost fifty thousand mostly unmarried Malay women came to 
fill the ranks of assembly line workers. Once in the factories however, Malay women 
proved much more difficult to discipline than expected. Quiescent workers would burst 
into fits of rage and screaming caused by sudden spirit attacks, causing stoppages in 
production. For Ong, spirits represent transgressions of moral boundaries precisely 
because they are disembodied beings unbound by human rules (Ong 1988: 30). As such, 
they manifest themselves to those who venture into amoral spaces and attack people 
who “unknowingly step out of the Malay social order” (ibid: 31).  Once removed from 
the traditional village environment, young women in factories often found themselves in 
spaces where the traditional moral boundaries that sustained personal integrity and 
regulated the interaction between men and women no longer applied. 
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Ong interprets the bouts of spirit possessions in factories as  a protest against changing 
social relations brought about by the process of industrial capitalism as a result of which 
workers become “alienated from their bodies, the products of their work and their own 
culture” (ibid 38). They are a way of articulating what cannot be said publicly, that is, a 
call for the renegotiation of social relationships on the shop floor between management 
and workers in ways that are less dehumanizing for the latter. For Ong however, the 
resistance expressed by workers is not geared against capitalist accumulation as such, 
but is more an opposition to the loss of autonomy and local notions of personhood. The 
values that inform this opposition are extra-economic and furnish a moral critique of the 
violation of the “fundamental humanity” of Malay workers through the production 
process. It is this culturally informed moral critique of personal degradation that factory 
managers are forced to deal with to their inconvenience. Whatever empowerment 
workers possess does not seem to derive just from the economic but, as with Thompson 
and Scott, from the cultural. Yet Ong moves away from them in the crucial sense that 
she is not inclined to pair the value system of Malay women with any notion of class. 
Malay women have no “class consciousness” (ibid: 194) but that does not mean we 
should assume that they are “over-determined” by their insertion in the capitalist 
production process. At the imaginative level, they are still able to forge novel and often 
unexpected subjectivities. In other words, resistance is always played out within and 
throughout forms of power and domination rather than “outside” of them. This is 
Foucault’s key contribution to the understanding of power brought to full fruition and to 
the dismay of the cultural studies approach that insists on maintaining the notion of 
class struggle as the centripetal force of social antagonism, for which the possibility of 
acting outside of the mediated forms of capital is a necessary corollary of political 
action. 
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Whereas Thompson does see the weak and the powerful as mutually constitutive, he 
sees them as such in terms of class, which is what he means when he says that classes 
always exist in their relation to other classes. For Thompson the social history of 
eighteenth century England can be seen as a series of moral and cultural confrontations 
between the “plebs” and the “gentry and clergy” through which class distinctions are 
historically crystallized. If he sees the immersion of the labouring poor into industrial 
capitalism as empowering, it is only in so in the sense of helping to foster a new “class 
consciousness”. Ong’s departure is subtle yet of great consequence. Resistance to 
capitalism may indeed occur and does occur among Malaysian workers. But one does 
not find there Thompson’s miners and railwaymen struggling for reform inspired by an 
imagined “totality of an egalitarian socialist society” (1978: 144). Resistance to 
capitalism need not be about socialist reform led by class awareness, but about the 
negotiation of cultural values and social boundaries that constitute a particular 
experience of personhood as a moral force. Ong’s focus on socio-economic 
transformation and the renegotiation of personhood within liminal moral zones is of 
particular importance for this thesis. As we shall see, many of the conflicts and debates 
emerging from the transformation of Macedonia’s social and economic landscape touch 
upon and unsettle the integrity of the moral self, which produces zones of friction where 
the refusal to internalize change is channeled within systems of power and domination 
rather than outside of them. For example, a key argument in this thesis is that workers, 
more often than not, seek to change the contours of hierarchy and inequality in ways 
that correspond to their moral economy and conceptions of personhood.  
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1.3 Liminality and Abjection 
The approaches outlined above are to an extent all concerned with the social and 
cultural management of economic transition (feudalism to capitalism, socialism to 
neoliberalism, peasants to factories etc.). On the one hand we have the various 
operations of control that accompany this transition (ideological interpellation, 
consensus, habitus, governmentality etc.) and on the other something we may call 
resistance, whether in the form of culture, class or subjectivity, which are not exclusive 
but produce each other. This thesis will try to speak to this tension as it unfolds through 
the various transitions that have taken and are still taking place in post-socialist 
Macedonia. The thread of the argument will oscillate between four main points: first, 
the prevalence of perceptions of the economy as an embedded activity bounded by 
social relations of mutuality and redistribution; second, the historically changing ways 
in which the argument for embeddedness is being articulated by workers deprived of the 
currency of socialism and class as rallying points; third, the specific consequences this 
has for the articulation and integrity of the moral person; and fourth, the political 
challenge this poses for the state and the centripetal forces of neoliberalism, particularly 
efforts to wither away the welfare state and introduce the arrival of homo-economicus. I 
use the latter term duplicitously to refer to neoliberalism both as an “art of government” 
in the Foucauldian sense (neoliberal rationality), and to the process of liberalization, 
marketization and state withdrawal that succeeded the socialist project (neoliberal 
capitalism) (see Ferguson 2009). 
I suggest that act of rejection of socialism can be seen as part of the ritual unmaking of a 
social structure and the specific subjects that populate it. One useful way to approach 
this is through Turner’s reworking of Van Gennep’s concept of liminality. Van Gennep 
(1960) challenged the naturalist models of human development of his day by 
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demonstrating that the “journey through life” and the various transitions from one social 
position to another was never complete unless socially sanctioned through a carefully 
orchestrated ritual process. He dubbed this process the “rites of passage” and separated 
its functions into three distinct stages: separation, margin and aggregation. In the first 
stage an individual is detached from her existing place in the structure, in the second 
(liminal) phase she acquires ambiguous characteristics, belonging neither to the 
previous nor the coming state; and the third stage the person is reincorporated in a new 
stable social position. Turner took on the middle liminal stage as much more than 
merely one more necessary component for reproducing structure. He writes that people 
resort to a variety of systems of classification that “keep chaos at bay” whilst in the 
process stifling discovery and innovation. Yet guided by the “need” to “live breathe and 
generate novelty” they create “by structural means” an “antistructural” liminal space 
where novel “suppositions, desires, hypotheses, possibilities all become legitimate” 
(Turner 1991: vii). Liminality is thus important not only in the ritual transition of 
subjects from one social position to another within the structure, but also for introducing 
unforeseen changes to that structure.  
Though I find certain elements of Turner’s model useful, particularly the emphasis on 
liminality as the site of uncharted possibilities, there are others that I expressly wish to 
reject; such as the implicit teleological modernism that sees liminality as part of а 
historical forward movement, oscillating between stable structure and controlled chaos. 
Also I find problematic Turner’s assertion that the transition of the subject is almost 
always a social movement from “low” to “high” (ibid: 197). To proceed along these 
lines would be to tell the story of how the old “worker” had to be undone or separated 
from the socialist system and tossed into an anti-structural liminal stage (of precarious 
unemployment), where subjects are neither what they were (the failed vanguard of 
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socialism) nor what are yet to become (free and prosperous entrepreneurs). Finally, 
order would be restored based on the ethics of market behaviour and everyone will 
assume their place in the new and improved system. To do this would be to fall right 
into the teleological web of the great neoliberal transformation (or even that of the 
socialist modernism preceding it). 
I take a hint from Ferguson here in assuming a non-linear, non-teleological approach in 
order to “follow a range of reactions and strategies that shift over time in ways that do 
not sustain a simple linear narration” (1999: 20). From the standpoint of people caught 
up in the transition, liminality itself appears as the new norm. One popular joke frames 
this well: ‘The finance minister said Macedonia will not be affected by the global crisis. 
We’re already in a crisis for twenty years now!’ The seemingly endless perpetuation of 
this precarious state of affairs is seen as absurd and people seem perpetually caught in a 
state of flux. In contrast, by-gone socialist times have mnemonically crystalized as the 
loci of stability and abundance. When making inquiries about socialism people often 
told me that “Back then you would be given work [always] according to your 
qualifications.” The wording is important here. One did not find work during socialism, 
one was given it by the state which had the moral responsibility and authority to 
delegate employment in accordance with people’s needs and abilities. It was the big 
Other guaranteeing a semblance of order that has now withdrawn to the much humbler 
role of a distant administrator. In other narrative reconstructions of the past it was the 
loss of the socialist firm that went hand in hand with the disruption of the 
developmental cycle of families and the dis-ordering of public space. As one of my 
neighbours put it when referring to the demise of Astibo, the local garment producing 
giant: 
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“All the workers there knew that there was always work there for their children. They 
even gave out stipends for the workers’ children to go on studies. But all of their kids had 
a guaranteed job there. Such a nice place it was, the town really was a beautiful place. 
Everything was clean and tidy. Now it’s all shabby and filthy it makes my soul cry. We 
were the regional center before and now all the nearby towns are ahead of us, we’re the 
forgotten place.” 
With the cycle in tatters, new flexible labour regimes have introduced a kind of 
“permanent state of economic emergency” (Žižek 2010) but also a crisis of personhood 
(Cohen 1974: 58). No longer the vanguard of society and lacking a clear narrative and 
symbolic subject position in the new order, workers struggle with the subjective 
experience of becoming “matter out of place” (Douglas [1966] 2001: 36), in many ways 
resembling those lost souls in the senseless hallways of Fredric Jameson’s swanky 
Westin Bonaventura Hotel (Ortner 2005: 45). Jameson is here basically referring to the 
stultifying effects of alienation in late capitalism, characterized by social confusion and 
spatial disorder, which has the makings of a world drained of meaning and affect and 
populated by disoriented subjects devoid of historical purpose (Jameson 1984).  
There are certainly traces of these effects in the landscape of post-socialist Macedonia. 
In her book titled Waiting for Macedonia that focused on a group of young female 
engineers in Skopje in the period from 1988 to 1996, Ilka Thiessen writes that the 
Beckett-inspired title sprang from the way in which people of different backgrounds 
recounted their experiences of postsocialism and post-Yugoslavism. Much like the 
famous play, the starting (and ending) point is a resounding “Nothing to be done”. 
Macedonia is “a non-subject of action, from neither the inside nor the outside: the story 
of Macedonia neither creates nor resolves conflicts, does not develop either ethical or 
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political programs of reform, and it does not offer meaning for its human existence. 
Every interpretation is null. There is no direction and no aim” (Thiessen 2007: 14).  
For many Macedonians, Yugoslav membership was the tether connecting them to a 
European community of civilization, progress and modernity as opposed to the dark 
pre-Yugoslav, orientalist history of a backward peasantry dominated by Ottoman rule 
(Thiessen 2007: 35; Graan 2010: 838). The demise of Yugoslav socialism and the 
‘transition’ towards an imagined European future of economic prosperity and job 
security that will resurrect the middle class consumer, has made the present appear as a 
liminal phase filled with disorder and insecurity but also with desires of reconstitution 
(Turner 1991: vii). Ferguson has defined the experience of people caught up in this 
process as one of abjection, a term adapted from Kristeva, signifying a process “of 
being thrown aside, expelled or discarded … but … also being thrown down – thus 
expulsion, but also debasement and humiliation” (Ferguson 1999: 236). This implies the 
loss, rather than the lack of a world of amenities and the loss of a sense of 
connectedness with a larger world of modern “first class citizens”.  
This experience becomes particularly visible through the breakdown of the myth of 
linear modernization in the face of total economic collapse. A “myth” is after all “not 
just a mistaken account” of reality, “but a cosmological blueprint that lays down 
fundamental categories and meanings for the organization of experience” (Ferguson 
1999: 13). It is in this sense that we can follow Verdery in approaching post-socialist 
change as a “problem of reorganization on a cosmic scale” that involves the “reordering 
of people’s entire meaningful worlds … including morality, social relations and basic 
meanings” (1999: 35). On the one hand this experience augments their sense of 
precarious insecurity and can be politically demobilizing. On the other hand workers do 
not remain entirely passive and people are everyday caught in a struggle “to make sense 
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of their experience and to find new ways of conceptualizing the broad social and 
economic changes that rock their lives” (Ferguson 1999: 14). As Anderson contends, it 
is precisely when subjects reflect on their involvement in a situation of absurdity that 
they begin to open up the individual or collective imagination to the possibility of 
alternatives (2013: 478). But what might such alternatives be and what kinds of political 
subjects do they involve in the case of post-socialist Macedonia? 
 
1.4 Dependent Persons 
In a recent essay James Ferguson (2013) has suggested that we re-examine our 
established preconceptions of personhood that rest on the presumably cross-cultural 
value of individual autonomy and self-sufficiency. He points to the somewhat 
surprisingly common practice in post-apartheid South Africa where people are "openly 
pursuing a subordinate and dependent status"; and instead of resisting "hierarchical 
subordination" people are actively seeking it out (ibid: 224). The reason we look at such 
practices as disturbing leftovers of colonial mentality is to be found precisely in the 
history of anti-oppressive struggles in which we are invited to equate human dignity 
with autonomy and independence. Consequently, dependence, as it moves up the scale, 
becomes a process of dehumanization or degradation. The trouble with this view is that 
it rests upon a specific understanding of personhood in which authentic human beings 
are seen as holistic individuals who ought to be able to fully govern their own selves. In 
contrast he says, in many parts of Africa persons have historically never been 
understood as monadic individuals, "but as nodes in systems of relationships" that are 
more often than not of an explicitly hierarchical nature. In other words, the person does 
not precede the relations of dependence in which she enters but is constituted by those 
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very relations. It is precisely through networks of dependence that one becomes 
incorporated into a social system within which one could be recognized as holding a 
valued social position, with opportunities for improving it (ibid: 227). Outside of such 
relations you are a “nobody”, a person of no consequence.  
My analysis will show that the specific economic culture nurtured by socialism rests on 
a similar understanding of personhood. I will argue that what held the system together 
was not the successful internalization of the ideology of a workers’ democracy, but a 
complex web of interdependencies between workers, technocrats and the state within 
the framework of a redistributive "moral economy" geared towards the satisfaction of 
substantive human needs. Being part of this network meant being someone, or being 
recognized as a moral person in relation to others and with certain rights to make claims 
on those others. In other words, persons during socialism were not constituted as 
monadic individuals but as “dividuals” which requires seeing persons as “constructed as 
the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them” (Strathern 1990: 
13). Through their position within socialist firms and the moral economy of 
redistribution workers were to a great extent able to operate on themselves by operating 
on others, whether co-workers or superiors in the form of managerial technocrats or 
party officials, and thus satisfy both their moral and material needs (Dunn 2004).  
But it is precisely this kind of entanglement between the moral and the economic that 
was identified as an obstacle to post-socialist neoliberal reforms that sought to promote 
a new vision of the modern subject modelled on the image of the independent, risk 
taking entrepreneur. Macpherson has dubbed this specific kind of person the possessive 
individual and argued that the historical emergence of such a notion of personhood 
“corresponds substantially to the actual relations of a market society” (1962: 3-4). 
Within the realm of the latter individuals are seen as “owners” of their person and 
43 
 
capacities, independent from any larger social or moral whole. Such an understanding of 
personhood is an important precondition for imagining a model of a society where 
individuals freely exchange their capacities (e.g. labour power) and possessions on the 
market.  
The application of this model in post-socialist Macedonia however, has only tended to 
generate growing forms of inequality and precarity under the legitimizing veil of 
individualism. For example the rhetoric of individual responsibility has not only 
facilitated the withdrawal of the welfare state but is effectively deployed on the shop 
floor as a means of controlling labour. We might be tempted therefore to interpret the 
possessive individual, in Althusserian fashion, as an ideological subject category that 
recruits from the masses and reproduces the supply of labour for capital. The trouble 
with this approach is that, the “recruits”, more often than not, refuse to recognize 
themselves in that category when entering into relations with the new captains of 
industry. Moreover, not all of the labour released through the dispossession of the 
industrial commons enjoyed the prospects of reabsorption (particularly the old and 
“unskilled”), effectively reducing a great portion of the labouring population to what Li 
terms an unnecessary "surplus" to the requirements of capital accumulation (2009: 67). 
In other words, the privatization process did its utmost in "releasing" individuals from 
the shackles of a state controlled economy (the "webs of dependence") but it did not 
necessarily create the prospects of their re-absorption, and even when it did the 
integration took place on terms that were hardly acceptable for workers and are still 
being vigorously contested. Contra Althusser, we might say there were no “ready-
made” subject categories at the end of the process, and that besides subjects, a whole 
class of people found themselves as superfluous abjects, with no value recognized by 
capital.  
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The question then is, what happens to dividual persons in the context of post-socialism 
marked by excessive labour surplus and suffused with a neoliberal commitment to the 
monadic individual as the very basis for the concept of the "free entrepreneur"? My own 
research suggests that as the economy took a turn towards “disembedding”, the newly 
unemployed found themselves in pursuit of new forms of dependence in order to 
combat the prospects of remaining perilously unattached and unable to realize both their 
moral and economic needs. We can define these struggles, as Ferguson does, as 
attempts to shift their relationship to powerful others from a kind of “asocial inequality” 
brought about by the impersonality of the marketplace (i.e. exchanging labour for cash 
and leaving it at that), towards a form of “social inequality” (i.e. an enduring 
relationship in which the larger social and moral needs are also accounted for) 
(Ferguson 2013: 233). This may appear as a dubious distinction considering that when 
we speak of inequality, however conceived, we are usually speaking of some kind of 
relation between groups or individuals. In other words we are speaking about relations 
between human beings that are by some definition always "social". This much is 
certainly true, but what Ferguson means by "asocial inequality" is not something that 
occurs outside the scope of human relations, but a specific kind of relationship between 
human beings who do not relate to each other as members of a binding moral 
community (ibid: 233), i.e. where those who are dominated lack any social means to 
relate back to or make claims on the powerful. 
Following from this, I suggest that workers’ struggles, insofar as they exist in 
contemporary Macedonia, are not driven by the desire for autonomy but by a desire to 
become recognizable within some kind of imagined moral community. Such pursuits 
however differ in accordance with the way that workers interact with the needs of 
capital and their social position as it relates to differences in age, gender, education or 
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ethnicity. All of these factors open up different possibilities and limits to the pursuit of 
dependence by workers, who nonetheless share an underlying aversion to the arrival of 
homo-economicus. It is in these indeterminate struggles by people to contextualize and 
re-value themselves that we can look at the neoliberal transformation as a “productive” 
and “oppressive” at the same time.  
 
1.5 Language and the Moral Community 
In analysing the polyphony of workers voices and strategies it is important to pay close 
attention to the uses of language, particularly in the shaping of such a moral community 
and the corollary forms of personhood. In his speech act theory Austin suggests that 
language utterances can be “constative” (i.e. defined by their capacity to say something, 
describe reality and convey meaning), as well as “performative” in the sense that there 
is a world of utterances that mainly do something. Constative utterances can be true or 
false, logically consistent or inconsistent (“I am 30 years old”, “It is raining” etc.), 
whereas performative utterances deliver force and do not aim to describe reality but to 
act upon it and change it and can therefore be either “felicitous” or “infelicitous”. By 
this term Austin generally means “appropriate” or “well chosen for the circumstances” 
(Austin 1962: 15-16). In other words, they can only be “felicitous” if placed or used in 
the appropriate context, by which he means the open social setting with its existing 
conventions that include “the appropriate person uttering the appropriate words in the 
appropriate circumstances in order to obtain conventional results” (Yurchak 2005: 59).  
Austin lists a number of examples of performative utterances such as “I do” or “I name 
this ship Queen Elizabeth” that produce action and have effects. Thus the performative 
utterance “I do” can be “felicitous” if spoken at a specific ceremonial context of a 
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wedding and only if the person uttering the words is not already married in which case 
the results would be rather unconventional or “infelicitous”. Likewise, Austin says, if he 
were to approach a ship on the stocks and smashed the bottle hung at the stem, 
proclaiming “I name this ship the Mr. Stalin” his action would be with no social effect 
since he is not the person chosen to name it, nor did he apply the destined name. The 
action falls outside of accepted conventional procedure and is therefore “a mockery, like 
a marriage with a monkey” (Austin 1962: 24). 
For example a rather common performative utterance in Macedonia would be “Ова 
никаде го нема!” which roughly translates as “This does not occur anywhere!” and is 
akin to the English saying “This is unheard of!” It is usually said in order to publicly 
decry certain transgressions of order and morality or a violation of widely shared 
conventions of acceptable behaviour. The statement is not intended to be scrutinized for 
its truth value, and in any case, one can more often than not easily demonstrate that the 
said transgression is not particularly original, or that it has indeed occurred elsewhere. 
But this of course would be to miss the point. The statement is not meant to offer an 
accurate description of reality but to deliver force and act upon reality so as to change it 
by, for example, restoring order. As stated, for the performative utterance to have force, 
or be “felicitous”, would depend on whether or not the context in which it is uttered 
includes others who share the same moral conventions or have the required means to 
intervene.  
Yet, as Vološinov and Bakhtin reminds us,  the “conventions” and “norms” that 
surround the communicative act are not floating semiological givens, but are firmly 
grounded in the open social event and that utterances are the product of a complex set of 
social interrelationships (1994: 41). In other words context implies a relationship 
between different subjects whose different perspectives, practices or activities always 
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mutually inform the larger whole in which they take part (Zigon 2008: 138). This in 
turn involves specific power relations, power structures and settings that shape the 
interaction and make context a malleable, constantly shifting and endlessly multiplying 
plateau (ibid). Or as Willis has argued, “socio-symbolic practices stabilize alternative 
liminal, uncoded or residually coded identities and meanings. They are held sensuously 
and practically and therefore relatively outside and resistant to dominant linguistic 
meaning. They refuse to be swallowed whole” (2000: 36). Thus conceived, my 
approach to socio-symbolic meanings and practices is in line with what Bakhtin terms 
“heteroglossia” (raznorechie). In his words: 
“At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic 
dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to formal linguistic markers, especially 
phonetic), but also and for us this is the essential point - into languages that are socio-
ideological: languages of social groups, "professional" and "generic" languages, 
languages of generations and so forth.” (Bakhtin 1981: 271).  
For example, even if we agree that at a certain level neoliberalism is a synchronic 
abstraction - a dreamed up economic code with certain basic assumptions and universal 
truth claims about human nature - its actual form can only be located within the social 
event, i.e. the wider context of post-socialism where it currently stands not as a 
ubiquitous but a centripetal force engaged in antagonistic interaction with a plethora of 
diverging voices and worldviews (Chaput & Hanan 2014: 44). For example, as we will 
see in the following pages, privatization quickly became a discursive arena “of state 
formation, in which one can look for contradictory destatizing and restatizing 
processes” (Verdery 1996: 210), as well as clashing moralities and contending notions 
of personhood that bring together the voices of workers (in various guises), employers, 
the state as well as international financial operators.  
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The “uses” of language thus conceived are important for my analysis of the ways in 
which the normative categories and practices of neoliberal capitalism are commented 
upon and renegotiated by workers through the use of laments and public outcries that 
seek to both create and engage the wider moral community in restoring some notion of 
“order”. Such utterances can become “political and social critiques” through which the 
discrepancies between the ideal social order and reality are brought to light (Gardner 
2002: 39). More crucially however they can be generative of collective and individual 
identities (ibid: 32). Laments are rife with notions of moral rights and entitlements that 
often draw on some kind of imaginative understanding of a moral economy, but are also 
productive in that they constitute us a moral persons and challenge normative 
categories, regardless of whether or not they succeed in their explicit goals (Zivi 2012: 
83). 
Before proceeding to the discussion on methodology, I would like to make a final note 
here that I do not wish to consign the work of thinkers such as Harvey (2005) to the 
dustbin under the pretext that it is unjustified in its approach to neoliberalism as an 
“epochal and totalizing … ubiquitous force” (Collier 2011: 10). If the logic of the latter 
is not ubiquitous in its effects and manifestations or the specific reactions it provokes 
among people, this has not made it any less forceful. The effects of the neoliberalization 
of Macedonian society have been very real and very dramatic. The state has been 
steadily withdrawing from spheres it previously governed. Special economic zones of 
exemption have become the jewel of economic development. Unions have been 
decimated. Workers’ legal rights have been eroded to increase the flexibility of labour 
(see Saveski, Apasiev, Kovachevski & Vasilev 2010). Standards of living have 
plummeted for a great many. True, people have come to grips with these new realities in 
various ways and have refused to simply roll over and passively take their lot in life. 
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But they have been placed in a situation where they have had to respond and adapt to 
changes that have touched on nearly every aspect of their lives.  
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Chapter II: The “Work” of Anthropology 
 
2.1 Finding the “Fieldsite”  
My field research was conducted in Shtip, a small township in Eastern Macedonia with 
a population of forty-eight thousand people, which make up 2.3 % of Macedonia total 
population 2.058 million. Compared to western Macedonia, it has a relatively ethnically 
homogenous population, with ethnic Macedonians making up 87 %, followed by Roma 
(4.5%), Turks (2.7%), and others. As a regional industrial hub, Shtip’s history of textile 
and garment production began in the 1950’s when Macedonia was part of the 
Federation of Socialist Yugoslav Republics. Whereas textile production has ceased 
completely, Shtip’s industrial belt houses 58 garment factories that employ over 45 % 
of the town’s active workforce. Nearly all production takes the form of outsourced 
processing, or lon, as it is locally referred to. The procurement of materials and designs 
is left to the buyers, leaving local factories to busy themselves only with assembling and 
shipping out garments in accordance with strict deadlines. In short, it is a town almost 
completely dominated by work and life in the garment sector. It is a precarious life, 
characterized by short term employment contracts designed to meet the needs of flexible 
demand for garments. Given this presence, it is no surprise that the garment industry is a 
constant and overwhelming object of reflection and inspection. As people ruminate on 
the consequences of the “transition” they inevitably end up scrutinizing all that which 
goes in and goes out of garment production, making it an almost ideal subject of 
anthropological inquiry.  
I arrived in Shtip with the specific intention of conducting fieldwork in one of its 
numerous garment factories. In fact my initial ambition was to gain access to two 
factories of a different size so as to be able to contrast different production sites. It was, 
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however, by no means obvious that I would manage to gain access to even one, given 
the intense public scrutiny under which the garment sector finds itself. Many owners are 
suspicious of outsiders poking around in their affairs and weary of potential 
embarrassing leaks to the media.  
This much I realized even before arriving in Shtip. I had spent the first month of 
fieldwork in the capital conducting some library research and other preparatory work, 
when I stumbled upon the existence of a documentary on Shtip’s garment workers 
called simply “The Seamstresses”, by a talented local filmmaker called Biljana 
Garvanlieva. Alas, the film was nowhere to be found for rent or purchase. After many 
attempts of contacting the filmmaker directly in order to obtain a copy I finally managed 
to arrange a meeting with her producer who was kind enough to explain that the film 
had to be withdrawn from circulation after receiving legal threats from Kole Patrakliski, 
the owner of the garment factory featured in the film. Patrakliski was also one of the 
main protagonists of the film and offered his full cooperation during the filming. After 
seeing the final cut however, he insisted that his words and actions had been taken out 
of context and threatened his public image. The main point of contention was a small 
excerpt in the thirty minute film showing Patrakliski in his luxury villa in Shtip, 
complete with an outdoor pool, lush lawns with sprinklers and various ornaments. The 
excerpt was used to allow viewers to experience the contrast in wealth and standards of 
living between himself and the women working in his factory. “Without that”, the 
producer told me, “the film did not make sense.” Unwilling to re-edit the film and 
fearing involvement in what could have become a protracted and expensive legal 
procedure, they decided to simply withdraw it and sacrifice more than a year’s work.  
Nonetheless, Patrakliski’s reaction struck me as somewhat peculiar. After all, capitalist 
elites are usually far from diffident when it comes to acts of ostentatious displays of 
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affluence. Converting economic into “symbolic capital” through acts of conspicuous 
consumption is the very stuff of social legitimation. One can hardly imagine Bill Gates 
seeing potential controversy in disclosing the fact that he lives in a much more 
expensive house than some entry level programmer working in a Microsoft office in 
Austin, Texas. What Patrakliski’s reticence underlines is the “unfinished business” of 
capitalist transformation in Macedonian society and the high political sensitivity of 
emerging distinctions in the local community.  
But it also made me aware of the possible pitfalls I might encounter in finding a 
research site. All the more so given the strict bureaucratic regulations in English 
universities regarding fieldwork and ethics, and the insistence on consent forms, 
information sheets and the like. The possibility of “going undercover” as, for example, 
Fernandez-Kelly (1983) did in her research on Mexican maquiladoras, is no longer an 
option that can get past any ethics review board. There was no other choice but to 
present myself in front of a factory building and ask to be seen by the manager, explain 
my research motives in full and offer every assurance that I had no intention of 
smearing their reputation or arousing trouble from the inside. But the question remained 
whether I would find a factory whose management was willing to risk full exposure of 
their internal operations to a complete stranger? 
As expected, the strategy was initially fruitless and after a few attempts at different 
factories I was unable to even obtain a meeting with someone from management. 
However, I soon realized that I was going about it the wrong way. As so often is the 
case in Macedonia, the more pressing issue when establishing a relation with someone 
is “Who sent you?” rather than “Why have you come?” In other words I was lacking the 
appropriate social lubricant in the form of a “recommendation” from someone “known”. 
As luck would have it, getting a recommendation was the least of my problems, as my 
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host in Shtip (a close friend of my family) was a well-connected physician. I had 
initially resisted asking for one as I was well aware that it might involve my “patron” 
into a cycle of favours and counter-favours that characterized the local economy of 
informal exchange. A favour, after all, is the equivalent of a gift, and to accept it is to 
bind oneself to the giver.  
After receiving every assurance that it was “not a problem” I finally accepted his offer 
to place me in touch with Mr Samorich, the manager of one of the town’s largest 
factories owned by the brother of a close friend of my host. Already the following day 
we made our way to the factory so that I could be introduced. Once inside we were led 
by the secretary to a large meeting room overlooking the shop floor where we were 
asked to wait for the manager. Whilst waiting I gazed with excitement upon what was 
later to become my main fieldsite. After a few minutes Mr Samorich entered the room 
and introduced himself. My host presented me and I proceeded to explain myself as an 
anthropologist studying in England and to outline the nature of my research. Mr 
Samorich listened carefully and expressed some doubts upon hearing my request to be 
given an unpaid job in the factory for the duration of my fieldwork. “You would have to 
be here every day?” he asked with amazement.   
His incredulity was unsurprising. I was certainly not the first researcher to approach the 
factory, but usually a researcher’s role would be limited to interviewing the manager 
and perhaps receiving a guided tour of the factory and leaving it at that. Research itself 
is commonly perceived as an activity taking place in university libraries or making 
formal interviews with influential individuals instead of stitching garments for months. I 
tried as best I could to explain the basic tenets of the ethnographic method and the 
virtues if qualitative research, all of which must have sounded odd.  
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In any case, he told me he would have to think about it and get back to me. After a week 
I was half certain of having reached another dead end. Nonetheless I decided to give Mr 
Samorich a call to ask whether he had made a decision and to my astonishment he 
agreed to meet me once again in the factory to discuss the details of my role. We agreed 
that I would start the following day in the upstairs planning office and then work my 
way down to the shop floor. The arrangement suited me as I thought it would allow me 
further insights of the overall division of labour in the factory. And so began my 10 
months of fieldwork. But what exactly, we may ask at this point, is a “field” and what 
kind of “work” are anthropologists expected to do there? So far I have used these terms 
unreflectively and I believe a few more explanations are in order so as to situate the 
research on which this thesis is based.  
 
2.2 What Field and What Work? 
In spite of all the paradigm shifts that anthropology has undergone over the years, the 
notion of fieldwork has endured. Even more, as Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 1) note, 
having done “fieldwork” is almost a necessary precondition for being recognized as a 
“real anthropologist”, as opposed to a mere “armchair theorist”. Anthropological 
knowledge is only considered genuine if it can be shown to rest on data collected in the 
“field”. Yet what exactly is meant by the “field” is a matter of ongoing debate. As 
Appadurai has noted, contemporary anthropologists do not have the luxury of assuming 
spatially bounded and culturally homogenous “local” communities that can be studied 
holistically (1991: 96). In a world defined by the global flows of people and goods the 
task of demarcating the boundaries of a “field” is bound to be futile. What does it mean, 
for example, to study the local culture of garment factory workers, whose lives are so 
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clearly entangled with an industry of global proportions, and where decisions by 
government officials, international organizations, or CEO’s in faraway places can 
determine local outcomes?  
One way to reconcile this discrepancy is to approach “fieldwork” not just as a mode of 
accumulating experiential knowledge, but as “location-work”, i.e. an ongoing project 
where spending time with and talking to individuals in a given setting is accompanied 
by “reading newspapers, analyzing government documents, observing the activities of 
elites, and tracking the logic of transnational development agencies and corporations” 
(Ferguson & Gupta 1997: 37), and also, research into historical social processes (Des 
Chene 1997: 67). This much is reflected in my own assortment of “methods”. Although 
I spent a year of my research degree in “the field”, the chapters in this thesis are based 
on data that is not exclusively derived from this period of research. Chapter III is an 
historical account based on secondary literature sources, whereas Chapters IV, V and VI 
draw on a combination of government and union reports, newspaper articles, documents 
from international development organizations as well as interviews and personal 
conversations with so called “informants”. Chapters VII and VIII are based on 
interviews, conversations and all the experiential data obtained through my interactions 
with people inside the factory and around Shtip, which can roughly be summed up as 
long term “participant observation”. In other words my “field” of research, although 
grounded in the everyday lives of industrial workers, extends epistemologically, 
politically and historically into a number of open ended directions, that transform the 
research project into a potentially never ending work in progress.  
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2.2.1 Participant Observation 
It is important to note that even though participant observation is still a widespread term 
in the conduct of fieldwork it is now loosely employed to identify a combination of 
more specific methods, rather than Malinowski's original usage of the term. For 
Malinowski participation appears to have been limited to enjoying the company of the 
natives and partaking in some of their games and amusements (Holy 1995: 22), while 
non-intrusive observation (“fly on the wall”) was in fact his main data collecting 
method. Similarly, for Radcliffe-Brown direct observation constituted the main 
scientific method for gathering empirical data from which the social scientist can draw 
general conclusions about the larger structure and network of social relations (ibid: 20). 
Excessive participation was even undesirable as the ethnographer's presence could 
threaten the “natural” behaviour of people in a given situation. The data thus observed 
through this positivist framework offers itself as the 'facts' of social life, and leads the 
researcher to focus exclusively on social interactions and structure while neglecting 
notions of meaning that cannot be observed, i.e culture (ibid: 25).  
This brings us to the more interpretive and participatory side of fieldwork. Without 
grasping culture we remain unable to understand the meaning that drives and motivates 
social action. As this meaning cannot be inferred by mere observation, the researcher 
must immerse herself far more intimately in the practices and affairs of the people being 
studied in order to build relations with them. Meaning is after all a shared resource and 
always in the process of (re)production in our relations with others (ibid: 28-9). Some 
anthropologists (Wacquant 2004; Hsu 2006; Barber 2003) have taken participation a 
step further by stressing the embodied aspect of cultural knowledge. Access to this is 
granted only by a complete bodily and sensual immersion in “the cosmos under 
investigation … that … makes it possible for the sociologist to appropriate in and 
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through practice the cognitive, aesthetic, ethical and conative schemata that those who 
inhabit that cosmos engage in their everyday deeds” (Wacquant 2004: viii). 
Anthropologists, Barber writes, “live their research [as] the supreme example of 
embodied knowledge” (2003: 149).  
For good measure, I did my best to immerse myself in the everyday patterns of garment 
labour by spending at least four days a week on the shop floor doing a variety of chores 
and participating in all the forms of sociability that take place between workers 
throughout the working day. I commuted to and from the factory using the hired bus 
transport that serviced most of the workers and socialized whenever possible with my 
colleagues after work, though mostly on weekends. I carried a small notebook with me 
at all times and used it regularly during the first weeks which I mostly spent in the 
upstairs office. It was during my time in the office that I was most visible as an 
“observer” precisely because I had nothing to do except make inquiries, observe, listen 
and take notes. There were no tasks I could “participate” in.  Before long, the office 
employees began speaking to the notebook rather than the ethnographer  and would say 
things like “Write this down Aleksandar!” whenever they felt they had something to say 
to a Western European readership, or give each other warnings such as “Be careful what 
you say he’s probably writing it down” whenever complaints about management 
became too vocal. I would of course reassure them of my commitment to anonymity 
and remind them of their “right” to opt out of participating in the research (a “right” that 
fortunately no one claimed).  The lunchbreak provided some crucial relief from such 
awkwardness, through various informalities such as banter, sharing food and 
discussions on off work topics.  
However, once on the shop floor I found note-taking to be cumbersome and alienating. I 
spent most of my time in the cutting section for the simple reason that there were a 
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variety of tasks there that did not require a great deal of training, which meant that I 
could begin to participate almost immediately in the labour process. Given the qualities 
of manual labour, the social ambience on the shop floor was emphatically corporeal in 
the sense that sociability was dependent on shared bodily experiences of toil, smell, 
food and sexual horseplay. My immediate judgement was that drifting around and 
taking notes without participating in the production process would not allow me to 
develop the closeness I thought was necessary in order to tap into the pool of shared 
meanings and practices that circulated on the shop floor.  
The strategy I developed then was to dedicate most of my time to the social life of 
cutting fabric, and pour the days’ experiences into text as soon as I would get home. 
Sometimes I would also take occasional breaks to the canteen to dictate notes into my 
smartphone which, thanks to useful technology, would get immediately transcribed into 
an online document that I could later edit – a great time saving device. My daily routine 
started at the bus stop where I waited for the transport to the factory and chatted with 
workers doing the same. Once in the factory I would join one or another group of 
workers for the ritual banter that lasted until the start of the shift (around ten minutes). 
Once the shift started at 7:30 there would be little opportunity for lengthy conversations 
although joking and flirting were not uncommon between workers, though it had to be 
skillfully done so as not to attract too much attention from management. Most of the 
conversation I had in the factory occurred during the two breaks, one at 10am and the 
lunch break at 1pm. While on the shop floor I refrained as much as possible from 
making friendly interaction with management so as to avoid becoming dissociated from 
manual-workers, though I kept making the occasional visit to the upstairs office for a 
coffee break.   
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I should probably say at this point that in spite of all my efforts I never managed to 
become a “body and soul” garment worker. My colleagues never lost sight of the fact 
that, unlike them, my “being there” was provisional and a mere extension of my 
research project in England, which meant that I always had one foot out the door. Time 
and again I would be reminded that I did not have to be there, and that well-educated 
middle class Macedonians from the capital had no business cutting garments in a 
factory in Shtip. But while producing some incredulity (and mockery), my insistence on 
sharing and participating in whatever tasks management threw on the cutting section, 
gradually transformed my presence into an amicable curiosity. Friendships were 
formed, gifts exchanged and as time passed by, my integration in the social activities of 
workers increased (see also, De Neve 2006: 78). Before long I was able to extend my 
interactions with workers beyond the factory and into the local bars, cafes and sporting 
grounds, where I could also meet and exchange words with people from all walks of 
life.  
 
2.2.2 Interviews, Memories and Scattered Narratives  
Whilst in the field I also conducted a total of five lengthy recorded interviews that 
included two factory owners, two managers (one current and one retired) and one retired 
worker. I also conducted a formal interview with two former union officials who 
allowed me to take copious notes but refused to be recorded. All of these materials have 
been used here to varying degrees. My initial intention was to also gather a solid 
number of life-histories from workers but I unfortunately had to abandon this idea as 
unworkable. Whenever I brought up the topic and asked workers whether they would be 
willing to offer a sequential narrative of their lived experiences and future expectations I 
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ran into a stubborn reluctance and a lot of raised eyebrows. This was in stark contrast to 
people of authority, such as owners, managers and union officials who are more than 
accustomed to giving interviews to researchers. As for people on the shop floor, my 
initial assumption was that workers simply did not appreciate how their lives could 
possibly be important enough to warrant such interest. Indeed, as Keesing writes, people 
are often willing to offer reflective autobiographies only if they are at some level 
convinced that their lives are worth narrating, and even then with considerable social 
support (1985: 37). In a way this made a lot of sense considering that workers often 
thought of themselves as having no influence whatsoever on the larger events that 
shaped their lives (Gardner 2002: 32).  
On countless occasions workers spoke to me about how their thoughts and actions were 
not relevant to how their lives unfold. I recall listening to one cab driver complaining 
about declining living standards to which I said “Well that is how we’ve made things 
today.” His immediate response was “No! That is how they made it for us!” In the 
factory the usual response to my incessant demands for workers’ opinions on events 
was “Who cares what I think?” At times such statements made me feel exasperated as 
they left me with little information and unable to grasp how and why an entire working 
population could become so resigned to an experience of themselves as little more than 
passive objects in the hands of the dominant?  Benjamin appears to offer an answer 
when he writes that “the concept of life is given its due only if everything that has a 
history of its own, and is not merely the setting of history, is credited with life” (1968: 
71). One could argue that it is precisely this crediting (i.e. recognition), that has been 
taken away with the inglorious downfall of the iconic socialist worker. No longer 
flaunted as the vanguard of history, its makers and owners, workers have now become 
the setting - the lifeless stuff over which history writes itself. It should have come as 
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little surprise that my “asking” for a unified plot containing a lifetime of experiences, 
hopes and desires was perceived as somewhat odd (and perhaps to an extent 
threatening).  
But there is another and slightly less gloomy layer behind this resignation that relates to 
my approach to personhood. Narrating the self as the main protagonist in a sequence of 
historical events requires a certain level of separation from these events. It requires a 
certain understanding of the self as an internally coherent and autonomous individual 
that “owns” her experiences and life choices. Most workers in Shtip do not see 
themselves as individuals who are the exclusive writers of their own lives, nor do they 
perceive this in itself to be a particular problem. In this sense, questions such as “Who 
cares what I think?” do not bemoan the loss of autonomy but the loss of mutuality and 
relatedness to others through which actions and selves receive recognition and become 
valued. They bemoan the state of abjection and reflect the experience of people being 
cast out and left to fend for themselves. My interpretation here rests on Graeber’s 
definition of value as the way in which “the importance of one’s own actions register in 
the imagination – always, by translation into some larger social language or system of 
meaning, by being integrated into some larger [imagined] social whole” (2007: 68). 
As time went by it  became clear that people were in fact more than willing to share 
scattered stories, experiences and memories, all of which were related to and shaped by 
the context of present events and in the presence of certain others. Some of the older 
workers would happily recall the superior quality of the canteen in socialist enterprises 
whenever we sat down to eat in during the break. Others often liked to reminisce how 
differently managers behaved when the workers’ councils ran the factory after an 
outburst by the foreman or anyone else from management. Younger workers with no 
direct experience of socialist work regimes relied on a different idiom to express much 
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of the same frustrations, usually by making references to the developed “West”. 
Memories, jokes and commentaries would erupt suddenly, provoked by some fleeting 
incident and disappear in a flash. Such stories I had to partially collect and assemble 
(write down, dictate, commit to memory) and analyze as much as possible within the 
context in which they were being uttered. I became particularly attuned to the way in 
which exchanging stories and objects could invoke or create a shared emotion, 
imaginative understanding or experience that comes out of shared practices and also 
attributes value and meaning to such practices. It is this interplay between praxis and the 
imagination that formal interviews are less able to capture for which participant 
observation is far more apposite.  
 
2.5 Positionality, Reflexivity and the Politics of Knowledge 
All this is not to say that direct engagement with subjects gives the ethnographer an 
authoritative access or a “hot-line” to some “undistorted reality” (Willis 2000: 113). The 
simple act of “being there” and witnessing events first hand has long ceased to provide 
the unshakeable foundations of ethnographic authority (de Laine 2000: 178). Much has 
been written about the power and subjectivity of the ethnographer when it comes to 
selecting ethnographic data, obtaining a partial perspective, uncritically using 
preconceived conceptual tools for interpretation and deploying clever literary devices 
for the representation of ethnographic materials (Clifford & Marcus 1986). These are all 
valid concerns. But while it remains necessary to keep on questioning the 
ethnographer’s positionality and textual authority, it is equally important to avoid 
relapsing into some kind of hermeneutical solipsism that reduces ethnography to an 
exploration of its own limitations (e.g. What can we say? What right do we have to 
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represent others?). Ethnography must continue to speak to the world outside itself if it is 
to retain its relevancy as an investigative project. And this means, to paraphrase 
Thompson, that the ethnographer ought to be entitled to a number of assumptions: that 
the evidence under investigation exists in a “real” determinate way independently of its 
existence in our forms of thought, that this evidence is subject to real social and 
historical processes, and that some approximate understanding of these processes is a 
legitimate object of ethnographic inquiry (1979: 220).  
Ethnography itself is key to understanding these processes insofar as it concerns itself 
with ‘teasing out the hidden symbolic, moral, or pragmatic logics that underlie certain 
types of social action; how people’s habits and actions make sense in ways that they are 
not themselves completely aware of … and then try to figure out what the larger 
implications of what they are (already) doing might be’ (Graeber 2007: 305-6). The fact 
that this knowledge is by definition partial and incomplete does not mean that it can 
never attain the status of real knowledge (Graeber 2007b: 390). In fact, it is only by 
being partial that we can ever know it is “real”, since totalizing forms of knowledge can 
only exist as abstract thought experiments with no relation to the fleeting quality of real 
life processes (ibid). To deny this and adopt an extreme relativist position would be 
politically disastrous insofar as we wish to critically engage with structures of power in 
the world. In other words, while remaining critical of our own concepts, we must resist 
the imperative to “opt out of analysis of any kind of the links between the informants’ 
subjective models and the nature of the social formations [of domination, exploitation 
and exclusion] which are not always apparent to those informants” (Yelvington 1990: 
330). This means that knowledge must be allowed to flow in both directions and that a 
research area, is therefore not just a “field” for collecting data, but “a site for strategic 
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intervention” where the links between different forms of knowledge are forged (Gupta 
& Ferguson 1997: 39). With this in mind we can now depart towards “the field”.   
 
2.6 A Brief Guide to the Chapters 
The following two chapters (III and IV), will provide an overview of the historical 
making and unmaking of the industrial working class in Macedonia. I deal mainly with 
the social and economic particularities of Yugoslav self-managed socialism and the 
transition to a free market economy during the nineties. Chapters V and VI explore the 
tensions and wider implications generated by the transition, and the responses of 
workers within a context of total economic decline. My focus in this section is on the 
public debates and encounters between workers, employers and the state, and the 
struggle to define the changing relationship between them. Chapters VII and VIII will 
explore the everyday lives of workers at in Stichko, one of Shtip’s largest garment 
factories. There I explore how categories of class and personhood are negotiated within 
the working environment, and relate this to the wider process of socio-economic 
transformation.  
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Fig. 1. View of Shtip’s central area 
 
Fig. 2. View of Shtip’s industrial zone in winter 
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Part II: The Making and Unmaking of an Industrial Workforce 
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Chapter III: The Rise of Self-Management 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The history of Macedonia has been a richly explored subject, which in its greatest part 
has not been the history of a state and its people. The name itself has most commonly 
been used to refer to a region in the south-central Balkans with historically shifting 
boundaries and peoples. One often encounters the use of the term “Geographic 
Macedonia” as a seemingly politically neutral way to invoke the “natural” boundaries of 
an apolitical geographic space, only to obscure the reality that there is nothing 
particularly “geographic” about Macedonia. The most “stately” and renowned 
association of the name is with the homeland of Alexander the Great whose military 
exploits have provided the fodder for many contemporary nationalist conflicts over his 
legacy. After the rapid dissolution of Alexander’s empire, Macedonia fell under Roman 
rule where it remained as part of the Roman and then Eastern Roman or Byzantine 
empires for the next fifteen centuries. Throughout its history as a Roman province the 
precise administrative and geographic boundaries of Macedonia varied considerably as 
did the peoples that populated the region (see Rossos 2008: 17). The most significant 
and lasting demographic change occurred with the arrival of Slavic tribes who crossed 
the Danube to permanently settle within the borders of the Byzantine Empire (Curta 
2001).  
In their various incarnations the Slavic peoples contributed to the rise and fall of many 
feudal kingdoms of the “Byzantine commonwealth” as Obolensky (1971) put it, 
whether Serbian or Bulgarian before being all swept up by the spread of the Ottoman 
Empire in the fifteenth century. Under the Ottomans Macedonia vanished as an 
administrative unit and became part of Rumelia, the empire’s largest European province 
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containing most of the Balkan Peninsula south of the Sava and Danube rivers. Ottoman 
power gradually began to decline from the 17th century onwards and by the early 19th 
century the Empire had ceded large portions of its European territories to Russia and 
Austria-Hungary. As the wave of nationalism swept through the Balkans in the 19th 
century, further concessions were made to emerging nation states within its boundaries. 
With the help and backing of European powers the empire lost Thessaly and the 
Peloponnesus to the new Greek state in 1830, followed by the formation of an 
independent Serbia in 1867 and Bulgaria in 1878. This left present day Albania, Thrace 
and what once more became commonly referred to as Macedonia as the last Ottoman 
European possessions.  
The history of the region following the “awakening” of nationals has been the subject of 
extensive research, documenting the complex ethnic, religious and political affiliations 
of its inhabitants and their role in the struggle of neighbouring states to further their 
territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottomans. Many journalists and policy-
makers have looked at the history of ethnicity and religion and the antagonisms of 
various national projects as a charter for understanding late 20th century politics in the 
Balkans. The shortcomings of such efforts have been studiously researched by 
anthropologists among others (see Cowan & Brown 2000; Todorova 2009), but given 
that this study is primarily concerned with industrial labour, its social history and its 
present social and cultural characteristics, it is this history that I will tackle in this 
chapter. The task will be to draw the contours of the “moral economy” of contemporary 
industrial labour in Macedonia and place it in its historical context; to reconstruct the 
historical conditions that shaped the making and re-making of industrial labour and to 
tease out the cultural and symbolic struggles that have re-defined the meaning of work 
and the social relationships between workers, employers and the state. The chapter will 
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take us through the shaping of an industrial working class within the framework of 
Yugoslav Socialism, with a focus on the concept of self-management. I pay particular 
attention to the distinctions between official representations of self-management and 
lived practices, and I accommodate the dimension of consumption as a vital element of 
ideological legitimacy. I pursue this history in order to make the argument that far from 
a utopian state of social equality, Yugoslav socialism nurtured a particular version of 
“social inequality” in which the related, embedded self becomes recognized as a moral 
subject within the wider webs of dependence. This is an important step that will help us 
approach contemporary experiences of and everyday reflections on labour not as an 
acute “condition” of the present but as historical “events” that acquire meaning only 
“within the context of a larger surrounding plot” (Morris 1997: 37).  
 
3.2 A Modern Socialist Republic 
The project of industrialization and modernization in Macedonia began with the end of 
the Second World War and the creation of Socialist Yugoslavia with Macedonia as one 
of its constituent republics. This was itself hardly a probable outcome, but for 
favourable political circumstances. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 Ottoman 
Macedonia was divided between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The current territory of 
the republic became the southernmost province of the expanding Serbian state. Four 
years later, it was to form part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later to be 
renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Following brief experiments with parliamentary 
democracy, the kingdom was maintained as much by internal oppression as by 
European “balance of power” politics in the aftermath of the Great War. Internally it 
was plagued by a constant crisis of legitimacy (see Benson 2001) and eventually 
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collapsed during the Second World War under the pressure of various national factions 
fighting for statehood.  
Various groups and ideologues, with often conflicting interests, had been actively 
promoting the idea of an independent Macedonia since the late nineteenth century, 
though none had managed to muster the organizational capacity and popular appeal to 
turn this into a viable project. All this changed with the arrival of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party on the political scene. The ideals of socialism were not new to 
revolutionaries agitating for an independent Macedonia in spite of the absence of local 
communist party organizations. This vacuum was gradually filled as Bulgarian, Greek 
and Yugoslav CP branches competed for the loyalty of local communists whose 
socialist ideals went hand in hand with the struggle for national liberation (albeit what 
“nation” and whose “liberation”  were hardly a matter of consensus among the local 
populace.) The eventual triumph of the Yugoslav branch was largely owed to the skilful 
military and political leadership of Tito (see Benson 2001: 88). Under his guidance, the 
Yugoslav Partisans emerged from their shadowy and largely insignificant existence 
during the interwar period, as the best organized and most suitable ally in the war 
against fascism in the Balkans. With the help of Allied military and logistical assistance 
the Partisans waged a successful guerilla war that crippled German military efforts in 
the region. By the end of the war they had staked an unassailable claim as the only 
legitimate political force to rule the territory of the old Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
Throughout the war the CPY strenuously pushed for the implementation of the 
Comintern program for Macedonia, which largely meant an ideologically inspired social 
and economic transformation with the usual socialist overtones of equality and social 
justice. More importantly, the CPY endorsed a national program of self-determination 
for Macedonians that included statehood, albeit as part of a communist federation of 
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equal republics within a redefined Yugoslavia. This was enough to attract the loyalty of 
not only communist sympathizers but also members of the right, who saw in the CPY 
the means to pursue their primary goal of national independence. In response, the CPY 
abolished its branch organization in Macedonia and in March 1943 replaced it with the 
more independent, though closely monitored, Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM). 
Carried by military successes against German and Bulgarian occupiers, the CPM swiftly 
began to establish its authority by forming local self-administration councils in liberated 
areas and establishing the first elementary schools and religious services in the local 
Macedonian tongue (Rossos 2008: 194). 
Such moves also facilitated military recruitment and transformed a hitherto local 
resistance movement into a formidable force engaging in large scale clashes with 
German and Bulgarian forces as well as Serb nationalists. By the summer of 1944 most 
of the western and southern parts of what is today’s Macedonia were liberated and the 
CPM organized the first elections of village, town and district National Liberation 
Councils. The delegates from these councils were to participate on the 2nd of August 
that year on the first Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia 
(ASNOM) and discuss the foundations of the future Macedonian state. The conclave 
ended with the historic proclamation of the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Macedonia within federal Yugoslavia. A provisional presidium of 22 members was 
chosen to perform all legislative and executive tasks until the following session of 
ASNOM during which the country’s political and legislative structures were aligned 
with those of the Yugoslav federation (ibid). 
The making of a new Socialist Yugoslavia out of the rubble left by the “fratricide” that 
tore the old Kingdom apart was always going to be fraught with innumerable 
difficulties. The communists inherited an impoverished and largely rural country where 
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three quarters of the population were employed in agriculture, with pockets of industry 
in the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia and a largely subsistence agriculture 
population in the southern regions such as Macedonia and Kosovo (Hoffman 1959: 555; 
Jeffries 1993: 364). Writing for the Geographic Journal in 1952, Wilkinson could still 
describe Macedonia as a place where “the process of industrialization and reform have 
not yet destroyed the illusion that in this part of  Europe time has stood still for four 
hundred years” (1952: 26).  
The task of state building was not made easier by the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 that 
polarized relations between communist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and saw 
Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist International (ibid). The source of the 
antagonism was Tito's desire to act independently from Moscow on the socialist stage as 
a key figure in a much larger south Slav alliance that included Bulgaria, but also the 
non-Slav nations such as Albania, Romania and Greece (see Rusinow 1977: 24-34; 
Jović 2000: 60). Yugoslav involvement and open support for the communists in the 
Greek civil war, created a volatile political situation in the wake of Truman’s promise to 
protect Greece and Turkey from the threat of Communism, and clashed with Soviet 
plans for a stable Balkans and a de-escalation of hostilities in the region (Jović 2000: 
60). Tito’s refusal to back down resulted in an unrelenting campaign by Stalin to isolate 
the Yugoslav Communists from the Cominform both politically and economically, 
which created the conditions for Yugoslav revisionism and rapprochement with the 
West. 
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3.3 Industrializing the Yugoslav Way 
Early Yugoslav reforms mirrored Soviet style policies, both economically and 
politically. The first five-year plan was introduced in 1947 and was aimed at rapid 
industrialization and collectivization of agriculture (Woodward 1995: 65), administered 
by a top down centralized Party. This implied centrally planned solutions for all 
economic issues such as valuation, organization of production, income distribution and 
investment (Mencinger 2000: 120). The standard aim of such modernizing policies was 
to “transform the under-developed, predominantly agricultural, capitalist society, into an 
industrial socialist society” (ibid). The construction of the Stalinist dictatorship of the 
proletariat however was stopped in its tracks in late June 1948 by the expulsion of the 
CPY from the Cominform. 
It was in the context of these events that the CPY’s two main ideologues, Edvard 
Kardelj and Milovan Djilas, sought to convince Tito that in order for Yugoslavia to 
truly assert its independence from Soviet influence it was necessary to achieve an 
ideological as well as a political separation as a safeguard from external interference 
and a base for internal cohesion (Woodward 1995: 159; Jović 2000: 71). This 
precipitated the shift from attacks on Stalin to attacks on Stalinism and formed the basis 
for the Yugoslav opposition to Soviet style bureaucratization and centralization, and the 
move towards a socialist democracy with self-management and social ownership as its 
key components. It was meant to achieve both political and economic equality for the 
working classes “based on the principle of full autonomy in deciding the outcomes of 
one's own labour” (ibid: 77). On an economic level this meant complete worker's 
control and collective ownership of enterprises, and a democratically, as opposed to a 
centrally, planned economy (Lefebvre 1975: 17). The state did however reserve the 
right to make interventions such as temporary wage and price freezes, and retained the 
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right to implement temporary management boards that overrode the principles of self-
management in order to restructure loss-making firms (Jeffries 1993: 365).  
The main idea though, remained that of political democracy through economic 
participation. The model endorsed a complex system of representation at local, 
republican and federal levels through worker's councils, delegations and self-managing 
interest communities (ibid: 79). Later in his memoirs Djilas wrote that Tito was initially 
hesitant about the idea, and although he eventually embraced it he remained sceptical of 
its virtues for some time (see Rusinow 1977: 51). Even Djilas and Kardelj had their 
disagreements about how to exactly achieve the 'withering away of the state' that was 
the logical conclusion of the process of self-management. Kardelj's pragmatic view that 
ideas are worth little unless backed by power and organization (Kardelj 1978: 47) 
clashed with Djilas' anarcho-syndicalist outlook that earned him his expulsion from all 
party activities by 1954 and brief imprisonment in 1957 before ultimately becoming 
exiled (see Rusinow 1977: 81-7).  
In Kardelj's (and Tito's) view it was necessary to maintain a strong and organized party 
that would ensure the realization of the “best interests” of the people even if the 
majority were unaware of what these might be, or refused to support their realization 
(Kardelj 1978: 212-3). In other words the party was the necessary vanguard of socialist 
reform, responsible for the proper education and reproduction of the socialist 
community (ibid). To this end, the official program of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia stated that 'communists … must educate the people to take a greater, more 
direct and more independent share in the management of society, and to think and act in 
a socialist manner, until the very last citizen has learned to manage the affairs of the 
community' (in Jović 2000: 76). In spirit, this somewhat contradictory policy was meant 
to be a reversal of the more paternalistic Soviet model of  a state-party system that both 
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represents the people and is responsible for managing and owning assets on their behalf 
(see Alexander 2004: 254; Verdery 1996: 25). 
This principle was extended to the political organization of the country and in 
accordance with Kardelj's notion of a direct participatory democracy, whose long term 
objective was to socialize all state functions at the level of producers (Kardelj 1978: 93). 
The republics of the federation were after the reforms of 1952 divided into 3,834 
communes grouped in 327 counties. The communes were administered by people's 
councils which were comprised of: a Political Chamber (usually CP representatives) 
elected by direct universal suffrage; a Council of Producers, elected by working people 
in their place of work in the productive sector; and a Chamber of Local Communities 
(self-managed organisations dealing with issues of local significance, i.e. environmental 
projects, welfare etc.) (Rusinow 1977: 69; Simmie & Hale 1978: 707). The voting 
power of delegates representing an economic sector in the Council of Producers was 
proportional to that sector's contribution to national product, which was meant to 
operate as an incentive to producers to increase their economic output. It also meant that 
anyone without a job in the social sector could not fully participate in the political 
process (ibid), which could be used by political structures to punish or isolate political 
opponents by simply restricting access to employment. In short, employment did not 
merely provide access to a job but to an entire set of political and economic rights that 
came to determine one’s status in society (ibid; Vušković 1976: 38). As such they did 
not constitute rights of citizenship but of “producers” of socially owned capital (Benson 
1973: 41).  
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Fig. 3. Formal relationships and political organization of the self-managing community (figure 
taken from Simmie & Hale 1978) 
 
 
3.3.1 The Peak of Self-Management 
 
Economic performance in the sixties and seventies was more than solid and growing at 
an average rate of six percent per year. Nevertheless, the increasingly large size of some 
enterprises created concerns that they were too big to be steered by self-managing 
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workers or that they were increasingly dependent on managerial and state direction 
(Jeffries 1993: 365). This encouraged the federal leadership to give the self-
management system further constitutional impetus by introducing the Associated 
Labour Act (ALA) in 1976, (although it had been on the drawing board since 1971). 
The main organizational change at the level of enterprises brought by the ALA was their 
division into “Basic Units of Associated Labour” (BOALs). These were the “smallest 
production units of an enterprise capable of independent accounting because they 
produced a marketable product” (Woodward 1995: 277). These units, although 
autonomous, were too small to operate independently and associated their labour with 
other units in the enterprise to form a “Work Organisation”, usually consisting of three 
to four BOALs and one “Work Community” (administrative unit). The largest forms of 
associating were the “complex organizations” which often consisted of over a hundred 
BOALs (Jović 2000: 131; Jeffries 1993: 366).  
Politically, workers had considerable rights as decision makers through their BOALs. 
The ALA stipulated that any decision making process in the enterprise had to function 
on the principle of total consensus from its constitutive BOALs, which meant that half 
the workers in one BOAL could veto thousands of other workers in their BOALs if they 
disagreed with a majority decision (Jovic 2000: 132). The manager was elected by a two 
thirds majority in the workers’ council after choosing from a list of nominees drawn up 
by a nominating committee. Half the members of the committee consisted of political 
appointees and included representatives of local government, one third were appointed 
by the workers’ council, and the rest by the trade union and local authorities or 
communes (Jeffries 1993: 366).  
Officially, the purpose of the ALA was: to further enable workers to take part in the 
decision making process in their enterprises; to give workers responsibility over social 
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reproduction by controlling all resources of social capital necessary for this 
reproduction; and to further decentralize the state and pass over many of its functions to 
workers' councils (Jović 2000: 130; cf. Kardelj 1978: 23-4). The ALA was supposed to 
eventually replace the state constitution and was in a way the culmination of the 
Yugoslav ideology of self-management (ibid).  
In the spirit of the Marxist “who makes it owns it” motto, what the Yugoslav leadership 
sought to create was a new concept of labour that no longer recognized unpropertied 
wage earners and tried to eliminate the distinction of labour as an actor separate from 
capital. Central to the new approach was the idea of the property owner as a producer of 
value and “its operative principle – the incentive to increase produced value” derived 
from the rights of “political and economic decision making” (Woodward 1995: 166; 
italics in original).  
The term “property owner” used here stands for the political and economic rights over 
the assets of public sector firms. Property was not owned in the strict sense by 
enterprises or the state for that matter. The state had in fact officially abolished the 
concept of state property in the early fifties and declared all capital assets to be 
“socially” owned (Uvalić 1992: 73). This concept of “social property” stipulated that 
capital was owned by society as a whole and the constitution of 1974 that set the 
grounds for the ALA explicitly stated that “no one has property rights of the social 
means of production – neither socio-political communities, nor organizations of 
associated labour, nor groups of citizens, nor individuals” (cited in Uvalić 1992: 73). In 
other words, the property of workers, i.e. what they “owned”, was their “individual 
rights to their social status with its political rights and economic benefits, or the 
collective rights to control [socially owned] economic resources” (Woodward 1995: 30; 
cf Kardelj 1978: 84). These rights meant that producers could participate in decisions 
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regarding the creation and disposition of surplus value in the enterprise, and so establish 
an individual economic interest in the surplus growth of the enterprise as a whole. The 
1958 official program of the League of Communists explicitly stated that: “Through 
[self-]management [producers] realize their personal interests every day: higher wages, 
a higher personal and general social standard of living” (cited in, Zukin 1975: 62). 
It might seem odd that the party leadership did not deem it problematic to adopt such an 
explicit liberal principle of economic interest as the motive of social good, but it was 
assumed that by extending rights over property and capital to workers, any potential 
conflict between them would thus be eliminated (Woodward 1995: 166). The problem 
of labour alienation emerging in production would thus be effectively resolved (Supek 
1975: 5). Instead of capital employing labour, self-managed socialism was to be a 
system where labour employs capital (Horvat 1975: 232). Diligence among workers 
was to become a mere consequence of self-interest created by this relationship. Since 
the system was seen as self-regulatory, the state could also reduce the expenditure on 
non-productive labour (Zukin 1975: 55).   
Essentially, the worker-managed enterprise was to be a mechanism for disciplining 
workers, increasing productivity and reducing costs in accordance with market 
demands, whilst retaining its socialist credentials. Whereas Taylorism insisted that in 
order to maximize production it was necessary to completely separate work and thought 
and delegate the latter to management (see Braverman 1998: 79), the Yugoslav 
leadership announced the very opposite. Precisely by extending the rights of workers 
over capital and the instruments of production, workers would efficiently control their 
own labour and the manner of its performance (Horvat 1975: 236). For instance, it was 
assumed that workers would “think long-term” and “voluntarily” opt to reduce their 
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demands for higher wages to avoid threatening vital resources for future investments, 
i.e. their future income and the risk of unemployment (Woodward 1995: 167).  
 
3.3.2 Was it Ever? 
The system however never lived up to the expectations that grew around its democratic 
decision sharing principles for several reasons. On the one hand, managers were elected 
by employees and their usual role of making a profit had to be negotiated with 
government interference in price regulations, import quotas, labour control and worker 
demands for higher wages (Benson 1973: 108-9). On the other hand, they also had 
almost complete control over investment priorities and income distribution, in spite of 
the political rights of workers.  
Jović, suggests that the BOALisation of the economy in effect reduced workers' 
participation to their immediate BOALs, rather than any higher level (ibid: 131), which 
brought about further fragmentation of the working population. The latter was already 
divided along republican categories after the 1974 constitution that gave republics total 
control over their local economies (see Woodward 1995: 311). In contrast, the 
managerial elite could enter industry wide alliances on a federal level that were more 
often than not highly influential in policy making processes. This was particularly true 
for export oriented enterprises on whose performance the federal budgets so heavily 
depended. This created a system wherein the independent interests of labour, unless 
conflated with those of management, could not be represented beyond the individual 
enterprise or republic (ibid: 322). 
At the most immediate level workers were politically disarmed through the supposedly 
“neutral” language of technology and the “scientific” organization of the production 
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process as set out by the “experts” and in stark accordance with Braverman’s (1998) 
critique of capitalist production. The increasing reliance on technical experts became an 
integral part of the ideology of self-management and gradually acquired dominant 
overtones. A key factor was the increasing emphasis on economic performance and the 
continuous growth in productive outputs as a driving policy for the Yugoslav 
leadership. From the 60’s onwards self-management was treated by state ideologues as 
both the pinnacle of socialism and the means for achieving economic growth (Zukin 
1975: 63). The term came to symbolize both the idealism of socialist revolution and the 
pragmatism that prioritises economic development (ibid).  
In 1965 the government partially relaxed its control over the finances of enterprises in 
order to encourage markets as the final arbiters of economic success under the motto 
“Reward according to the results of work.” The Ninth Party Congress held in 1969 
delivered the objectives of the CPY in terms that officially made economic growth the 
dominant priority and defined the task of the party in ominously technocratic terms. In 
the years that lay ahead the CPY was to: 
“fight for the completion of existing and the development of new forms of self-managing 
decision-making in work organizations; for the modernization of the process of preparing, 
making and carrying out decisions; for the development of contemporary information 
systems; for the scientifically- analytically based plans, programs, and decisions; for the 
continual perfection of cadres and their affirmation on the basis of creativity and the 
results of work” (in, Zukin 1975: 63.) 
The resolution appeared closer to the spirit of Henry Ford and was the cause of some 
concern among idealists that the CPY’s policies were veering dangerously away from 
more traditional socialist goals such as solidarity and the fight against all forms of 
inequality.  The resolution of the CPY institutionalized the idea that society needs 
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technocrats and economists to lead the way towards the ultimate realization of self-
management. Thus conceived the idea of self-management tried to juggle both views. It 
would appease the pragmatists by stressing the immediate necessity of economic 
development and the idealists by projecting “true” self-management as a future ideal to 
be reached through growth and a constant improvement in the quality of living 
standards (Zukin 1975: 71). However by doing so priority was given to economic rather 
than socialist development resulting in the reduction of participation from below into a 
mere formality whilst cementing the political authority of technical experts. When I 
interviewed Joncho in 2013, a retired manager of the engineering department of 
Macedonia’s garment producing giant Astibo, he reiterated the influence of skilled 
technical staff and management over workers: 
“As the manager who has a function, who gets a salary to think about the development 
and the strategy of the Work Organization, I have to, if I decide to buy a new machine or 
introduce some new technology, I have to have a decision of approval from the Workers’ 
Council. Without their approval I could end up in jail if I buy a new machine. It’s not 
important how much benefit there will be from that machine later on. I’ll still end up in 
jail if I buy it without a decision from the WC … [So] I have to explain to the workers 
and they have to make the decision. And they can ask questions. First of all they have no 
idea what the machine is. Secondly, they don’t have the parameters that I have at my 
disposal. Ok if they ask for them I’ll give them, and I explain in general terms what it is. 
But in general terms they have to just trust me, they cannot verify it themselves. So they 
either trust me or not. If they don’t trust me they’ll say we’re not making a decision and 
then there will be no development of the enterprise. But usually the managers made their 
own decision, I never forced them to vote on anything but always sat down with them and 
we’d sit as long as necessary until they gave their approval.” 
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Trade unions, or syndicates as they are locally called, whose usual task would be to 
offset this kind of immobilization were of little help. Their role in Yugoslavia was 
mostly educational and confined to that of an advisory body (Jeffries 1993: 369). A 
retired union representative described to me the position of the union at the time as 
limited to precisely this role:  
“We used to hold regular seminars during which they informed the workers of any 
changes in the labour laws which occurred quite frequently. This was all designed to keep 
workers updated on the latest changes in their rights and privileges. We also used to do 
ideological seminars during which they discussed the pillars of Marxism and tried to 
educate workers about their role in society. But the managers were mostly sucking up to 
the local authorities and it was they who had the last word on everything not the unions. 
A lot of the workers were also uneducated and semiliterate and they did not have the 
capacity to participate in the management of the factory or in the decision-making 
process. They would arrive at the meetings tired and wanted to go home and tend their 
orchards and so on.” 
Party policies were commonly enforced by local political organs by influencing 
appointments to managerial positions (Woodward 1995: 334). This was a useful tool in 
a country where enterprises operated as one of the key mediums through which the 
social objectives of governments would get transmitted onto local communes (Uvalić 
1992: 59; Kavcic 1990: 836). As a result enterprise representatives in local, republican 
or federal bodies were almost always drawn from the ranks of management and the 
party organization (Woodward 1995: 167) and the skilled/non-skilled hierarchy became 
firmly entrenched across all institutions.  
Children from peasant and blue collar families for example formed less than fifteen 
percent of pupils in academic secondary schools, but represented between 70 and 80 
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percent of pupils in secondary vocational schools, learning a hands-on trade (Vušković 
1976: 39). Few of those would proceed to university education or come to occupy 
positions of political influence. In fact, as educational capital became more closely 
associated with such positions, the period from 1958 to 1970 was marked by a 
continuous decline in working class representatives in the Federal Assembly and 
assemblies of the individual republics from eight percent of all delegates in 1958 to one 
percent in 1970 (ibid: 40). 
The dominance of the techno-managerial elite is perhaps best reflected in the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled labour particularly after a federal decision in 1962 to 
allow bodies of management to determine the structure of basic salaries and bonuses 
without consulting local trade unions or industry scales (Singleton & Topham 1963: 
11). The decision was ideologically squared as part of the attack on Stalinist “etatism” 
and the Soviet practice of uravnilovka or “levelling” (Zukin 1975: 69). This kind of 
state imposed egalitarianism was seen as a fallacious and degenerate form of socialism 
that reduces everyone to shades of mediocrity and that a true “developed communism” 
should “show greater concern for the individual and his needs” (ibid).  The effect was 
an explosion of income differences and by 1971 studies were indicating severe 
inequalities in the distribution of perquisites and benefits between educated/qualified 
and non-educated labourers (Vušković 1976: 36-7). 
In spite of the official rhetoric praising the worth of production workers, the general 
tendency from as early as the fifties was to encourage the view that skilled labour 
inherently contributed more to production. This already shown in the first round of free 
decisions by workers councils in 1952 when workers refused to protest against the firing 
of unskilled workers seen to contribute less to productivity and approved schemes that 
gave significant raises to technical and administrative staff (Woodward 1995: 175). This 
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resulted in the popular (and certainly reinforced in practice) perception that the route to 
upward mobility led through education and a continuous improvement in one's 
qualifications (ibid: 317). 
The possibility of such outcomes was paved by the Yugoslav leadership’s authority 
building strategies in the post-war period. Initially Kardelj and Kidrich’s model 
imagined the state as a body of rule-making experts needing no authority “other than 
that afforded by expertise and professional competence” (Woodward 1995: 317). 
Sourcing legitimacy from the latter alone proved difficult and after 1950 the leadership 
began to draw more heavily on pre-war symbols of social status afforded by visible 
perquisites. By pairing formal criteria of expertise with higher salaries and better 
housing they hoped to impute greater authority to skilled professionals in charge of 
running the state and the economy (ibid)2.   
In many ways the system resembled the labour-management cooperation schemes that 
began to emerge in the first world in the eighties as an alternative to the Fordist top 
down separation of mental from physical work, only to reveal themselves as a new form 
of de-bureaucratized control that undermines the shop floor power of unions and the 
independent representation of workers (Kasmir 1996: 3). But a number of important 
distinctions need to be made here. Labour-management cooperation schemes in the US 
and Japan were accompanied by the implementation of just-in-time irregular production 
cycles that tailored production to incoming orders and reduced the amount of capital 
                                                          
2
 The socialist government was far from indifferent to this development. In fact it emerged as one of the 
key issues during the 10th Congress of the League of Communists in 1974, at which an agreement was 
reached that the education system was in dire need of reform. Of particular concern was the hierarchical 
division or manual and intellectual labour and the reproduction of social inequalities between the 
labouring and intellectual classes (Bacevic 2014). The reforms that followed were aimed mainly at raising 
the prestige of vocational schools and reducing the number of gymnasiums that prepare young people 
exclusively for university studies. The program never worked for various reasons, though mostly due to 
the inability of the productive sector to absorb the emerging workforce during the crisis years of the early 
eighties (ibid). 
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tied up in stock (ibid: 6). This was made possible by the development of new 
technologies that reduced downtime but also by introducing more flexible labour 
patterns such as temporary contracts and irregular working hours split up into periods of 
intense overtime labour when orders were high followed by periods of idleness (ibid). 
Such a move required an organized weakening of shop floor union power and a shift to 
nonunionized female and immigrant labour (see Lamphere, Stepick & Grenier 1994). 
Much of this characterizes contemporary industrial relations in Macedonia but neither 
job insecurity nor irregular production cycles were defining features of the self-
management system of industrial production.   
Job security was virtually guaranteed and decisions made by management to dismiss 
workers could always be appealed in law courts and even overturned by the worker’s 
council which was most often the case (Horvat 1975: 239; see also, Woodward 1995: 
317). Managers also had little incentive to fire workers in times of low economic results 
due to the federal policy of socializing risk which meant that struggling firms could rely 
on “soft loans” from banks and the diversion of funds from more profitable firms in 
order to prevent bankruptcies and the social instability caused by redundancies (Uvalić 
1992: 104). Yugoslavia’s banking system was such that banks operated as a non-profit 
service, founded and controlled by enterprises that could include loss making firms 
among their members (Jeffries 1993: 371). The founders not only provided the banks’ 
funds but also distributed among them all the profits regardless of individual capital 
shares (Friedmann 1966: 633-4). In spite of their low profitability the nature of the 
system allowed firms, often guided by the interests of the communes in which they were 
located, to impose pressures on banks for additional resources in hard times (Uvalić 
1992: 62). 
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In spite of all flirting with market regulation, employment was never an issue that the 
socialist leadership could afford to delegate to “market forces” with their suspected 
tendency to generate precarious labourers backed up by an “industrial reserve army”. 
The stakes were raised even higher by the very nature of the system which granted 
political rights exclusively to producers and managers of socially owned capital. 
Uncontrolled unemployment would bring into question the entire ideology of 
democratic socialism and “governing through the workplace”. Indeed, Woodward’s 
(1995) central thesis is that it was precisely the inability of the communist leadership to 
manage unemployment and reconcile the contradictions of political and economic 
objectives that brought down the Yugoslav system (see also Ramet 2005: 57). The 
ideals of self-management and a participatory democracy through the workplace were 
shot through with systemic deficiencies to the extent that few took the official ideology 
of “governing form below” seriously. Yet, Yugoslav socialism maintained a genuine 
popular appeal well into the eighties by operating on another essential socialist promise: 
the good life, to which I now turn. 
 
3.4 Consumption and Legitimacy 
In her influential work on socialism, Verdery defines the latter as being governed by the 
rationality of redistribution. What this means is that unlike capitalism, socialist regimes 
are not concerned with the accumulation of profit or surplus value but with the 
accumulation of distributable resources (1996: 25). The aim was to exercise control by 
creating dependency on a paternalistic state authority that ‘gives’ out goods. Profit is 
here less important than the hierarchical relationship thus created between giver and 
recipient. To maintain its authority the state needs to not only control the goods being 
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produced but the tools and resources necessary for their production. It also needs to 
control the goods being distributed even after their distribution in order to prevent 
consumers from claiming ownership and redefining the relationship between subjects 
and objects in ways that did not suit centres of power (ibid: 26). For these reasons 
socialist regimes placed more emphasis on heavy industry rather than on consumer 
goods such as jeans or chocolates. This in turn created tensions between the source of 
legitimacy (distributing goods) and the source of power (accumulating and controlling 
goods). Verdery writes that as regimes were more inclined to favour power over 
legitimacy they sacrificed consumption at the altar of production only to engineer their 
own demise.  
Socialist Yugoslavia however appears as a deviation from this model. The system most 
certainly did not rely on maintaining a state of deprivation and scarcity to accrue power. 
Throughout its duration the self-management system was a curious combination of a 
labour-management cooperation scheme backed up by the Fordist commitment to 
continuous production, an eight-hour working day and a genuine link between 
production and consumption (cf Kasmir 1996: 2). Since the early post war days, the 
Yugoslav leadership was ideologically and politically committed to ensuring that 
workers had both the time and resources to lead fulfilled social lives that relied on the 
idea of leisure and consumption as the material embodiment of the ‘good life’ afforded 
by socialism. It was precisely this promise of the good life under the guiding hand of a 
capable political and technocratic leadership that constituted the main pillar on which 
the authority and legitimacy of the system relied on, rather than ideals of political 
empowerment in and through the workplace (se Patterson 2011: 124). Older workers I 
interacted with rarely acknowledged their role in managing their firms and often joked 
about how political dissidents could routinely be made to “disappear”. This in no way 
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seemed to detract from the sense of nostalgia that many shared about the “good old 
days”. As Grigoriy, (a high school educated power cutter), and many others in the 
factory put it, “Back then you could afford a house, a car, a holiday an education for 
your kids and still have something left. Today you need two jobs just to make ends 
meet.”  
There is much exaggeration in these descriptions, but, the language reveals a sense of 
nostalgia for a time of careless abundance that is no longer present. Such narratives 
certainly cast doubt on the notion that exercising power during socialism meant keeping 
a tight leash on consumer goods. Borneman for example writes about the different ways 
in which capitalism and communism arouse and manage desire: capitalism renders it 
specific and focalized and continually satisfies it with ever changing products, whereas 
socialism arouses it without focalizing it and keeps “it alive by deprivation” (1990: 17, 
in Verdery 1996: 28). Consumption and the promise of abundance are seen as equally 
present in both systems, but the assumption is that communism can never conceivably 
fulfil it without politically undermining itself. This distinction between the two systems 
appears rather curious from the vantage point of a present capitalist order riddled with a 
crisis of legitimacy in the face of widespread economic “austerity”. From Grigoriy’s 
point of view it is precisely with the onset of capitalism that consumer desire became 
deprived of objects to satisfy it. Against this stands the still widely shared view of 
Yugoslav socialism as the symbol of abundance. To be sure, there was much inequality 
among Yugoslavia’s citizens in terms of purchasing power but as Patterson writes “the 
new vision of consumer abundance was grounded firmly enough in Yugoslav social and 
economic realities to give it substantial legitimacy as a dominant cultural model for the 
country as a whole” (2011: xvii).  
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The culture of consumption was perhaps best seen in the figure of Tito as the epitome of 
socialist enjoyment. In parallel with the years of economic growth, Tito nurtured a 
public image that closely reflected and symbolized this side of self-management. His 
penchant for expensive whisky and fine cigars was regularly publicized. Images of the 
ageing ruler indulging in one of his numerous luxurious villas on the Adriatic became 
commonplace by the seventies. A machinist by trade and coming from a modest peasant 
background, Tito was the very embodiment of the Yugoslav socialist worker rising from 
poverty and living the good life. It was hardly the image of the “austere socialist” many 
would come to expect from a communist leader. But frugality was never the foundation 
upon which the Party wished to model the country’s socialist outlook. In a sense, Tito 
truly became the “Body Politic” of the political economy of Yugoslav consumerism 
(Kantorowicz 1957) and embodied the “health, fertility and prosperity” of the federation 
and the promise of abundance (cf Graeber 2011: 3). For example he was known to have 
regularly used a sun lamp to maintain his tanned complexion and in later years resorted 
to dying his hair and wore a “brilliantly white set of false teeth” (Bringa 2004: 152). 
Rather than sheer vanity, his defiance of natural processes of aging was more an effort 
to publically maintain the vitality of the “Body Politic” that both reflected and projected 
how life in the republic ought to be lived.   
Zukin’s sociological research with working families in Belgrade in the 70’s shows that 
socialism tended to be defined in terms of higher living standards and self-management 
was perceived by workers as a “set of economic rights” rather than a political system of 
governing from below (1975: 77-78). When she asked a skilled machinist in Belgrade 
with rural origins to compare socialism with capitalism before the war she received the 
following account: 
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“You can't compare them nohow. Before the rich were only rich and today the conditions 
are different. Today you can, take me, for example. I can get credit to get on an airplane 
and fly to Korcula [an island in the Adriatic Sea]. And before the war it wasn't like that. If 
you were rich, if you had money, if you had land or factories, then you go, you get on a 
train, you have your limousine, whatever you want. But today it isn't like that. They take 
some pocket money, or nothing even, and off they go. Company credits, airplanes, buses, 
trains, credit for anyone who works. The workers in a big trading company, for example, 
they get credit for clothing. Three or four hundred dinars, just for clothing.” (ibid: 79). 
Self-management and socialism are here clearly visible as economic benefits instead of 
politico-ideological goals. Other youths described the system as including the “right to 
vote, the right to a vacation, and profit, and trade, and all that” (ibid: 97). Whatever the 
theoretical innovations in the development of socialist democracy, the latter was 
commonly experienced to go hand in hand with the development of consumer society 
(ibid). One of my neighbours in Shtip for example described life during socialism in 
terms of an orderly cycle of production and consumption, enabled by the security of 
work in the town’s SOE’s: 
“[My wife] used to work in Nova Trgovija [NT] which was the only retailer in eastern 
Macedonia for white goods, furniture, carpets, kitchenware and all sorts of other goods. 
They had it all. And then everyone knew, Crvena Zvezda [a local agricultural monopoly] 
gets paid on the 16th - 4000 workers. Astibo [garment factory] on the 18th - 3000 workers, 
Makedonka [textiles factory] on … I think it was 22nd - 6000 workers, and a few of the 
other smaller factories too and they all would come down to Nova Trgovija to do their 
shopping. And on credits. We had arrangements between our companies. In my company 
for example I was doing the accounts. And people would buy stuff from NT and then pay 
it out from their salaries. They agree on the rates and then I approve it and I start 
transferring a third of his salary to NT every month. The maximum was 1 third.” 
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The political freedom to travel abroad that was initially granted in order to facilitate 
labour migration and loosen the pressures on the domestic labour market, also gave 
birth to the common practice of cross border shopping. Crossing the border with ease to 
Italy or Greece was not just a consumption activity but a ritual confirmation of the 
political freedoms and European middle class connectedness of Yugoslavs, compared to 
the insulated countries of the Soviet Block. Trips to other communist states such as 
Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria were opportunities to display the superior living standards 
of Yugoslav market socialism (Mikula 2010: 218). These demonstrations of relative 
affluence are nowadays often nostalgically associated with the “Yugoslav era of peace 
and plenty” (ibid: 211). Italy, was the most common destination for Yugoslavs of all 
republics where they could purchase goods that could not be found on Yugoslav 
markets. Yugoslav customers was becoming so reliable by the 60’s that shopkeepers in 
border towns like Trieste were learning enough Serbo-Croatian to “lubricate their 
business transactions” (Patterson 2011: 5). Mikula writes that initially, trips to Italy 
would often be accompanied with a feeling of inferiority and an awareness of being 
surrounded by better dressed Italians, symbolizing the economic superiority of the West 
(2010: 218). Yet, when Italy’s economic fortunes took a downturn in the seventies some 
reversals in this pattern were beginning to emerge. Richard West notes the smug 
triumphalism of Yugoslav shoppers that he encountered in his visits to Trieste in those 
years. Statements such as “We used to come here to buy better quality, now we come 
because it is cheaper” were becoming curiously common. An Italian shopkeeper 
complained to him that “Fifteen years ago I had a car and the Yugoslavs had nothing to 
eat. Now they have a car and I don’t have two. The fact is that they are advancing and 
we are going backwards” (West 1994: 278; cited in, Patterson 2011: 288). If these 
statements seem extreme, they were backed up by Yugoslavia’s soaring reputation in 
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international circles, including the World Bank, as a model of developmental success 
(Bockman 2011: 100-102). Ordinary Yugoslavs were, of course, well aware that their 
country was being increasingly mentioned as an economic success story, which only 
further bolstered the legitimacy of Yugoslav socialism (as well as their myth of linear 
development).  
 
3.4.1 The Socialist on Holidays 
Perhaps one of the most important forms of leisure and consumption was the annual 
holiday. Sending workers on vacation was a high priority in the country’s socialist 
outlook. Authorities took great strides in ensuring that what was once the privilege of 
the few would become part of the common good (Yeoman 2010: 82). Interest in tourism 
however was something the authorities struggled to create and develop. The federal 
government introduced two weeks of annual paid leave as early as 1946 and the Labour 
Act of 1958 entitled all employees to 12-30 days of annual paid leave depending on age 
and years of service (Duda 2010: 36). By 1973 this was extended to 18-30 days for 
regular employees. What remained unchanged was the constitutional entitlement to paid 
leave which employers had to endorse and workers could not reject. The Yugoslav 
ideology of socialist development had appropriated the idea (already popularized in 
twentieth century Europe) that no one should spend their holidays at home. Although, in 
their specific case it was the task of socio-political institutions to guarantee not only that 
workers did go on vacation but to manage the way in which they did so. The two main 
pillars of the system were financial assistance in the form of price reductions and annual 
allowances, as well as specialized accommodation resorts such as holiday centres 
(odmaralishte – “resting place”). 
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Although the early fifties saw a period of reductions in benefits and privileges for 
workers on holidays the economic boom of the late fifties reaffirmed the need to 
develop domestic tourism as part and parcel of rising social standards (ibid: 38). The 
still renowned K-15 card was introduced in 1961 for workers in socially owned 
enterprises, and, it allowed holders who bought round trip tickets for their annual 
holiday, discounts of 50 percent for air fares, and 75 percent for any other kind of 
transport. The discounted sums were paid to the seller by the state with money allocated 
from a federal fund to which all workers contributed with 1.5 percent of their gross 
annual income.3 By 1965 Yugoslavia had nearly 73,000 beds in workers resorts around 
the country with 72 percent of them on the Adriatic coast in Croatia. The quality of 
many resorts remained poor throughout the sixties and workers often complained to 
their unions of feeling malnourished and suffering from lack of sleep after spending two 
weeks in the resorts (ibid: 59). 
But the bigger challenge that local authorities met when organizing holidays for 
workers was the lack of interest. Promoting the need for vacation was left to a special 
branch of the trade union. Its task was to organize lectures and showcase the beauties of 
the country and promote the right of the revolutionary class to a well-earned rest from 
hard physical labour. In spite of such efforts the president of the worker’s council of 
Varteks, a textile factory in north Croatia told a Croatian daily in an interview that “The 
majority of workers come from the village. Many simply don’t feel the need to go away 
for the summer. For some of them seaside holidays are a ‘luxury’, something peculiar to 
‘gentlemen’ rather than workers.” (ibid: 53). Many workers preferred to spend their 
time off work on subsistence agriculture back in their villages and in the presence of 
                                                          
3
 The card was discontinued in the mid-sixties as development plans shifted towards promoting foreign 
tourism to boost the country’s hard currency reserves leaving only the annual allowance or regres and 
holiday resorts in place. 
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close kin. As early as 1949 workers from Croatia were unwilling to travel to other parts 
of the country such as Montenegro or Macedonia for vacation because it was “too far 
away” and preferred to stay in Croatia.  
Faced with such difficulties the authorities intensified their campaigns and efforts to 
improve the quality of the resorts and diversify the leisure activities and cultural life in 
such a way that would “render them genuinely accessible to the working people of our 
country” (Duda 2010: 54). This was a matter of high ideological importance, not only in 
terms of living up to the socialist ideal of distributing the good life as a common good, 
but as a social project through which to bolster the unity of the different Yugoslav 
peoples and overcome the traumatic and still living memories of fratricide during the 
war (Yeoman 2010: 74). Sending Serbian workers to Croatian holiday resorts was 
meant to both demonstrate the rising standards of living for workers, but also, for 
different peoples of the nation to get to know one another.  
Slavnić (2010: 65) suggests that the abstract socialist symbols of brotherhood and unity, 
self-management and socialism itself were given a face and a name in the visual 
representation of the Yugoslav worker on holidays. The iconic representation of the 
worker engaging in consumption symbolized the affluence of Yugoslav socialism and 
the economic health of the self-managing society. This was clearly expressed by the 
president of the Tourist Alliance of Croatia Marin Cetinich, during a conference in 1953 
where he defined the aims of tourism along strict ideological lines. The purpose of 
tourism was not to be mere loafing but to foster solidarity and unity and learn about the 
country’s “cultural-historical monuments ... the achievements of the socialist homeland, 
its factories, its other new projects and its overall construction” (cited in Yeoman 2010: 
76).  
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Domestic tourism was thus to be an educational experience and a matter of national 
priority. To this end the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia stressed 
in 1958 that more care must be undertaken of “everyday needs and provisions, rest and 
leisure” (Duda 2010: 54). More journals, brochures, magazines and tourist videos were 
provided as workers were obliged to stay after work and attend exhibitions on leisure 
and learn about the benefits of tourism “in order to utilize their work achievements more 
successfully” (Turizam 1960, cited in Duda 2010: 54).  Political structures were in 
effect producing not only a particular type of worker through the self-management 
system, but sought to materialize the benefits of the socialist economy in the figure of 
the socialist consumer. As the period covering the late fifties and sixties saw a wave of 
liberalization and prosperity unfold across the country, consumerism and 
commercialism became tools for promoting “national unity through prosperity” 
(Yeoman 2010: 97). 
The results were telling as domestic tourism increased from 19.5 million overnights in 
1960, to 25.9 million in 1970 and reaching its peak of 59.7 million in 1986 (Duda 
2010). Workers were expected to pay for their holiday themselves, though with state 
allowances and discounts the average Croatian worker in 1963 had to spend no more 
than three days’ worth of wages on seven nights with full board at a holiday centre in 
the Adriatic. There were certainly marked regional differences between the “average” 
wage of Macedonia and Croatia, though the general sense one gets from workers 
narratives is that holidays were “affordable”. Tourist magazines in the seventies were 
ripe with statements of content workers who spoke of the joy of “doing nothing” for a 
couple of weeks (see Duda 2010: 61). “What more do I need than swimming and 
sleeping? At work I have to bend down and get up a thousand times a day ... The only 
recreation I need is sleep” (Workers’ Daily, cited in Duda 2010: 61).  
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My sixty year old neighbour in Shtip who fondly remembered these Yugoslav trips and 
referred to the good old days as Yugovina, a local neologism derived by combining 
Yugoslavia with ubavina meaning ‘beauty’ in Macedonian:  
“Ooh Aleksandar you should’ve seen how we used to go on holidays when the cheque 
books came out. Even if you did not have a penny you could go to the Adriatic and pay 
everything with cheques that get realized much later. Some of them were never even 
cashed in, I mean we didn’t even keep track of all the cheques we used to sign. And 
usually the Croats were in no hurry to realize them because they have money in the 
summer season so they keep them and start cashing them in the winter. So you just sign 
cheques with no date and enjoy your holidays. What can I say, it was Yugovina.”  
It was this same person who at the same time assured me that when it came to self-
management: “There was nothing of the kind. Whatever they decided in the party had to 
be implemented in the firm. The workers’ councils never contradicted instructions from 
the party. We never had much of a say. If the manager was close to the party officials 
the [workers’] councils couldn’t do anything.” These observations about 
disempowerment at the workplace hardly ever spontaneously emerge in workers 
nostalgic narratives of Yugoslav socialism but were nonetheless unhesitatingly offered 
whenever I made inquiries. One worker in the factory summed it up well by saying that 
“If you stayed out of politics you didn’t have to worry about anything.” Staying out of 
politics here means simply avoiding open confrontation with the Communist Party. But 
the common knowledge that Yugoslav popular democracy was a sham hardly seemed to 
detract from the sense of nostalgia evoked by workers of almost all generations. This 
apparent contradiction evaporates once we realize that the main legacy of self-
management was not political “empowerment” but a widely shared “moral economy” in 
which socialist workers had a right to a fair portion of the public product by virtue of 
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investing their labour in the creation of socially owned assets (i.e. the industrial 
commons).  
But it is important to note that these claims to economic goods are not to be treated as 
constitutive of the possessive individual, i.e. of workers claiming ownership of the 
products of their labour. Workers did, and still do claim economic rights but only 
because such acts work to sustain the related self within the moral realm of "community 
life" based on an ongoing cycle of mutual obligations (Rio 2014: 77). The salient 
references to careless abundance and the cyclical process of consumption and 
production point to a kind of potlatch ritual practice wherein economic activity was 
being firmly “embedded” in the social relations of reciprocity and redistribution 
nurtured by (and nurturing) the overarching political system (Polanyi 2001: 49-50).  
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have tried to outline the contours of what I have referred to as the 
“moral economy” of Yugoslav socialism and the historical making of the socialist 
working classes. The importance of the socialist project cannot be overemphasized 
considering that it coincided with the spread of industrialization itself. This was 
particularly so in the less developed Yugoslav Republics, such as Macedonia, where the 
very existence of industrial labour as a significant (even dominant) social element 
emerged through the framework of socialist modernization schemes. I have paid 
particular attention to the growth and development of the self-management economic 
model as the peculiar Yugoslav contribution to socialist economic experimentation. 
While it cannot be denied that self-management was to a great extent the offspring of 
geopolitical necessity, the debates and social struggles that emerged around the efforts 
99 
 
of Yugoslavs to implement a socialist democracy through the workplace, took on an 
independent form. The end result however was not a popular democracy from below, 
but a peculiar form of social inequality (or as Schierup puts it, a patronage “coalition of 
unequal partners”; 1992: 90) defined by shifting modalities of interdependence between 
labourers, technocrats and political classes, conjoined by a utopian project of socialist 
abundance. In spite of frequent flirtations with market models and emphases on profits 
and efficiency, the production of commodities never veered too far away from the 
commitment to better satisfy the socially defined “needs” of producers (Patterson 2011: 
124).  
The rise of a local consumer culture that accompanied this commitment was in fact one 
of the main pillars of legitimacy that sustained the political system. It led not only to an 
increased pursuit of economic goods, but also to an embedded economic model where 
producing things was visibly accompanied by the making of a complex web of mutual 
obligations between producers, employers and the state, often blurring the boundaries 
between them. As Woodward notes, investing one’s labour in socially owned firms did 
not just define one’s employment status, but “the identities, economic interests, social 
status, and political loyalty of Yugoslav citizens. One’s place of work was the centre of 
one’s social universe” (2003: 76). The repeated, cyclical use of credits was not seen as 
an ominous form of impersonal indebtedness, but as a form of ongoing gift exchange 
that, in a way, continuously recreated the embedded, relational self, within the larger 
social fabric of Yugoslav society (see also Graber 2011b: 124). This leads me to one 
final key aspect I wish to stress here, and one that will become more apparent as the 
thesis unfolds, which is that the interconnectedness mentioned above also 
accommodated a specific conception of personhood, in which “persons are not 
understood as monadic individuals, but as nodes in systems of relationships” (Ferguson 
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2013: 226), which more often than not, implied some form of dependence and 
hierarchy. Understanding this is crucial for the discussion that follows where I will 
examine the kinds of debates that emerged from the historical undoing of socialism, and 
the attempts to unravel the fabric of mutuality that grew up around self-management.  
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Chapter IV: Decline and Transformation 
 
4.1 The Long Drop: Experiences in the Garment and Textile Industries 
The development of Yugoslavia’s consumer culture was powered by high rates of 
economic growth in the decades following the war. Real income per worker grew at a 
rate of 6.8 % between 1960-70 and private consumption in the period 1970-1977 had an 
average growth rate of over 6 % (Patterson 2011: 39). Concomitantly, the period from 
1947 to 1985 marked an average annual growth in GDP of 5.2%, whereas industrial 
production grew at an average rate of 12%. Macedonia had a slightly above average  
growth rate in this period of 5.8% per year (Miljković 1986: 197) and much of it was 
owed to heavy government investments in the productive sector. In Shtip this resulted in 
the rise of the textiles and garment industries in the shape of Makedonka and Astibo that 
dominated the town’s economy throughout the socialist period. 
Both Makedonka and Astibo were mainly the result of federal policies to tackle the 
issue of female unemployment in the southern regions. To this aim federal funds were 
channelled mostly in labour intensive, low paid branches such as textiles, electronics 
and tobacco processing (Mežnarić 1985: 216). All of these industries relied heavily on 
female workers as such work was seen as particularly suitable for women because it 
corresponded with “similar work within the family and household” (ibid: 217). Credits 
for these investments were received by the republic from a federal budget consisting 
mostly of foreign loans intended to boost the export sector (ibid: 279).  
Makedonka (literally meaning “Macedonian woman”) began production in 1952 with 
120 workers following the purchase of equipment from the UK. It quickly developed 
into one of the largest and technically modern textile factories in Yugoslavia, producing 
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yarn, fabrics and cloth for the domestic market. As production expanded a weaving 
plant was added in 1955, clothing manufacturing line in 1962 and a jeans factory in 
1983. By the seventies it also included its own restaurant serving food to the workers, 
three discount stores, a library and a medical unit for emergencies. The enterprise also 
oversaw in the early seventies the construction of apartment buildings for its workers in 
nearby Shtip, which they could purchase through different types of credits, mainly from 
the firm itself. Funds had been allocated for the construction of holiday facilities for its 
workers, a hotel and a camp site, on Lake Dojran in southeast Macedonia4. By 1987 the 
total number of workers stood at roughly 6000. Inside the industrial complex one finds 
more than just a gritty textile factory. The various buildings that housed the different 
departments are designed to be separated by luscious lawns and greenery, speckled with 
fish ponds, fountains, roaming pheasants as well as art statues celebrating the men and 
women of socialism.  
The fibres and cloth produced in Makedonka were used in the clothing production unit 
of Astibo, whose main business was the design, production and distribution of men's, 
women's and children's clothes.  The number of workers in Astibo grew from 119 in 
1962 to over 2000 in 1972, and was by this time the biggest producer of casual clothes 
in all of Yugoslavia, exporting half of its products to foreign buyers. The factory 
grounds were similarly arranged to improve the overall ambient and paid special 
attention to the needs of its largely female workforce by building a kindergarten on site 
and providing a healthcare unit offering gynaecological check-ups, treatment and advice 
on reproductive health (Bonfiglioli 2014: 11). 
                                                          
4
 See “Macedonian clothes for Europe” study made by the Centre for Research and Policy Making, 2006 
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However, the years of prosperity and economic calm that defined the sixties and 
seventies respectively were followed by the economic gloom of the eighties, ripe with 
inflation, unemployment and a mounting foreign debt, experienced by ordinary 
Yugoslavs as a dramatic reversal of the established trend of rising living standards 
(Pedrotty 2010: 340). The policy of borrowing western capital in order to fund growth 
through exports turned out to be disastrous when western economies entered a recession 
after the oil price shocks of 1973-4 and 1979 and blocked Yugoslav products (Gowan 
1999: 85). The price of oil in 1980 was 28 times higher than it had been in 1971, 
whereas Yugoslav oil consumption rates had more than doubled in the same period 
(Miljkovic 1986: 166). At the same time, Yugoslav export industries that had absorbed 
the vast majority of borrowed capital experienced declining export rates. The end result 
was a huge trade deficit and piling foreign debt problem (Patterson 2011: 46; Jeffries 
1993: 374). 
This facilitated the turn to IMF supported austerity policies according to which the 
Yugoslav advantage in exports was in low labour costs (Woodward 1995: 281). The 
Kraigher commission, headed by the federal president Sergej Kraigher, was set up in 
1981 to draft a stabilization program acceptable to the IMF. The report was released in 
1983 and even though it recommended retaining the basic structure of social ownership 
it firmly concluded that increased efficiency and sustained profit levels were to become 
the only guarantor for employment (Jeffries 1993: 367; Hudson 2003: 59). The 
guaranteed minimum wage was reduced by 1982 and two years later the revised income 
policy was signed by all republican governments. The government sought to increase 
exports and access to foreign currency as much as possible and reduce domestic 
consumption to a minimum along with all imports not critical for production 
(Woodward 1995b: 51). Food subsidies were ended and investment in social services 
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and public infrastructure all but ceased, resulting in an eighty percent increase in 
industrial action from 1982 to 1983 (Hudson 2003: 60). By 1984 overall consumption 
had dropped to levels of the pre-boom years of the late fifties (Miljkovic 1986: 133; 
Patterson 2011: 47). Shortages of basic goods and services became the new reality for a 
population that had only recently come to identify themselves as comfortable citizens of 
a prosperous modern country. 
 
Fig. 4. Aerial View of Makedonia circa 1980 
The vacation that once appeared to workers as another institutionalized hurdle were by 
this point an established part of consumer culture among workers. Already in 1984 the 
Workers Daily was publishing articles lamenting that vacations are becoming too 
expensive for the working population and that it was “hard for our people to give up the 
habit of and need for summer holidays” (Duda 2010: 56).  
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By this time Yugoslav firms had resorted to subcontracting and making their production 
facilities available to foreign firms who sought to utilize the local labour force at sub-
minimal wage levels (Schierup 1994: 84). The garment industry became a particular 
target for such arrangements with foreign suppliers dictating and supervising production 
that was for the great part seasonally oriented (Schierup 1994: 85). By the end of the 
decade the average length of work in a Yugoslav garment factory rarely exceeded six 
months, subject to the demands of the market, with subcontractors receiving few or no 
orders when markets went bust. With an average pay of 3$ a day, Yugoslav textile 
workers were by 1989 earning less than their Indonesian and South Korean 
counterparts, their main competitors on the market (Schierup 1994: 85).  
Schierup (1994) argues that from the late seventies onwards, Yugoslavia entered a 
process of “re-peripheralisation” by retreating to a level of relative economic 
development vis-à-vis Western Europe that characterized the post-war period. As the 
economic decline slowly reached its apex in the late eighties, some sociologists began 
documenting the de-urbanization of the industrial working class and their retreat to 
traditional forms of peasant agriculture for their subsistence. The Croatian sociologist 
Vlado Puljiz expressed the irony with which “the  individual  peasant  holding  which  
the  agrarian  policy, during the whole  post-war  period,  has  endeavoured  to beat  
down  as a survival from past times, has today become  the main cushion  for the crisis, 
warding  off social misery of huge dimensions” (in Schierup 1994: 83). The very things 
that were for so long dismissed as backward and disappearing now appeared most vital 
(Ferguson 1999: 250). Woodward adds that this was followed by resorting to older 
peasant norms of reciprocity and mutuality that supplemented the declining purchasing 
power of workers with “barter, gifts, friendships, political networks and connections 
and the reciprocal obligations of kinship and ritual kinship” which only increased “the 
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barriers to collective political action for change” (1995b: 56). In other words, economic 
decline was experienced not only in terms of diminishing material resources, but as a 
complete breakdown of the linear modernizing narrative of the socialist project. Much 
like Ferguson’s analysis of African industrialization, the achievements of 
“development” it appeared, were clearly reversible (1999: 13). 
The consumer culture that the Yugoslav leadership had carefully employed to deflect 
criticism of both socialist rule and regional grievances could no longer be relied upon. 
The economic crisis directly fuelled regional discontent among the republics and 
nationalist leaders were quick to capitalize on the highly unpopular austerity measures 
that were beginning to be introduced by the federal government (Pedrotty 2010: 340). 
The end of the Cold War signalled the loss of Yugoslavia’s international position as a 
link between the two blocs and Western support grew for separatist politicians in 
Slovenia and Croatia who were advocating that they should stop subsidizing the poorer 
republics’ ill planned economic projects (Ramet 2005: 56). Domestic economic liberals 
and nationalist leaders had been marked for support by Reagan’s policies ever since the 
early eighties in order to stimulate a “quiet revolution” to overthrow the Communist 
leadership with the use of economic instruments (Hudson 2003: 57). The demise of the 
Soviet Union only upped the stakes.  
In 1989 the pro US Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic, led a series of attempts to 
salvage the economy by implementing an IMF sponsored economic shock therapy 
program that reduced available resources to individual republics and increased internal 
tensions (see Lampe 2000: 356). The following year however US congress cut off all 
aid, loans and credits to Yugoslavia, specifying that in order for aid to resume republics 
were to hold democratic elections under State Department supervision after which funds 
would be channelled only to those forces identified as “democratic” (ibid). A politically 
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and economically bankrupt Yugoslavia quickly slipped down the slope of war and 
disintegration that defined much of the decade of the nineties.  
If the Soviet model was to favour power over legitimacy, the Yugoslav model 
emphasized legitimacy over power. When political structures did actually impose tight 
restrictions on consumer goods it was mostly under the pressure of “market force”, IMF 
reform programs and concerns about the profitability and efficiency of firms. But even 
then, the question of profitability was highly specific given the social ownership of the 
means of production. Firms were expected to operate at a profit and accumulate surplus 
value which could be then redistributed in order to secure higher standards of living for 
the general population. Creating and accumulating surplus value was never “an end in 
itself” (cf. Weber 1992: 34) but a means for promoting the ideals of political 
participation through production and fostering a middle class consumer culture among 
socialist workers.  
This tension between the two poles of power and legitimacy defined internal debates 
within Yugoslavia for decades. Economic activity was periodically left to market 
regulation particularly during the sixties, only to force the state to start pulling levers 
whenever market behaviour exacerbated inequalities and failed to redistribute wealth in 
accordance with socialist morality (Estrin 1991: 189). This would spur liberal 
pragmatists into reiterating that interventions designed to redistribute only decrease 
overall profits and diminish the total available goods for redistribution (Lydall 1989: 76, 
cited in Jeffries 1993: 389; Woodward 1995b: 49).  
When I interviewed Joncho, a former manager of Astibo’s engineering department, he 
explained to me the irresolvable contradiction in these priorities. He resigned from his 
position in Astibo after a prolonged strike by the workers in 1988. Faced with rising 
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inflation, the strikers demanded a no less than 50% increase in wages. which the 
management had deemed an impossible demand if the factory was to stay afloat. They 
nonetheless yielded to the pressure after an intervention from the local CP branch. 
Joncho was incensed. In his words “we were the experts, the directors and it was our 
job to know what could or could not be done.” The ability of workers to wrestle this 
concession was seen as an illegitimate assault on the cultural (knowledge and expertise) 
and symbolic (capacity to define the terms of the debate) capital of the managerial elite.  
As it turned out, the “experts” won the debate and by the end of the eighties the main 
obstacle to efficiency and profitability was firmly identified in the tendency of workers 
to scale up wages at the expense of reinvestment through the self-management system. 
The emerging consensus resulted the new Law of Enterprises in 1989 which virtually 
abolished self-management and social ownership and gave managers full rights to hire 
and fire in accordance with strict market dictates (Woodward 1995: 281). Enterprises 
were to be managed by private owners and creditors. The new Banking Law dismantled 
the country’s socially owned banks which froze all credits to the industrial sector. Huge 
numbers of industrial enterprises that had been struggling for over a decade were now 
being driven into outright bankruptcy (Hudson 2003: 60). Reflecting on these hard 
times, Joncho shared his thoughts on what he saw as a logical and inevitable outcome of 
an historical flaw: 
“To be honest what happened to us would have happened anyway sooner or later. The 
inflation, the depression and so on ...  Let me explain something. The mentality of today’s 
workers, of workers back then and workers in the Soviet Union is completely different. 
Those same workers during Tito thought that they were the vanguard, that the working 
class was the motor, you know this was in a way taken out of Capital and from Marxism 
as their currency. And they thought the working class was the vanguard of the country. 
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Now firstly, the very word “vanguard” cannot mean the majority, it can never be the mass 
of people. You cannot have ninety percent of the society being the “vanguard”. Even ten 
percent is too much for a “vanguard”.  A “vanguard” is something that is absolutely 
unique with views different from its environment, and it is not accepted by the masses. 
That is why Galilleo was persecuted. Because he was that vanguard. You can’t have 
everyone being the vanguard. The rest can only be a rabble.” 
Even though this narrative was captured in 2013, long after the collapse of socialism, 
Joncho still insists that it had been more than clear to him during socialist times that 
something was terribly wrong with the ideology of self-management. His views were 
hardly an isolated occurrence. By 1990 it became possible and commonplace for 
Yugoslav intellectuals to define the economic decline as “the problem of economic 
efficiency of self-management system in general” (Kavcic 1990: 834) and that 
enterprise success depended mainly on the “role of top managers” whose main 
complaints were “that they do not have enough power” (ibid: 848). The decisive shift to 
market principles in 1988 only increased the unease with which the liberal technocratic 
elite experienced the formal submission of their authority as experts to the worker’s 
councils and the local commune. Although considerable, the political power of the 
technocratic elite was never completely removed from their legally defined obligation 
as managers to always “take into account the broader social interests of the working 
organization” (ibid: 837), an obligation that much of the technocratic elite found to be in 
contradiction with their primary task of running an efficient enterprise (ibid). Once the 
rules of the game began to break open many would eagerly participate in the unmaking 
of the historical and economical “aberration” that became the socialist state and the self-
managing worker.   
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4.2 In-dependence and Privatisation: Setting the Framework 
Macedonia declared its full independence from the Yugoslav Federation in September 
of 1991 and immediately embarked on the road to economic and political liberalization 
under Western supervision. The circumstances under which this transformation began to 
unfold could hardly be called auspicious. War in Bosnia and Croatia, and Macedonian 
participation in international sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, cut off traditional 
export markets. Hyperinflation of the local currency reached 1664 per cent in 1992. 
Inflation was brought down after introducing an IMF stabilization package in 1993 in 
combination with price controls and a wage freeze in April of that year. Control of 
wages was extended until 1996. A World Bank and IMF reform programme was laid 
out in 1994 the purpose of which was to start large scale privatization, reduce inflation 
and reform the banking sector (Jeffries 1993: 346).  
From a purely administrative point of view privatization in Macedonia developed at a 
faster pace than many neighbouring countries, but the larger political and ideological 
overhaul of Macedonian society that came with privatization is still a matter of intense 
public debate with unresolved questions. The initial problem the state faced was one of 
ownership. The inherited legal category “socially owned” implied difficulties that were 
not present in other Eastern Bloc countries where capital was unambiguously state 
owned. The prospect of nationalizing the economy in order to privatize it appeared too 
unpalatable for a government struggling to transform a socialist economy under IMF 
and World Bank tutelage. Instead, a complex legal document was drafted that became 
the “Law on Transformation of Enterprises With Social Capital”5. It laid out the 
framework by which all such enterprises were subjected to a re-registration in the courts 
                                                          
5
 See: “Закон за Трансформација на Претпријатијата со Општествен Капитал” [Law for the 
Transformation of Socially Owned Enterprises], Republic of Macedonia, Official Bulletin 38/93, 
21.06.1993 
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and by legal fiat were transformed into joint stock or limited liability companies. The 
document itself was largely based on the incomplete Yugoslav privatization program of 
1989, developed under the guidance of Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs who acted as 
an advisor to the Yugoslav government. Sachs was also the chief creator of the Shock 
Therapy program for transforming East European states into fully operational market 
economies in order to achieve, in Sachs’ words: “a recovery of human freedom and a 
democratically based rise in living standards” (cited in, Gowan 1995: 5).  
A new government Agency was formed to control and oversee the organization of the 
transformation, offer legal assistance and provide the government with reports and 
estimates regarding the size, number and value of SOEs. In the process of registration 
SOEs (whose decision making bodies remained the worker’s councils and the 
managerial board) were obliged to choose from one of the approved methods of 
privatization and transfer their assets to the Agency to act as a trustee (of the still 
socially owned capital) and facilitate the finding of interested buyers.  The 
“transformation” thus became a half-way form of nationalization in which the 
“trusteeship” of socially owned capital was moved from workers to the state. All profits 
however from the sale of socially owned capital were appropriated by the state with the 
aim of supporting development projects and reducing the national debt. 
The sale or privatization of capital varied according to the size of enterprises. Small 
(below 50 employees) and medium (below 250 employees) enterprises were free to 
choose between any of the methods prescribed by the Law. This included employee and 
management buyouts or a direct agreement with an interested external buyer. Large 
(over 250 employees) enterprises had to choose their method in consultation with the 
Agency. In order to facilitate the process many large enterprises were split up into their 
respective BOALs and became medium sized before being offered for sale. The shares 
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were offered first to existing employees as privileged buyers and after three months to 
any willing investors whether foreign or domestic. A majority of 51 percent of total 
shares was necessary to claim ownership, with the Agency continuing to claim 
dividends from any shares remaining in its possession. Employee buyouts became the 
dominant model for small enterprises whereas management buyout prevailed in the case 
of medium and large enterprises (see Drakulevski 1999: 32). Article 55 of the Law 
defined management buyout as “the sale of the enterprise to people who will take over 
the management of the enterprise”. As former employees this meant that the existing 
management boards would enjoy preferential treatment and could take over the 
enterprise by presenting a development strategy and purchasing 20 percent of the capital 
with an obligation to purchase a minimum of 51 percent majority shares within a period 
of five years (Shuklev 1996: 12). 
 
4.3 (De)valuing the Industrial Commons 
The value of an enterprise was defined in the law as the book value of assets minus 
liabilities (Article 7). Although seemingly a straightforward affair, assessing the value 
of enterprises was likely to produce odd figures for several reasons. Determining the 
real market value of assets in conditions where markets were not yet fully operational 
meant more politics and less accounting. The accounting system of the Republic itself 
diverged considerably from international standards and did not include standards on 
accounting for such things as state guarantees, government aid or financial information 
from affiliates (Shuklev 1996: 15). In addition, many books showed assets in former 
Yugoslav republics in the form of credits or property that were virtually impossible to 
recover due to war and bankruptcies of former trading partners. Further ambiguities 
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arose from the self-management accounting system under which wages were not 
considered a cost of production and were already in 1955 redefined as income 
(Woodward 1995: 176).  
Then came the question of efficiency. Once again, determining how capable enterprises 
were to generate profits under market conditions was difficult, considering that self-
managing enterprises were not designed to compete on the market or to generate profits 
as an end in itself. Their chief aim was to sustain Yugoslavia’s consumer culture and 
guarantee political rights through employment for which they depended on a wider 
network of support and risk socialization involving protected markets, “soft loans” from 
banks and other enterprises and links to political structures. How well individual 
enterprises would perform once severed from this system was anyone’s guess.  
To address the particularities of poor performers when drafting the Law, it was decided 
that enterprises operating at a loss could also be transformed if they could show they 
had either found a way to cover their losses, or simply by reducing the overall value of 
socially owned assets with the consent of the Agency (Article 5). This placed managers 
in a uniquely advantageous position to assume ownership of enterprises through 
controlled bankruptcies (cf Verdery 1996: 211). Given the high dependency of 
enterprises on the above mentioned support networks, it took very little effort to 
bankrupt a company and decrease the value of its assets before applying for a buyout. A 
two year legal vacuum from 1994 to 1996, during which political parties struggled to 
form a stable government, allowed management teams to stop all restructuring activities 
that might increase the value of their enterprises and undermine their chances of buying 
them out (Slaveski 1997: 34). All this was a major concession to the former socialist 
managerial elite who were now in a perfect position to translate their vast social and 
cultural capital (links to influential persons, knowledge and expertise) into economic 
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capital as well. Faced with domestic political instability, war in neighbouring ex-
Yugoslavia, Greek sanctions and domestic interethnic tensions, the state had little 
choice but to sell at whatever price, as well as resort to some “creative” solutions to 
facilitate the sale of SOE’s.  
In order to increase the available capital in circulation the state allowed the use of 
frozen hard currency savings for the purchase of enterprise assets. Namely, due to 
severe inflationary fluctuations of the Yugoslav Dinar during the last years of the 
federation a great number of savers opted to keep their bank savings in more stable 
foreign currencies, usually Deutschemarks. Pressed for hard currency reserves, the 
Yugoslav state encouraged foreign currency deposits by offering high annual interests 
rates on hard currency savings of up to 10 percent. With the demise of Yugoslavia and 
the withdrawal of the Dinar, the Macedonian government found itself ill prepared for 
the introduction of the new currency, the Denar, which took much longer to implement 
than expected. To avoid running out of hard currency, the government continued the 
imposition of capital controls and restricted access to hard currency savings. For savers 
this meant that around half a billion Euros worth of foreign hard currency savings 
continued to be little more than irretrievable numbers in bank accounts.  
The new state appropriated this amount as a public debt by issuing hard currency bonds 
to bank clients with a maturity of 15 years and an annual interest rate of 1.5% (Dnevnik 
1997). Citizens however were allowed to use their bonds prior to maturation at their full 
face value to pay VAT on real estate, pay customs (merchants only), or for the purchase 
of shares from socially owned assets sold by the state. In the meantime however, 
through informal public initiatives, it became possible to trade these “frozen deposits” 
as they became known, for cash in hand at a discount that hovered around 58 percent 
(see Brown 2003: 30). Given the dire economic situation and the lack of requisite 
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information among workers to place informed bids on SOE assets, many newly 
impoverished savers who could not afford to wait for bonds to mature opted to sell their 
savings at extremely unfavourable rates to obtain cash in hand. Managers who did 
possess valuable insider information could thus buy up these “frozen savings” and 
receive a further 58 percent discount when using them to buy enterprise assets.  
When the representative of the Agency, Verica Hadjivasileva-Markovska, gave her 
report before parliament in May 1997 regarding the progress of the privatization 
scheme, the numbers were shocking but somewhat unsurprising. She reiterated that the 
agency lists drawn up in 1993 contained around 1200 enterprises headed for 
privatization with an estimated value of 2.3 billion Deutschmarks (around 1.2 billion 
Euros). By the time of her address the agency had overseen the transformation of 
exactly 1000 enterprises for which the state managed to receive a meagre 167 million 
Deutschemarks, out of which 101 million came from “frozen deposits”, 45 million from 
bonds, and only 21 million came as cash payments. Accusations that the industrial 
commons were being given away for free that were already spreading like wildfire 
appeared vindicated by the numbers. Although highly controversial, the arrangement 
seemed politically less problematic as long as managers could keep enterprises running, 
employ workers and generate tax revenue. Such expectations however turned out to be 
baseless. The traditional eastern and Yugoslav markets were no longer existent and 
technological underdevelopment and political instability made Western markets all but 
inaccessible for local industry. The prevailing credit crunch and the complete absence of 
domestic financial markets made borrowing for investment well-nigh impossible, 
forcing all restructuring efforts to focus almost entirely on reducing labour costs (cf 
Gowan 1995: 14).  
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One by one, hundreds of enterprises lined up for liquidation or bankruptcy with their 
existing owners trying to minimize losses by laying off workers and making a last ditch 
effort to peddle any movable or immovable assets from the enterprise. The number of 
employees in industry dropped from 470,000 in 1990, a year before Macedonia seceded 
from the Yugoslav Federation, to 221,000 in 2000 (Majhoshev 2005: 64). 
Unemployment in 1999 stood at a whopping 47 percent. An ESI (European Stability 
Initiative) study from 2002 centred on the town of Kičevo stated that ‘as in the rest of 
Macedonia … economic transition in Kičevo has amounted to a painful process of de-
industrialisation. A quarter of its socialist era enterprises are already in liquidation, and 
half of the industrial jobs have gone’ (8; my emphasis). For yesterday’s self-managing 
vanguard of society such scenes were unfathomable. Several decades worth of labour 
and investment in what were the centres of their social universe, were now disappearing 
overnight or melting into the pockets of a select few, leaving scores of destitute workers 
behind. The privatization process became commonly referred to as a “robbery of the 
national wealth” and in many ways can be summed up as a financially localized version 
of  a state sanctioned capitalist “accumulation by dispossession” of the industrial 
commons (see Harvey 2004: 75). A former textile worker from Makedonka described to 
me the experience of this process with the following account: 
“The bigger BOALS were the first to be sold and for nothing, they were virtually given 
away for free. And inside there were goods that were worth, and I don't want to 
exaggerate, maybe 25 or 50 times more than what they sold it for. And then they [the new 
owners] started selling the machines, the spare parts and so on. And they not only got 
their money back but doubled their profits. There were machines that were still in their 
wrapping there … Wagons of iron and metal were shipped out. Colleagues of mine were 
going there as hired labour to do the cutting and dismantling. They were cutting them up 
and crying for having to destroy good machines. And no one can tell me that they could 
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not start something to feed at least a few families in there. All those years it worked and 
the town lived from it and now all of a sudden its scrap metal!?” 
The final question is one often posed by those who lived through the privatization of 
their enterprises. Consistent with heritage of Yugoslav socialism, when speaking about 
the closing of factories workers do not mourn the loss of political rights to govern in 
and through the factory. The language instead is focused on the loss of economic rights 
to a portion of the social product and the ritual cycle of production and consumption 
that constituted the communal life of the related self. Thus the role of factories is to 
sustain people which means more than just securing certain standards of living and 
levels of consumption. It also means firmly locating economic activity as a socially 
embedded practice performed by moral subjects with mutual obligations.  
In contrast, these daily scenes of privatization seemed more like a ritual transformation 
of “subjects into objects, owners into property and profit into debt” (Dunn 2004: 32). 
Instead of transforming wasteful socialist enterprises into technologically modern and 
efficient capitalist ones, the process generated a popular perception that privatization 
meant the transformation of perfectly operational SOE’s into worthless junk. But for 
workers there was much more to SOE’s than places of employment. They were the sites 
where social status and identity were realized and performed and their undoing threated 
the foundations of both. This symbolic crisis was objectified in the actual physical 
deterioration of SOE’s. The machines, albeit now useless, continued to operate in a 
sense as symbols of changing social relations and power struggles in which workers 
ended up as the losers (cf Narotzky 1997: 111). In the act of cutting, workers found 
themselves embodying an altogether different economic subject position as owners of 
nothing more than their labour power that few were now even willing to purchase. In 
other words, workers became a kind of labouring surplus, severed from the webs of 
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mutuality and interdependence that held the previous system together. Given the 
importance of these webs for the integrity of the moral self, it should come as no 
surprise that the economic transformation brought upon the unsuspecting a profound 
crisis of personhood (see Ferguson 2013: 230). 
 
4.4 Suturing the Market Ideology 
Such developments brought new challenges to the economic orthodoxy that had been 
steadily gaining ground since 1989 that “advocates the myth of a natural order emerging 
in full glory –including stability, prosperity and welfare- as soon as the shackles of 
public ownership and state regulation are removed” (Brabant 1992: 94). A World Bank 
analysis of “The First Ten Years of the Transition” could only confirm the obvious fact 
that “concentrated ownership alone is not enough for effective governance” (Pradeep 
2002: 72). This was clearly visible in the debates that took place during the special 
parliamentary session on privatization in May 1997 following the presentation of the 
Agency’s report. Opposition MP Ace Kocevski accused the government that 
privatization did not seem to increase efficiency and that “those enterprises that worked 
well in the past were bought by managers who ran them, thus replacing management 
with ownership … and so continued to work efficiently in the new conditions, in other 
words efficiency was not achieved through privatization”6. He further added that the 
state had made a lousy bargain by making a deal with insiders and selling enterprises 
cheaply in order to keep workers employed, only to end up with little revenue from 
sales as well as hundreds of thousands of people on welfare.  
                                                          
6
 Stenographic notes from the first Continuation of the 68tth session of the parliament of the Republic of 
Macedonia, held on the 27th of May 1997. Accessed from:  
http://www.sobranie.mk/WBStorage/Files/68sednica1prod27maj97.pdf 
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Taki Fiti, the minister of finance from the reformed Communist Party of Macedonia, 
and now renamed Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM), defended the 
numbers by arguing that the low revenue was a result of the poor productivity of 
enterprises. “The only thing that determines the value of enterprises is their capacity to 
generate profit ... we have this understanding that an enterprise is worth a lot because it 
has magnificent halls and warehouses and this is absurd.”7 Testifying to the power of 
the neoliberal idea at the time among former communists, Fiti brought up in his defence 
Margaret Thatcher as an example of someone who “was also sharply criticized for 
selling state assets at a very low price, which many later realized was untrue.” The main 
problem, Fiti reiterated, was to be found in the “financial dubiousness, management 
issues, and problematic organization of production in SOEs”. In concluding Fiti told 
MPs that it is too soon to judge because “privatization on its own is not a panacea” and 
that “the real effects of privatization in Great Britain came fifteen years later.”  
Reflecting parliamentary debates in Macedonia, in 1997 the OECD published a series of 
papers by transition economists analyzing the progress of Eastern European states 
where it was possible to argue that: 
“It is somewhat misleading to describe the problem with East European economies as 
primarily one of state ownership … What the decades of communist misallocation 
produced, especially in areas with little preexisting industrial base, was a set of white 
elephants in the middle of nowhere, with whole cities and regions dependent on 
dysfunctionally huge industries with very low quality of capital stock and an 
organizational structure incapable of functioning in a normal economic environment” 
(Frydman & Rapaczynski 1997: 264; my emphasis).  
                                                          
7
 Stenographic notes from the first Continuation of the 68tth session of the parliament of the Republic of 
Macedonia, held on the 27th of May 1997. Accessed from:  
http://www.sobranie.mk/WBStorage/Files/68sednica1prod27maj97.pdf 
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Thus, in the following paragraph we are told that: 
“The pain of transition is directly proportional to the amount of ‘creative destruction’ that 
market forces are apt to inflict on the former state sector. The greater the proportion of 
firms without any reason for their existence under the new conditions, the less 
privatisation can do to soften the hard landing in a competitive environment. Under any 
regime, the essentially non-reformable, value subtracting firms must be closed down if 
they are not to continue to drain the resources needed in other, more dynamic sectors of 
the economy” (ibid). 
Socialism here no longer figures as the competing alternative to capitalism, but as a 
theatre of the absurd, an unmanageable and unmarketable illogical system whose 
elements could never possibly form a functioning whole no matter how they are 
rearranged. The lunacy of the system is elevated to such levels that one could blame it 
not only for making companies work poorly under socialism but also for the fact that 
they could not work at all under capitalism. If the havoc wreaked by market forces is 
seen as a “creative destruction”, socialist firms stand in opposition as “destructive 
creations” – a cancerous tissue invading other vital organs. The patient itself turned out 
to be the illness. Poland’s Lech Walesa’s famously summed it up with a liquid 
metaphor: “It is easy to turn an aquarium (capitalism) into fish soup (communism), but 
not so easy to turn fish soup back into an aquarium.” What else is one to do but toss it 
out the window and start anew?  
That this logic had taken a strong foothold could be seen in an interview given in 2000 
by Sam Vaknin, a staunch monetarist liberal. Vaknin, an Israeli physicist turned 
economist and stockbroker, made his first public appearance in Macedonia 1996 when 
the SDUM hired him as a consultant for setting up the Macedonian stock exchange (a 
somewhat dubious choice considering that he spent most of the previous year in prison 
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after an Israeli court had found him guilty on three counts of stock fraud.) In any case, it 
was during this period that Vaknin first met Nikola Gruevski, the current long-serving 
prime minister of Macedonia, and then a young economics graduate who was one of the 
first active traders on the local stock market. Vaknin became his close friend and 
economics mentor and in 1998 the two published a book together duscussing the main 
challenges facing the Macedonian economy. That same year, the SDUM bore the brunt 
of total economic failure and unsurprisingly lost the general elections to the 
conservative IMRO-DPMNU (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity). In 1999 Gruevski was appointed 
finance minister in IMRO conservative government, and brought in Vaknin as a special 
economic advisor to the government. In February 2000, Vaknin was also appointed as a 
member of the government committee for reforming the country's wage system and 
labour legislation in order to increase flexibility and liberalize the labour market (see 
Vaknin 2002). In April of that year, the self-assured Vaknin was unambiguous in 
announcing to the public the policies the new government needed to undertake:  
“Macedonia knows what it has to do and it has known what it has to do for the last ten 
years. What was lacking was not the knowledge - but the political will and a modicum of 
courage and leadership. Whatever one thinks about this government - it is confronting 
difficult issues head on. We have to fire people in loss-making factories. We have to 
reform the banking system by opening it up to foreign investment. We have to collect 
more taxes by any means necessary - many of these means disagreeable. We have to 
privatize by selling directly to investors, if there is no other choice. This is a very partial 
list. And we have to absorb the public's ire and wrath. It is part of the price we have to 
pay for finally doing what needed to have been done long ago.” 
After being questioned on whether this would not bring about further collapse of the 
economy, Vaknin added in somewhat prophetic terms that: 
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We have to collapse first in order to grow later. This is what the previous governments 
refused to accept. Decades of socialism left in their wake such devastation that the only 
sensible thing to have done is to erase everything and to start anew. Instead, previous 
governments tried to patch things up, to insert a finger in the bursting dike. The next two 
years will be horrible. People will lose their jobs. Factories will be closed. The state 
administration will be cut. The tax burden will increase. It won't be easy. But, if everyone 
will lend a hand and understand that we have no choice - this too shall pass. A new dawn 
will rise. The remaining factories will be lean, mean and efficient. The remaining 
workers will be industrious and conscientious. The remaining businesses will pay taxes. 
The country will seem much more appealing: modern, streamlined, efficacious, 
functioning. One has to go on a severe diet to look good later (in Vaknin 2010: 104; my 
italics).  
Unsurprisingly, the IMRO were punished at the next elections in 2002 by an electorate 
with little appreciation for having been put on a strict diet of utter destitution. Power 
went back to the Social Democrats, who once more did little to alter the course of the 
privatization. In a sense, Vaknin merely expressing in plain unadorned English what 
became a matter of political consensus by the end of the nineties, which was basically 
that the specific goal of the transition was no longer to transform existing unprofitable 
enterprises into profitable ones. “Privatization” gradually developed into a more general 
project of social engineering aimed at introducing order where there had previously 
been none. What needed remaking were not just factories, but the entire state and the 
economic subjects that populate it. But there is another important element we must 
highlight in this narrative, that being the openly selective nature of this process. The 
brave new world of streamlined efficiency is only for those still “remaining” after doing 
what must be done. The “rest” are an unnamed and unrecognized abject-surplus. In 
other words, economic transformation and development is no longer concerned with 
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broader issues of social and economic inequalities but is designed to “enhance, quite 
specific, selected targets to optimize their comparative advantage” (Smith 2011: 6).  
For Vaknin, it is literally the quest for modernity itself that is at stake, in opposition to 
the irrational devastation left by socialism. Perhaps the greatest irony of this argument is 
found in its capacity to ignore the fundamentally modernizing mission of the socialist 
project. However, for the communists, modernity was understood in terms of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization, and the reformation of the “ossified” peasantry into 
the socialist citizen-producers of tomorrow under the watchful guidance of an already 
enlightened elite.  Thriftiness, efficiency and conscientiousness were not irrelevant to 
this project - they were core values to be achieved through the system of self-
management. This was much in line with the Marxist critique of the bourgeois strategy 
separating private morality and public reason, or state from society which for the 
socialists led to the formation of a depoliticized and alienated proletariat (Turner 1993: 
16).  
In contrast, Vaknin’s promise of modernity and order is Parsonian in that it assumes that 
rationality is based on an economistic model of objective calculation and pursuit of 
material interest. It stands in opposition to morality which is seen as a feature of the 
non-rational and normative aspects of social life that lead to subjective and emotionally 
led concerns such as altruism (Levine 1991: 191). Parsons believed that the task of 
sociology is to study the latter whereas economists should busy themselves with the 
former (ibid). Embarking on the task, the economist Vaknin announces this separation:  
1) in order to rebuild the economy, the country must carry out rational reforms and 
create a market driven model where the competition for scarce resources increases 
efficiency and productivity; and 2) in the process, the country must sideline and 
neutralize the petty moralizing that will inevitably emerge as a result of the suffering 
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that the reforms will unleash, by branding it a vestige of a non-rational socialist inability 
to separate the economic from the moral. Depriving socialism of any claim to reason 
ultimately deprived it a place in the new modern era of market rationality and further 
strengthened the argument for the “disembedding” of economic activity. Also, the 
sequestration of rationality by the economic paved the way for the new elite, supposedly 
in possession of authoritative and exclusive forms of knowledge, to step in as the new 
vanguard of progress.  
But the self-assured claims of neoliberal modernizers that post-socialist economies 
would quickly catch up following the initial shocks of restructuring, have fallen far 
from those expectations. The economic trajectory of Macedonia post 1989 has been one 
of precipitous collapse followed by a feeble rebound to levels that are still below those 
existing in 1989. Yugoslavia’s total share of world product in 1990 stood at .48, 
whereas in 2008 its combined successor states comprised no more than .06 (Böröcz 
2012: 115), making Vaknin's modernizing narrative appear emphatically short-sighted 
insofar as it assumed a linear pathway and a predictable set of outcomes (Li 2009: 69). 
In addition, the early period of socialism was marked by significant improvements in 
economic performance and living standards which directly contradicts the neoliberal 
critique of socialism as an inherently unworkable economic system (ibid: 111). With 
hindsight, it becomes easier to approach this kind of economic rhetoric as precisely that: 
a discursive assault on socialist concepts powered by the economic jargon of Austrian 
school economics, supposedly demonstrating the logical impossibility of the very notion 
of a socialist economy (see Aligica & Evans 2009: 145).  
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4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The redefinition of socialism as chaos was certainly an important rhetorical device for 
pursuing popular consensus for the imposition of neoliberalism as a new kind of 
“common sense way in which [people] interpret, live in, and understand the world” 
(Harvey 2005: 3). Rather than economic growth, the main achievement of this rhetoric 
has been to facilitate the withdrawal of the state through its ideological exposure to the 
forces of international economic operators (Gowan 1995: 9; Böröcz 2012: 121), and the 
introduction of new mechanisms for the realignment of “economic, social and personal 
conduct with [neoliberal] socio-political objectives” (Miller & Rose 1990: 2). But it is 
precisely this attempt to introduce an all-encompassing neoliberal rationality and erase 
former knowledge-practice systems that generated cleavages in the new ideology.  The 
privatization process did not simply clear the ground for the unfettered ideological 
growth of capitalism but became the loci of a “complex negotiation of reality” (Ong 
1988: 28). 
For example this is evident in the failed attempts of privatizers to use “particular 
technical devices of writing, listing, numbering and [accounting]” that were supposed to 
turn SOEs into “knowable, calculable and administrable objects” (Miller & Rose 1990: 
5). Instead, SOEs were found to be “fundamentally inauditable” (Dunn 2004: 40), both 
through the failed attempts to submit them to capitalist accounting procedures and in 
their classification (i.e. rejection) as economically unworkable “destructive creations”. 
The process of neoliberalization did not follow the Foucauldian metaphor of “stacking” 
a new discursive grid upon another and in the process making invisible previous forms 
of knowledge and practice. As will become apparent in the chapters to come, neoliberal 
planners found the legacy of self-management not only impossible to “(re)organize” but 
also difficult to erase. Socialist practices and subjects that could not be made to 
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disappear were instead reified and exhibited as artefacts of the absurd, such as factories 
that produce nothing of value or workers demanding their “fair” share of nothing.  
In other words, the conceptual categories and practices of socialism simply became in 
Mary Douglas’ words “like matter out of place” (Douglas 1996 [1970]: 153), and a 
“contravention of order”, by which she means the “by-product of a systematic ordering 
and classification of matter, insofar as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate 
elements” (Douglas 2001 [1966]: 36). Such elements involve complex socio-symbolic 
categories of personhood (such as the embedded “socialist worker”) and certain aspects 
of the “welfare state”. The categories that formed part of the moral economy of 
Yugoslav workers were re-classified as an impediment to the development of society 
and the individual. In Turner’s terms, we can interpret this kind of re-classification as a 
ritually orchestrated separation of socialist workers from their social position in the 
“moral economy” of Yugoslav socialism; and placing them into an ambiguous liminal 
space, from where they can be called upon to assume their new roles as conscientious 
and industrious entrepreneurs whose value is based on productivity and market demand. 
In effect, the privatisation process sought to unleash the possessive individual and 
establish the foundations of a competitive labour market. If it was labour who employed 
capital during socialism, privatization ensured that, yet again, capital will employ 
labour. But as already hinted, not everyone is “hailed”, as Althusser would say, by 
capital to realize their “marketable labour capacities” (Smith 2011: 16); nor do those 
who are hailed, necessarily respond to the terms of the calling. In the following chapter 
I will discuss the complications arising from this political process in terms of class and 
personhood. Particularly, I will look at the terms of interaction between the newly 
released labour force, the state and the former managerial elite.  
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Fig. 5. Makedonka today: scenes of decay 
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The old cotton mill. Plaque to the left dated 6-IV-1952 says: “The work collective received the 
management of the Cotton Mill” 
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Fig. 6. Selected Economic Indicators (taken from Jeffries 2002: 357) 
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Part III: Negotiating Change: Free Markets and Dependent Workers 
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Chapter V: Subsuming Labour 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I analysed the decline and transformation of Yugoslavia’s and 
Macedonia’s socialist economies and the separation of the labouring population from 
the webs of socialist dependence. Polanyi described a similar process in his analysis of 
forms of paternalism in pre-industrial Britain. In particular, he singled out the invention 
of the “right to live” with the enactment of the Speenhamland law in 1795, which 
guaranteed wage subsidies so that a minimum income could be assured for the poor 
irrespective of their earnings (2001: 82). The immediate aim of the law was to offer the 
minimum amount of social protection for impoverished fellow Christians, towards 
which there existed a moral obligation to provide assistance.  But while Speenhamland 
“protected labour from the dangers of the market system” it directly undermined the 
capitalist economy by preventing the emergence of a free labour market, leading to a 
depression in wages and a rise in pauperism. As the scope of industrial market society 
enveloped the countryside, paternalism became identified with everything that was 
wrong in society and gave license to the imperative to liberalize and regulate through 
markets. Eliminating Speenhamland and the “right to live” turned into a prerequisite for 
the establishment of a free labour market without which a capitalist economy could not 
function (2001: 84). The immediate effects of reducing moral subjects to labour power 
were devastating for the poor and before long “it was not the absence but the presence 
of a competitive labour market that was the new source of danger” (ibid: 87).  
A similar rationality was certainly made explicit by the ideologues of neoliberal 
transformation in Macedonia through the political and ideological assault on everything 
socialist and the promise of neoliberal modernity. But the great turn towards efficiency 
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and productivity has left many expectations unrealized. Twenty five years after the 
neoliberal onslaught, the large industrial reserve army that the state managed to place on 
the labour market remains to a large extent unabsorbed by capital. In the June 2013 IMF 
country report Macedonia’s youth unemployment rate was ranked 4th in Europe at just 
over 50 percent but topped the charts in both the overall rate of unemployment (over 30 
percent) as well as the long-term unemployment rate (IMFCR 2013: 4). These numbers 
have hardly changed in spite of an average real output growth rate of three percent a 
year between 2006 and 2012 (ibid: 3). This “lean mean” economy is not just 
experienced as an overall decline in living standards and working conditions, but as the 
disintegration of the moral community and of the integrity of the moral self. As argued, 
releasing workers from the socialist webs of dependence also meant the transformation 
of embedded subjects into discarded abjects. Polanyi warned against the dehumanizing 
consequences of reducing individuals to nothing more than labour power with a market 
value, and he remained convinced in “society’s” inbuilt capacity to protect itself. 
Moreover, he suggested that the only way a person thus robbed of the social status 
afforded by paternalism could “regain his soul” is by “his constituting himself the 
member of a new class” (2001: 103), the effects of which were not to be felt until the 
onset of trade-unionism in the 1870s. It was in the very abolishment of Speenhamland 
that Polanyi saw “the true birthday of the modern working class, whose immediate self-
interest destined them to become the protectors of society against the intrinsic dangers 
of a machine civilization” (ibid: 105).  
The twenty five year old history of market based reforms in Macedonia does not share 
Polanyi’s optimism, and the prospects of a self-interested class movement emerging 
from the rubble of socialism appear to be diminishing rather than growing with the 
passage of time. Despite this, the analysis in the pages to follow will seek to show that 
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in the face of absent class based strategies, workers in Macedonia have still been able to 
mitigate the effects of marketization and commoditization and to “regain their soul” by 
challenging the kinds of inequalities that develop within a market based society. As 
argued already, the transition from socialism to neoliberalism was not a movement from 
dependence to autonomy but a movement from social inequality to asocial inequality. In 
other words, a shift from a relation of dependence wherein workers were recognized as 
moral subjects with the ability to make claims on their superiors, to a relation of 
dependence wherein they persist as commodities with a market determined exchange 
value.  
It is this legacy of the socialist moral economy that resonates and is refracted within 
contemporary strategies through which workers seek to create forms of dependence and 
inequality that are firmly contextualized within the fleeting boundaries of some kind of 
moral community. Such strategies are almost by necessity non-class based given that 
they seek out forms of “thick” social recognition from the Other in a social context 
where the language of class is being increasingly deprived of currency. Social 
recognition also entails a whole gamut of factors ranging from gender, age, ethnicity, 
skill and education, all of which have their separate effects on the way different 
categories of workers relate to each other and with influential others. We are thus 
dealing with a heteroglossia of voices relying on multiple strategies. It is at this point 
that we also need to bring in language as the point of convergence between praxis and 
the imagination particularly when it comes to the task of constituting the moral self 
within the context of a larger imagined “whole”.   
The two following two chapters will explore the themes laid out in this introduction and 
are to be read as one. I will try to isolate and analyse a number of separate categories of 
workers in order to illustrate both the process of creating a “free” labour market and the 
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emerging distinctions and points of contact within it. I will firstly look at the dissolution 
of unionized labour, the divisive politics of the state and the role of international 
financial operators. I will then proceed to examine two main sections of the new-old 
industrial workforce that correspond to two different kinds of abjection, using examples 
from the garment and textile industries in Shtip: firstly, the skilled and (mostly) female 
garment labourers that were highly sought after by the emerging capitalist elite. These 
are the workers who faced the prospects of commoditization and alienation in the 
workplace, and sought to negotiate their re-entry and position within the new 
exploitative relations in production. Secondly, there are the workers for whom the 
dispossession of the industrial commons was never attached to “any prospect of labour 
absorption” to begin with (Li 2009: 69), effectively reducing them to an unnecessary 
“surplus” in relation to the requirements of capital accumulation (ibid: 67). Smith 
(2011: 4) refers to this form of capitalism as “selective hegemony” and contrasts it with 
the “expansive hegemony” of the “Keynesian National Welfare State”. The focus on 
“selectivity” is useful here in highlighting the creation of surplus populations whose 
predicament is not to be found in their “interpellation” or subjection to the interests of 
capital, but in that they became not worth subjecting and were cast off by market society 
(Ferguson 2013: 231). I will not analyse these groups in isolation but in dialogue with 
the state and the new industrialists-employers. I will be drawing on data from personal 
interviews and communication with people in Shtip, as well as newspaper archives and 
other literature. By exploring the various strategies of dependence deployed by these 
different categories of people, I hope to shed some light on the social formations and 
politics of class and personhood under changing labour regimes. 
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5.2 The Brief Rise and Fall of Unionized Resistance 
The period of the nineties was marked with an unprecedented number of strikes and 
protests and an upsurge in the activity of unions. The new economic and political 
realities demanded that unions reinvent themselves and abandon their traditional 
educational roles and take the fight to the streets to articulate the plight of workers. The 
various demands of workers in this period were mostly directed at the state and reflected 
the overall collapse of industry and the personal loss of any semblance of security and 
stability. Country wide union reports covering the period from 1996 to 2002 showed 
that, starting from the most frequent, there were 470 demands relating to higher wages, 
payment of unpaid wages, wage benefits etc; around 284 demands were made to replace 
existing management structures; 237 demands were made relating to unpaid 
contributions, pension insurance and health insurance; 115 demands were made to 
governments to ensure continuous production and better working conditions (granting 
credits for production, providing raw materials, heating, health and safety equipment 
etc.); 111 demands were made to revise the privatization schemes that transformed 
socially owned enterprises  (Majhoshev 2005: 82-83).  The most frequent demands from 
1999 onwards focused on securing health and pension insurance and continuous 
production in factories with the aid of state credits (ibid: 160) and securing welfare 
support for workers from former socially owned enterprises with over 25 years of work 
experience until their next employment or retirement. Unsurprisingly, there were no 
demands to “return” SOE’s in the hands of workers and the overall focus was on 
maintaining state patronage and protection from the debilitating effects of 
marketization.   
Being a core industrial hub, Shtip’s struggling workforce took much of the initiative and 
public limelight as the two garment and textile industry giants, Makedonka and Astibo, 
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felt the full sting of economic decline. The state struggled throughout the nineties with 
futile attempts to keep Makedonka alive by implementing various restructuring 
programs, partially laying off workers and granting loans for production. The efforts 
came to an end in the middle of 2001 when, after being pressured by the World Bank, 
the IMRO government of Ljubcho Georgievski announced its decision to liquidate the 
enterprise by December the 31st of that year. Around fifty workers arrived in front of 
the parliament building in Skopje and pitched tents in the park opposite the main 
entrance in a desperate attempt to make their plight visible to those in power. The 
protest gave no direct results and the timing itself was particularly inconvenient. In the 
summer of 2001 the country found itself facing yet another precipice when sporadic 
clashes with Albanian separatists in the Northwest began threatening to transform 
themselves into outright civil war. Economic issues briefly fell in the background as 
public attention was captured by negotiations with the rebels.  
In January 2002 the government reiterated its decision to liquidate Makedonka along 
with a number of other enterprises and announced that by doing so they had met all the 
necessary conditions for receiving the second tranche of loans from the WB (Popovska 
2002). This sparked further unrest among workers that culminated in April 2002 with a 
massive protest organized by the Macedonian Union of Syndicates that included 
workers from textiles, metal, mining and automobile industries as well as public 
administration workers. The number of protesters exceeded 50,000 people who voiced 
their indignation in front of the parliament and government buildings (Majhoshev 2005: 
162). After Union delegates were prevented from entering the parliament the mass of 
workers tried to storm the building which led to violent clashes with the security forces 
during which ten workers and union delegates ended up with light injuries. No 
negotiations took place on that day. The following month unions organized a joint 
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country wide strike that again included between fifty to seventy thousand workers from 
industry and the public sector. Left wing intellectuals celebrated the event as a massive 
show of workers’ solidarity displaying the revolutionary potential of the working 
classes (see Atevik and Weston 2002). The show of solidarity however turned out to be 
short lived. Whereas industrial workers were demanding the usual payments of wages 
and contributions in arrears, or loans to restart factories, public sector employees were 
mostly affected by a drop in real wages.  
Up until 2001 both left and right wing governments had been justifying their policies of 
holding down public sector wages by referring to pressures from the IMF with which a 
number of stand-by loan agreements were made in the nineties. IMF policies 
traditionally conditioned all governments to support strict austerity measures such as 
wage freezes and labour deregulation. Funds were channelled towards supporting the 
country’s balance of payments and agreements explicitly disallowed the use of credits to 
support budgetary obligations such public sector wages (Majhoshev 2012: 241; 
Stevkovska 2010). However, in 2001 the IMRO government decided not to renew its 
agreement with the IMF that year in order to uphold its decision to partially reimburse 
over 10,000 people who lost sixty million Euros in an ignominious pyramid scheme set 
up between 1992 and 1997 (Jeffries 2002: 347; Vest 2002). This decision provoked 
immediate criticism from the IMF representative in Macedonia (Sodikj and Petkovski 
2002), but it allowed the government more liberties in their negotiations with the 
strikers. The result was a twenty percent increase in wages for public sector employees, 
thus appeasing the majority of the strikers and isolating them from industrial workers 
(see Majhoshev 2005: 162). Only ten years before, the distinction between industrial 
and public sector employees would have been much more difficult to make, as both 
categories could be treated as members of SOE’s with similar sets of rights. Public 
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sector workers now occupied an altogether different and, to a great extent, privileged 
class position, secured not by their market value but by state decree (see Parry 2009: 
183). Instead of unity, the strike only highlighted the different ways in which capital 
and the state interacted with the various subsections of labour.  
Industrial Union delegates leading the strike failed even to get an audience with the 
government and the momentum was losing ground fast. Privatisation and everything 
that came with it appeared irreversible and irresistible. The following year saw the last 
street protests of workers though their numbers had dwindled to less than three 
thousand. Although the emerging private sector managed to absorb some of the newly 
released workforce, union surveys of its membership in over one hundred struggling ex-
SOE’s in ten municipalities, showed that around eighty two percent of those surveyed 
were of the opinion that open protest was no longer considered a viable strategy for 
pursuing their demands (Majhoshev 2005: 169). The unions themselves quickly began 
to disintegrate and lose legitimacy. By 2012 the Union of Syndicates of Macedonia had 
dropped to no more that forty two thousand members in the entire private sector 
(Majhoshev 2012: 143) and had shifted their strategy towards less antagonistic 
approaches such as the implementation of collective agreements and negotiations.  
In Shtip, when I interviewed Andon Majhoshev, a former union official, he attributed 
the decimation of the union’s membership to widespread disappointment stemming 
from “too much failure” and a feeling of “helplessness”. He recounted one of his last 
attempts to build a union membership in one of Shtip’s garment factories: 
“We approached one factory to try and recruit workers and the owner told me that the 
factory is a bigger union then the union itself. He looked at me and he told me ‘What are 
you going to do for them [the workers]? Are you going to give them higher wages? I am 
the one who gives them wages’ he said. ‘I am the one who will decide whether they 
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receive higher wages. I am the one who gives them medical insurance. I will pay for their 
hospital expenses if they get injured, we sell them products at discounted prices, pay their 
contributions. If they get into some money problems we can help them out. The company 
can give them a loan. What can you do for them?’ And I wasn't really sure what to tell 
him. The problem was that the union really could not offer much to the workers under the 
current conditions. We were broke, we had no money, which is only natural because we 
did not have a membership. Without any active members the union really did not have 
much to offer the workers.” 
To many contemporary activists and social rights movements, this shift marked the 
complete conceptual abandonment of collective “class” struggle and the total 
capitulation of labour to capital. But whilst this particular capitalist was being 
dismissive of unions, he was already making a different kind of concession: firstly, that 
wage levels are not determined by invisible “market-forces”, but by flesh and blood 
people; and secondly, that simple wage remuneration is not the only legitimate relation 
that can take place between himself and his employees.  In the pages to follow I will 
explore how such concessions and relations are made, denied and negotiated, and 
extrapolate the wider political implications of this process.  
 
5.3 “Liberating” Garment Labour 
The brief account above shows that although “shock therapy” was met with 
considerable social unrest the dissolution of unionized labour was nonetheless carried 
out with relative success. All in all, the dismantling of unionized movements and the 
steep rise in unemployment, paint an irremediably grim picture of the political power of 
workers in the new economy. But this does not mean that workers have been unable to 
continue negotiating their socio-economic position by other means. Hardt and Negri 
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suggest that we should re-examine the common wisdom that low union representation 
and the lack of collective political organization lead to a weak and powerless working 
class (2000: 269). On the contrary, they see working class power to reside “not in 
representative institutions but in the antagonism and the autonomy of the workers 
themselves” (ibid). In other words, labouring populations are just as - if not more - 
likely to develop forms of creative autonomy outside the factory, by using strategies 
that rely, among other things, on the active refusal to work (ibid). In this section I will 
focus on this last point, but I depart from Hardt and Negri in that I do not treat this 
refusal as a longing for autonomy. On the contrary, I approach the refusal to work as the 
refusal for entering economic relations defined by “asocial inequality” and a longing for 
“social inequality”, which can wreak all sorts of headaches for the industrial elites. Let 
me turn to some examples.  
When I interviewed Danica, one of the first businesswomen to open a private garment 
factory in Shtip she recalled the challenges she faced when searching for willing 
workers for her small production line in the early nineties. Danica had worked as a line 
manager in Astibo since the early seventies and quit Astibo in 1990 to work for a 
British company with production facilities in Macedonia. British investors had been 
particularly attracted by the declining value of the Yugoslav Dinar in those years which 
made purchasing labour and materials in Yugoslavia a very lucrative affair. The 
company was reluctant to continue working with Astibo directly as it was seen as 
lacking the necessary “flexibility” to adjust to the declining international value of 
labour. After approaching Danica, she had agreed to leave Astibo to work as a quality 
controller but also to assist in attracting skilled workers from Astibo into their 
production line. This second task however proved impossible at first.  
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“We needed only twenty workers but a hundred and twenty came for testing. By then the 
smaller firms were already going under and there was a lot of available labour, but I had 
only two women that wanted to cross over from Astibo. It was a great risk you know. 
People still saw security in the public firms. None of us thought that Yugoslavia would 
fall apart. No one thought that the time had come for a new system. I crossed over for 
financial reasons. Wages had gone down significantly in Astibo and the English offered 
me a salary 30 times what I was getting in Astibo. I thought that even if I lose this job 
after a year I will have earned 30 years’ worth of wages by then.” 
In the end Danica had to personally train the new workers and supervise the small 
production unit they had set up in a small apartment. After some time they had moved 
to a larger space in Shtip’s industrial zone but the principals of recruitment remained the 
same. Sudden change came when in 1994 her British employers decided to pull out of 
now independent Macedonia as the new currency, the Denar, no longer offered a 
favourable exchange rate to the Pound. After some negotiations regarding the price of 
the company, Danica took out a loan and took ownership of the company herself.  
“And we still had the same problems. Workers in Astibo had an allergy to private 
employers. Astibo was barely working but it was still standing. It wasn’t until 97 that 
they started to cross over.” By then the garment producing giant was fully defunct and 
had for some time not been able to pay out regular wages nor contributions to its 
workers. But even though some of the workforce was being released the process was 
still slow going. In April 2003 Astibo’s union declared that it still registered 1804 
workers, which was a decrease of only 450 workers in the past 5 years (a good portion 
of which had been retirees). It seemed that the “self-regulating” labour market was long 
overdue for some assistance.  
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After more than a decade of decline and lack of investments that year the government 
decided to sell the factory at a public auction with a starting price of 2.5 million Euros. 
The initial winning bid made by an Italian company for 2.2 million was withdrawn after 
the owner inspected the grounds of the factory and concluded that the machines had 
been grossly overvalued. The second best offer came from Sasho Miladinov, a 
successful local businessman and garment factory owner. Touting his “excellent 
business relations with international partners”, Miladinov had offered 2.1 million and 
promised the townsfolk that soon, “most of Astibo’s workers will get back to their jobs” 
(Bojadziski 2003). The deal went to Miladinov. As legally stipulated, he deposited 
10,000 Euros as a guarantee that he would transfer the full sum within 21 days.  
Suspicions however were in the air that Miladinov was in cahoots with a consortium of 
local garment factory owners, led by Vlado Netkov, and trying to bring the price down 
even further. The group consisted mostly of Astibo’s former top management echelon 
who were already exposed to accusations of deliberately working to undervalue the 
factory during the nineties. Nonetheless, the consortium was the next bidder in line with 
an offer of 1.7 million and according to the privatization law, if for whatever reason the 
first ranked bidder pulled out of the deal, the procedure once started would have to 
continue with the second ranked bidder and so on. As it turned out, after 21 days 
Miladinov pulled out citing loss of interest among his international partners. Nada 
Cvetanovska, Astibo’s bankruptcy manager, expressed her disappointment with 
Miladinov who “up until a few days ago was assuring us that there has been no change 
in his intentions or in the intentions of his foreign partners” (Bojadziski 2003b; Dnevnik 
2003). Speculation emerged again that another pull-out was to follow dragging the price 
down even further. However the terms of the auction were changed requiring the buyer 
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to deposit 30 percent of the full sum as a guarantee. Finally the factory was sold to the 
consortium and was split up into a number of private production lines. 
Danica was one of the members of the consortium (as was the owner of Stichko where I 
did most of my fieldwork) and for her the sale of Astibo meant that at long last a large 
pool of skilled workers finally became available. “Then we moved into one of the plants 
and took 120 of former Astibo workers … That wasn’t part of the deal but we told 
people that whoever wanted to work could stay. And then once they crossed over all the 
complaints began.” When I pressed for more information about the specific kinds of 
complaints Danica only offered a broad answer. In her view this had nothing to do with 
differences in work conditions. 
“I claim that in Astibo we worked even more, and we worked overtime, but we are a 
strange people. In that time self-management taught us that we are working for ourselves, 
that the factory is ours … but Astibo did not get transformed into a joint stock company 
where they all received shares instead it remained state owned [sic] and the state was 
selling it. And imagine me personally I worked for 17 years on Saturdays8 [once a month] 
so we could build a kindergarten and other production lines outside of the town. That was 
all made with our labour. And I want to tell you that in their psychology they were not 
used to working for an owner. You know ‘why should I work so that she can get rich?’ 
That was the main reason. And to this very day people are looking at me instead of their 
own job and how much they’ve worked and earned.” 
Danica’s account is in many ways typical in its focus on the absurd “socialist mentality” 
of workers. The recourse to psychology indicates that workers have no objective 
reasons to lament and that the lamentation itself is devoid of logic. Instead of looking at 
                                                          
8
 Danica is here referring to the so called “Solidarity Saturdays”. Workers were asked to “voluntarily” 
spend one Saturday of each month at work and the profits made from this work were to be used for 
improving the facilities for workers at the factory, i.e. child care, medical care, restaurant etc.  
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the larger distribution of wealth, Danica insists that workers ought to look solely at their 
individual achievements which are objectified in wages and perceive themselves as 
uniquely responsible for their actions. Her views are far from isolated and in a sense 
reflect the conceptual break that was being championed by managerial elites since the 
late eighties. Joncho, another former manager from Astibo, likewise emphasized to me 
that the main obstacle to progress and economic efficiency during socialism was the 
structural absence of individual responsibility. According to him, individuals in 
socialism were encouraged to fail by allowing them to “hide behind the worker’s 
collectives as decision making bodies”. 
Also interesting in this narrative is that in both economic models Danica treats workers 
as possessive individuals: in communism workers "falsely" owned (or at least thought 
they did) the products of their own labour, whereas in capitalism they "truly" own only 
their labour power. The transition from one model to the other should be simple enough 
as soon as workers realize that during communism the state was in fact was robbing 
them of their ownership; whereas in capitalism they are allowed and encouraged to 
claim ownership of their labour power as a personal possession to be freely used, 
disposed of and handed to others for a price through the market (Macpherson 1962: 48). 
As such her criticism that workers were wrongfully “taught” that they work for 
themselves (i.e. that they own the end product as opposed to merely their labour) fails to 
capture the full picture. My claim is that when pointing out income discrepancies, 
workers are not so much stressing their personal autonomy as producers (by claiming 
ownership to what they produced). They are criticising the asocial fabric of market 
society as the very basis of the possessive individual which precludes the realization of 
“community life”, and with it, the social and moral needs of the related self. In other 
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words, if workers saw the transition as a movement from social to asocial inequality, 
Danica framed it as a movement from social inequality to market equality. 
The rhetorical focus on the autonomy of the individual and the primacy of self-interest 
is of course the bread and butter of the neoliberal market rationality of profitability, 
progress and development through which emerging social inequalities become 
legitimized. The holistic possessive individual is accountable, measurable and 
answerable for his or her actions, which allows income inequalities to be repackaged as 
distinctions in personal “merit” (as well as for questions of age, class and gender to 
simply vanish).  Promoting such an understanding of the self becomes part and parcel of 
the general program of transforming the economy. Much in the same way that markets 
on their own did not regulate the flow of workers from Astibo to the private factories 
(and depended on a combination of state help and the concerted initiative of local 
business interests), individual workers also required strategic interventions in order to 
be “interpellated as ‘free’ neoliberal subjects” required by the new workplace (Chaput 
& Hanan 2014: 50). 
However, the rhetorical force of this discourse quickly dissolves when faced with the 
question: “Whose profitability, development and progress are being aimed at?” 
(Godelier 1972: 9). This, as will become increasingly evident in the remainder of this 
thesis, is a question that has never ceased to be asked by workers in post-socialist 
Macedonia with widely shared notions about the relationship between employees and 
employers as not just economic (selling labour power) but social and multifaceted 
(Dunn 2004: 153). Some of Danica’s workers may have ended up in literally the same 
working space, or doing the same job, but in a radically different context: one devoid of 
job security, affordable holidays, day-care facilities for children or regular wages. But 
perhaps more importantly, a context that failed to recognize them as moral persons, thus 
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depriving them of the ability to make claims on their new employers who were already 
seen to have amassed their wealth under profoundly dubious conditions (Graeber 
2011b: 191).  
In 2010 Danica was still complaining to reporters that “every day we are hoping to see a 
young person knocking on the doors of our factory for work, but in vain. There’s not a 
whiff of female workers and even the men are in short supply now. In this situation we 
will not be able to respond to the increased demand” (Bojadziski 2010). When I 
interviewed her in 2013 she claimed that the situation had barely changed and that 
workers are still hard to come by in spite of soaring rates of unemployment in the city. 
 
5.4 Framing a Counter-Narrative 
One of the things that immediately struck me when I started doing my research were the 
frequent complaints by factory owners voiced in the media about the difficulty of 
finding labourers. Workers may have been kicked out of their old factories but they 
were not necessarily rushing to join the emerging private assembly lines. Such refusals 
are traditionally supported by relying on support networks of kin and friends or the grey 
economy, but also, by putting pressure on the state and employers to redefine the 
meaning of employment as a multilayered social relationship rather than a purely 
economic one. For many workers the new workplace clearly did not meet not just their 
economic but their moral and social needs.  
In 2004 the local daily Utrinski Vesnik revealed a telling paradox: Greek investors 
trying to open up two garment manufacturing companies could not find eighty willing 
employees in a region that had a registered unemployed workforce of around 22,000 
(Karevski 2004). The reporter interviewed an unemployed textile technician who said: 
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“I would rather continue my miserable existence with the social benefits my 
unemployed husband receives than work in conditions that have been surpassed in the 
nineteenth century”. She goes on to say that “they pay for eight hours a day but make 
you work ten … including on national holidays … and if you so much as mention any 
union, you end up without work the following day” (ibid).  
Statements such as this one filled the daily newspapers on a regular basis and 
contributed to a public condemnation of the new employers. They also capture the 
widely held sentiment that time itself was slipping backwards into eras consigned to 
history books. Rather than ushering in a new era of progress the “transition” was 
experienced as a drifting away from any semblance of modernity. Instead of the much 
flaunted new conceptual order of “market rationality” the world looked rather topsy-
turvy. When I arrived in Macedonia in October 2013 to begin my fieldwork, the most 
common phrase that people used to describe to me the situation in the garment industry 
was “Slaves and slave owners, that’s what you get there”. The metaphor of slavery was 
something I often encountered in the factory. One time, as we were working, my partner 
started whistling a tune and told me: “We’re very musical here. But we don’t sing from 
joy. We’re just like the negroes in the cotton plantations singing the blues.” The 
reference to chattel slavery as a form of dehumanization is often reinforced by 
observations that workers are being treated like “stoka”, which in Macedonian has the 
double meaning of cattle and commodity.  
It should come as no surprise that large sections of the workforce put up various 
displays of refusal to participate in the new economy, or at least a refusal to participate 
consentingly. If Danica’s stress on individuality is an attempt to reduce grievances to “a 
private affair” (Bourdieu 1977: 40), workers complaints can be seen as a set of 
performative utterances that try to “mobilize the largest possible group” by imposing a 
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“collective definition of the situation” (ibid). For workers, it is the new industrialists 
that are “matter out of place”; i.e. morally transgressive “thieves” or peddlers in goods 
who skim the profits without adding any value through their own labour (Thiessen 
2010: 203). Rather than accepting a certain model of personhood as a common good we 
are seeing here a contest “over the social contexts (if any) in which it is appropriate to 
present oneself as a possessive individual” (Martin 2007: 286). Workers were, in other 
words, putting together their own subject categories and counter narrative that draws on 
the legacy and experience of the moral economy of socialism. 
Such symbolically loaded downgrading of the industry has also allowed those who opt 
out of labour to retain the moral high ground and evade some of the common 
accusations of pauperism and loafing. Ironically, the very insistence on brutal 
exploitation as an anachronistic but factual state of affairs directly threatened the full 
transformation of the unemployed into “that monstrosity, an industrial reserve army, 
kept in misery in order to be always at the disposal of capital” (Marx 2012 [1903]: 313). 
As a result employers often find themselves on the back foot and coerced into making 
efforts to improve their public image. In 2006, three years after spearheading the 
dismemberment of Astibo, Vlado Netkov made the following statement: 
“Every day we place ads for new workers but receive no feedback. There are not enough 
qualified workers in the town. The second thing that is forcing us to open factories 
outside Shtip is the realization that in our town an image of us has been created as public 
enemies, as soulless people who are unscrupulously exploiting the workers with overtime 
labour and supposedly low wages. This is also being supported by the town’s authorities. 
And this hurts us, because the people who undertook the risk to invest their capital in 
such uncertain transitional times to create jobs and suffer permanent insomnia, are 
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exposed to daily criticisms without anyone making an analysis about the validity of such 
criticisms” (Bojadziski 2006b).  
A few month earlier, Orce Atanasov, another factory owner from Shtip, made a curious 
appeal to workers in a national daily newspaper:  
“We need eight new seamstresses to whom we can guarantee an eight hour working day, 
and we’re also working on ensuring at least one non-working Saturday in the month ... In 
our town there are around fifty garment factories. I’m not making a big discovery if I say 
that exploitation in the factories is the biggest talk of the town. I want to practically prove 
that it is possible to have regular working hours in the factories and still earn a profit for 
both the workers and the owners” (Bojadziski 2006).  
Atanasov certainly got one thing right: that what went on in the factories was the talk of 
the town. This “factory talk” was, to use Mauss’ term, a total social phenomenon (that 
gives expression at one and the same time to “all kinds of institutions”, whether moral, 
economic or political Mauss (1990 [1950]: 100). Or as Sykes puts it, a total social 
phenomenon “concentrates attention on social relations” and at the same time 
“constitutes those relations” (Sykes 2005: 63). The talk is most conspicuously present in 
public spaces in Shtip such as the main square but more importantly the promenade or 
korzo as it is locally referred, along the canal in the old centre that act as the gathering 
points where people socialize exchange information and experiences. The korzo has 
been a common feature of Balkan towns since the early 19th century and the word 
usually stands for “a public space where people go for a leisurely walk” (see Vućinič-
Neškovič & Miloradovič 2006). The segmentation of the space itself reflects local 
social, political, moral and economic institutions (ibid: 231) and allows people the 
opportunity to “project their own social identity before known and unknown others 
through public presentation and interaction, and to engage with others doing the same” 
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(Graan 2012: 177). More importantly it allows people to performatively engage with 
one another in creating a “collective definition” of the social context. This is precisely 
what took place during my walks with my co-workers as we would stop and meet others 
at various points and discuss life around the factories. They would bump into old 
colleagues, ask about old workplaces share information about wages and employment 
opportunities or lack of; exchange stories  of hardship, complaints about mistreatment, 
excessive overtime, nepotism, unpaid holidays and unrealistic quotas.  
People also never missed an opportunity to point out to me and identify the affluent 
Other of garment manufacturing, i.e. the nouveau riche industrialists. Someone driving 
by in an expensive car would immediately be identified as the owner of a factory or 
member of their family. On one occasion while strolling in the city centre one of my 
friends pointed out to a small unfinished church, whose construction was known to be 
funded by a local factory owner. “Is he trying to reinvest some of the profits in the 
community?” I asked. “Or maybe he’s trying to seek forgiveness for his sins”, was the 
rhetorical reply. The very act of being a wealthy factory owner in a social environment 
beset by poverty and precariousness is seen as a stark moral transgression, a sin one had 
to atone for. The transgression would often be articulated in explicit class terms: “There 
are only two classes in Macedonia today: the rich and the poor. There is no longer a 
middle class for workers”, was a particularly common evaluation.  
It might seem odd to a western ear that garment factory workers should ever consider 
themselves morally offended by their expulsion from a “middle class” position. The 
idea of being middle class, however, has very little to do with education or white collar 
work. The notion of middle-classness is directly inherited from the moral economy of 
Yugoslav consumerism as objectified through the continuous improvement in living 
standards under the watchful eye of a technocratic elite. In effect, privatization did away 
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with these webs of mutuality, or the “social inequalities” of socialism, so as to make 
way for an altogether different type of relation in which the new elites and workers 
become increasingly alienated from one another, an experience once more objectified in 
consumption patterns. It is precisely this distancing that is the object of criticism rather 
than the idea of inequality in absolute terms. The invocation of class concepts by 
workers should not therefore be interpreted as a call for class warfare or unity 
(something which most people in Shtip consider to be a perhaps noble but impossible 
and unworkable “ideal”), but an attempt to rework the contours of inequality so that 
elites can reassume their moral responsibility towards those whom they dominate. This 
however, is as much a practical as it is an imaginative effort to reconstitute the self in 
relation to others in the context of a larger social and moral whole. Peteet rightly argues 
that the everyday sharing of stories of suffering, interwoven with moral and evaluative 
judgements is an important context in which “the moral constitution of the self unfolds” 
(1994: 42).  
 
5.4.1 The Myth of the “Social” Capitalist 
By the time I arrived in Shtip almost anyone could give me a short version of a well-
established narrative on what is happening in the town. During my first cab ride in Shtip 
the driver who noticed my Skopje accent inquired whether I was here on business. 
When I told him I was doing research on the garment industry he immediately shot off: 
“You will hear a lot of things but let me give you the people’s account. Makedonka and 
Astibo were respected companies back in the day where thousands of people and 
families worked and lived off. They were huge exporters that made a good profit and 
gave good salaries. Then when this transition process started under Branko 
[Crvenkovski, PM from 1992-1998], things got out of hand. All of the former managers 
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and directors that held the top spots managed to get a hold on the factories they were in 
charge of during socialism. They got the best deals and paid nothing for the plants they 
got. Not a single drop of sweat came from them in those factories but they got the best 
deals. Now those who were the rich bosses back then got richer and better off and those 
who were the poor workers got even poorer with even less rights. They exploit them, 
people work overtime, on public holidays, on weekends and don’t get paid for it. 
Salaries are irregular and very low. The managers are scum. There was one factory in 
Babite [neighbourhood in Shtip] where the manager had slept with or abused half of the 
[female] workers in the plant. 
The labour inspectors don’t give a shit. They come to the factory with nothing and leave 
with bags of stuff and don’t report anything. I used to work in a factory for two years 
myself but I couldn’t take it. I can’t take all that stuff that goes on in there. I’m the 
rebellious type. My wife still works in one though.  
You don’t know that factory that shut down a few years ago. It was opened  up by this 
German fellow who was running it  for a while and he promised the workers 300 Euros 
salaries  and other benefits, like 50 euro Christmas  bonuses etc. But then he left the 
factory in the hands of local managers and they made a proper mess of things. They 
were sending money from Germany for the workers that never got to them because the 
managers were skimming the bonuses for themselves and paying the workers 150 Euros 
on top of that.  When word got to Germany about what was happening the owner just 
shut down the factory and moved production elsewhere. Those are the people you have 
to work with.” 
This brief narrative contains four important elements that capture the morally 
transgressive experience of the transition, such as: theft, rape, deception and expulsion, 
all of which jointly constitute an account of moral decay and social disintegration, i.e. 
abjection. In the plot workers appear as wrongfully dispossessed of their property by an 
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amoral conglomerate of government and business forces. The state is personified in the 
face of corrupt labour inspectors. There follows a Marxist account of exploitation that 
seamlessly transitions into a more vivid moral transgression, namely the violation of the 
sanctity of female bodies by voracious managers with extreme sexual powers.  The use 
of gendered and kin terms is more than accidental and provides the idiom to articulate 
the morally transgressive nature of the new workplace. It speaks of the workers’ loss of 
control over their bodies but is also a way of rebelling against the workers' “lack of 
control over social relations in the factory” (Ong 1988: 34), or relations that are 
increasingly becoming asocial, i.e. situated beyond the limits of a binding moral 
community and mutual obligations. The narrative paints a grim picture that captures a 
widely shared experience of moral decay and social disorder. But, it also highlights a 
possible alternative to these perceived transgressions.  
What I wish to stress here is the narrative about the German owned factory whose 
“redistributive” intentions got sabotaged by greedy locals to the point that it shut down. 
I made some further inquiries but the cab driver was unable to offer any specific details 
that I could follow up. I did not have to wait too long however before similar accounts 
started cropping up more regularly and in different contexts. The narratives all had more 
or less the same elements. Foreign (usually German), but sometimes also local investors 
would try to open up a garment factory, guaranteeing high wages, bonuses, paid 
holidays, maternity leave and a 40 hour working week. These efforts would inevitably 
be sabotaged by a scheming association of local factory owners, determined to keep 
wages as low as possible and profits high. Sometimes this was said to take violent 
proportions. One worker in the factory told me: 
“Did you know the owners meet every month to talk about how they’re going to set the 
wages and stuff like that? There was this factory owner ... I can’t  remember the name of 
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the factory but he treated his workers really well, bonuses a 13th salary and stuff like that. 
You know what they did? They burned his house down. He had a villa and they burned it 
down, the bastards, but you know, he was attracting all the best workers with his 
conditions.” 
On no single occasion however was I able to extract any precise details about such 
events. No one was quite certain about the specific names of factories or persons 
affected by such mischief, nor when it could have occurred. I tried to do some research 
and after browsing through news archives I discovered that a certain factory called “In-
Time-Tex”, owned by a German investor, had shut down in April of 2009. The owner, a 
certain Johann Van Brams, or Braus, had made “grandiose” announcements before 
opening up shop in 2007, and offered a minimum monthly wage of EUR200 (fairly 
average for Shtip), a 40 hour working week and non-working Saturdays, which stirred 
up some interest in the township. By 2009 he decided to close the factory, citing 
declining interest among his European buyers as the main reason, and made no mention 
of foul play (Bojadziski 2009). This only made the notion that benevolent investors 
were being sabotaged because of their efforts to give higher wages to local workers, 
somewhat less believable.  
Workers on the other hand, never seemed to question the credibility of these accounts or 
the legitimacy of the accusations being hurled at employers. Sometimes this would be 
done very directly, such as when the president of the Association of Garment Producers, 
Angel Dimitrov, was being interviewed for a local TV station about the state of the 
garment industry. Dimitrov gave the standard expose of the industry where he 
mentioned the influence of competition from low income countries such as Cambodia 
and Bangladesh, the need to import materials for production, the focus on outsourced 
production instead of building local brands, and the pegging of the Denar to the Euro as 
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the main factors that complicate work in the garment sector. For these reasons, he went 
on to explain, overall production had declined by 25 percent since 2005. Raising wages, 
Dimitrov continued, could only be achieved by raising productivity per worker. In order 
to achieve this, the Association was petitioning the government for subsidies to help 
purchase the latest machinery for cutting and designing garment pieces, and increase the 
overall productivity per worker and the competitiveness of the industry.  
At this point, I was taken aback when the host asked Dimitrov to comment on 
widespread accusations that the Association is threatening any factory owners who try 
to raise wages above the current average, with bodily harm and destruction of property. 
Dimitrov answered wryly that in the factory where he is the general manager: “we’re 
giving above average wages and no one has come to threaten us because of it.” In the 
last instance, Dimitrov reiterated that “the price of labour is dictated by the market, and 
that is how things work in the capitalist society that we are building.” This resort to 
“markets” as the final arbiters of value appeared rhetorical and immediately 
contradicted the previous appeal to the state for subsidies. When the host opened the 
telephone lines for questions from viewers Dimitrov was instantly bombarded with 
accusations of manipulation. One viewer asked “When will the owners allow workers to 
form unions in the factories?” A second one asked “What good will the workers see 
from the subsidies you are asking for?” A third one shouted emotionally that “The 
workers are in shackles, textile [production] is going back in time! Women are not 
home to see their children on Sundays.” No one, however, tried to offer any “evidence” 
that might have backed up the initial accusation.   
How then, in the light of what has been said here, are we to approach the stories about 
these “social capitalists” that are constantly being undermined by local elites? Are we 
dealing with mere gossip that, as Gluckman suggests, is trying to “maintain the unity, 
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morals and values” of the social group (1963: 308)?  This can hardly be the case, since 
very little of what goes on in Shtip is about maintaining old organic unities, and is 
mostly about defining new relations between emerging social fragments. I believe that 
the narrative of the “social capitalist” is best approached as a part of a larger myth-in-
the-making. Going back to Ferguson’s definition, a myth is not just a flawed account of 
reality (as opposed to “history”), but a “cosmological blueprint that lays down 
fundamental categories and meanings for the organization of experience” (Ferguson 
1999: 13). A myth however, is not just inherited or unsettled. It is also made, remade 
and redeployed in new contexts and in response to new social experiences. The myth of 
the “social capitalist” has force because condenses in one and the same narrative the 
multiple and often contradictory aspects of life in the garment industry. It is actively 
shaping a new context in which social experiences of work are being articulated and in 
which social relationships between employers, workers and the state are contested and 
redefined (cf. Ries 1997: 21, cited in Zigon 2008: 140). It identifies transgressions of 
social order and offers possibilities for overcoming them, or at least, identifies different 
ways of structuring relations between those involved.  
The scattered stories may lack constative value, but they nonetheless carry an internal 
coherence and a performative force (Austin 1962). A clear distinction emerges in them 
between the “social capitalist”, who goes out of her way to respond to workers’ 
substantive needs, and the “asocial capitalist” who relates to workers through the 
medium of markets. It is also a way for workers to challenge the legitimacy of market 
ideology, which in any case is only strategically deployed whenever it suits the needs of 
owners. Wages, for example, are not seen as something determined by impersonal 
markets but by scheming capitalists behind closed doors. But we should not look here 
for the hidden Marxists, employing a primitive critique of capitalism (Taussig 2010: 
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10). This criticism does not reflect some kind of longing for an egalitarian socialist 
utopia or personal autonomy. On the contrary, through such narratives that contain a 
shared experience, workers are attaching value to a new form of dependence on the 
“social capitalist”. This clearly highlights their unequal position to employers, but is 
also socially much “thicker” than the crude impersonality provided by the selling and 
buying of labour (Ferguson 2013: 236). Dimitrov on the other hand, only manages to 
recognize workers in the most socially minimal way as commodities that may or may 
not have a market value and workers would have none of it. This shows that workers are 
to a considerable extent capable of imposing their own context as opposed to merely 
internalizing and operating within the given categories of the neoliberal “unitary 
language” (Bakhtin 1981). 
Perhaps one immediate social result of this can be seen in the manner in which 
employment is procured. In my entire eleven month stay in Shtip, I failed to meet one 
single garment worker that gained employment in the garment industry by responding 
to an ad or some similarly impersonal manner. Entry into the garment sector is almost 
exclusively mediated through networks of friends and kin. That is to say, employers 
usually mobilize their existing workforce to recruit new workers through these networks 
which has the immediate consequence of making the social experience of garment work 
considerably “thicker”. Bringing in new workers can increase one’s leverage and social 
standing in the factory, but also being “brought in” can provide a social cushion for new 
employees. And this is precisely what leads to those minimal concessions identified at 
the beginning of this chapter. We cannot reduce such instances to manifestations of “old 
socialist thinking”. There is a long way to go from the self-managed firm to the 
patronage of private entrepreneurs. But it is still in some ways a move away from total 
abjection.  
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5.5 The Black Book 
The strategies outlined above that developed largely out of workers’ relations and 
experiences with private employers were also adopted by unions who sought to direct 
them into a dialogue with the receding state. In the beginning of 2006, Andon 
Majhoshev, acting in his capacity as the president of the local Union branch in Shtip, 
edited and published a small booklet called The Black Book, Stories From Shtip and 
Karbinci. The booklet is a collection of short statements by local town folk who 
experienced the demise of the socialist industrial giants and found themselves either 
with no work or in a very different working environment. Majhoshev described to me 
the serendipitous occasion of its inception:  
“I was sitting in my union office and a couple of the workers who lost their jobs from 
the old enterprises and were unemployed for several years came up to see me. They 
were seriously distraught because of their situation, and one of the women asked me ‘Is 
there a black book somewhere where I can write down my suffering so I can get this 
heavy burden off my soul?’ And I happened to have a black notebook in the drawer in 
my desk and I said yes I have a black book! And that's when I got the idea that workers 
should write down their stories so that people can hear them. And then it wasn't difficult 
to get more people to come over and write down their stories and get statements. People 
wanted to come so they can be heard. I gathered about 142 stories of which we included 
about 100 in the black book. I then distributed the books to all the major political parties 
and officials and even journalists came and took interest in the Black Book. I even met 
with the then Minister for Social Care and Labour as part of our negotiations between 
the union and the government and gave him a copy. I remember him saying ‘Let us 
hope there will be no more Black Books to write.’” 
What the minister received was a series of short statements that together represent a 
litany of complaints and accounts of hardship, suffering, humiliation and uncertainty 
159 
 
with the future peppered with expressions of solidarity. Majhoshev gathered a total of 
147 statements, 73 from men and 74 from women, 85 percent of which were aged 
between 41-60 years which meant that the vast majority of those included came of age 
and had a history of employment during socialism. The statements are divided into four 
main sections, those being: workers from bankrupt former SOE’s, garment industry 
workers, pensioners and public sector workers. The book does well to capture the 
diverging categories of workers that were being released on the labour market, each 
with different challenges and priorities, but whose appeals nonetheless shared the same 
underlying logic of seeking out new forms of dependence. The majority of the 
statements are addressed directly to the state, personified by politicians and the labour 
inspectors immediately charged with the responsibility of eradicating economic abuses.   
In a tradition very familiar to anthropologists, Majhoshev writes in the introduction that 
the purpose of the book is to provide “vulnerable citizens” with “a space where they can 
voice their anger and disenchantment due to the accumulated social problems and at the 
same time give them hope that someone will read about them and help them.” That 
“someone” is explicitly defined as the “relevant state institutions” that have turned a 
deaf ear to the plight of workers. He adds that “the best part of these people have never 
been asked how they live, how they feel and what are their expectations of the future.” 
The act of giving voice to the voiceless and simply being “listened to” is presented as a 
starting point for change and improvement and is even seen as having the potential of 
becoming a “new form of union struggle”.  
A fifty year old male former employee in a socially owned firm wrote: “If during 
socialism we were seeing in the dark, in today’s pluralist democracy and freedom we do 
not see at all. We are left without work, without existential means, and many young 
people abandoned us and went abroad. All of the above is in my opinion the result of 
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bad politics, corruption and anarchy.” This description of the transition directly 
translates the experience of “disorder” on a cosmological scale. In their focus on human 
tragedy as an onset of chronic suffering, they trace the experience of a ritual passage 
from subject to outcast (ibid) and are a form of protest against the loss of social status 
and the protracted state of liminality (Caraveli-Chaves 1980: 138, cited in Fishman 
2008: 272). 
Another former employee in the garment manufacturing giant Astibo wrote: “I was left 
with no employment from Astibo after 30 years or working. My husband is also 
unemployed. He works on the black market for [three Euros] a day. We have two 
children who are students. We’ve had to recall one of them as we cannot support his 
studies anymore. I am very disappointed about the conditions in the country because 
together with my husband we have worked for a combined 63 years and now we are on 
the street9. I am unhappy because my children are unhappy and apathetical and want to 
go abroad to work. The government has to do something to stop the children from 
leaving abroad. I feel we are losing the future of the country. If they shorten the 
maternity leave to three months or to six I think that the Macedonian nation will vanish. 
That has to be stopped.”  
A 59 year old garment factory worker wrote: “My son and daughter in law are 
unemployed. They have only one child. They do not want to have another because they 
have no work. If the crisis continues in this way soon the population will grow old and 
                                                          
9
 The closing of the factories and the experience of becoming surplus labour is usually described as 
“being left on the street”. This is not a reference to homelessness which is an exceptionally rare 
consequence of unemployment. Most workers in Shtip (of all generations) still reside in extended family 
households capable of providing a roof for several generations of family members. It is instead a 
reference to being deprived of a workplace that used to be the converging point of people’s social 
universe; leaving workers to aimlessly wonder the streets to fill in empty time (see Graan 2012: 179). 
This usually legitimate leisure activity loses its meaning when separated from its opposite, i.e. some kind 
of productive enterprise and becomes a symptom of social decay ultimately embodied in the former 
workers. 
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there will be no one left to replace the current workers.” Two younger garment workers 
in their thirties wrote: “I feel humiliated because my boss is breaking my basic human 
rights so that I cannot raise my children as I should because he keeps me at work all 
day”; “I am very sad because my children grew up without a mother because I work all 
day in the garment factory. I feel I am losing control over them and that they no longer 
feel I am their mother”. A former worker from Astibo with 28 years of working 
experience wrote that for her family time was also slipping backwards and out of 
modernity with the closing of Astibo: “Our only son has become depressed. He wants to 
leave the country. You should know that as an honest family we are very disappointed 
and every other month they switch off our electricity and we eat with candles and live 
like in the middle ages.” 
A key recurring element in the statements is the introduction of the national dimension. 
What it highlights is the gradual relaxing of the Marxist language of class and 
proleterianization to make space for the (ever growing) discourse of the national 
community and the corollary language of kinship. Instead of a corporate “class” 
workers here become an inseparable and vital part of the national community and the 
“health” of workers becomes directly linked to the “health” of the nation. The shift is 
significant in that it allows workers to tap into a pool of widely shared symbols of the 
(imagined) moral community of the nation as the “listener”. Women, who represent the 
more likely garment factory workers, are particularly important in the value matrix of 
the nation as responsible for its social and biological reproduction. As a result, 
complaints about female overtime labour and exploitation in the factories focuses on the 
disruption this cause in the unpaid economy of household labour. The lack of “worker’s 
rights” translates into an interference of the basic tasks of rearing the next generation.  
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The last section of the booklet contains statements from civil servants employed in the 
public administration expressing their support for the plight of factory workers and are 
inserted as examples of “listening”. One of them, identified only as a 29 year old 
woman states “I work in a public enterprise and I am doing well, but I stand behind the 
workers who have no rights, work all day long, are not paid for it and are humiliated, 
disenfranchised and terrified.” 
As Zigon points out, complaints can be seen as doing a kind of “ethical work” by 
explicitly identifying a moral transgression for the listener, and thereby, bringing them 
“into the context of the transgressive moment” (ibid: 141). As such, the laments are 
directed above all at a listener who is assumed to share the moral assumptions of the 
disenfranchised, such as the fictitious kinship community of co-nationals (Alexopoulos 
2003: 115). We can thus look at the short statements in the Black Book as a cluster of 
performative speech acts working on social reality by working on, and mobilizing, 
others. Through their complaints expressed in the Black Book, workers are not just 
addressing the state but mobilizing the discourse of the national community, and the 
traditional gender norms built into it, in order to situate themselves within a larger 
whole.  
This “connecting” of economic activity with the moral community of the nation and the 
gender norms governing the intimate work of reproduction, allows workers to link their 
interests with the interests of “society” as a whole. The hope is that by reciprocating the 
indignation the listeners will participate in the collective recognition of a moral disorder 
and its condemnation. On the one hand, this allows workers to “transcend … the limits 
of purely economic class” and contest the co-option of the State as the organ of one 
particular group, i.e. the new capitalists (see Gramsci 1992: 181-182). But in doing so 
workers consciously step away from the idea of class unity and autonomy, reify 
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established gender hierarchies at home and in the workplace, and cement the patriarchal 
image of the state-as-guardian (not to mention further alienate non-nationals from the 
struggle.) The reason this is not seen as problematic, however, is precisely because 
within such forms of dependence workers can at least be recognized as moral persons 
towards which those in power have some kind of obligations that go beyond the mere 
exchange of labour for cash on the market (Graeber 2011b: 191). As Ferguson remarks, 
“for those thus abjected, subjection can only appear as a step up” (2013: 231; italics in 
original). With this in mind, I now turn to another struggle of the abjected: that of the 
labouring surplus.  
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Chapter VI: Discarding Labour 
 
6.1 The Labouring Surplus  
Having discussed the category of workers that seek to redefine relations of dependence 
in production, I would now like to turn to the second category brought up in the 
introduction. Namely, those workers with very little or no prospects of ever being 
reabsorbed in the economy. This category of workers was represented in the Black 
Book, in the shape of former veteran workers from defunct socially owned enterprises. 
Most of these workers were in their mid to late fifties when the final wave of 
privatization “released” them on the labour market only to discover “their very limited 
relevance to capital” (Li 2009: 67). Their refusal to be left at the mercy of the “free” 
labour market and consequent struggle to wrangle some concessions from the state 
managed to transform the “stealthy violence” (ibid) they faced into a protracted media 
event that shaped public debates regarding the legitimacy of the new economic 
(dis)order. The workers had been part of the larger movement that had withered away 
after 2002 and had splintered off as a separate interest group. The core of the movement 
was composed of former Makedonka workers, made redundant with the liquidation of 
the factory in 2002. By 2004 the position of many had become particularly dire. 
According to existing bankruptcy laws workers aged less than 55 years received welfare 
for no more than 18 months after the liquidation of their enterprise, after which the 
amount dwindled to a bare minimum leaving them to fend for themselves.  
Under the leadership of Stojan Stojanov, a seasoned textiles technician from 
Makedonka with experience as a union leader from the nineties, they formed the 
laboriously named “Association of Workers with over 25 Years of Work Experience 
and an Unresolved Status”. The very name of the association strongly emphasized the 
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liminal position of veteran socialist workers in the new political economy, i.e. the 
acutely perceived lack of a designated social status. In this sense the name was chosen 
more to reflect the actual experience of workers as “rejected matter in search of a place” 
rather than to lend itself to witty acronyms for political campaigning. The decision to 
register as an actual association, with an official membership and a designated 
leadership who could act as legal representatives of a political cohort, was made only 
after Stojanov and others were persuaded by a local politician that this was the only way 
any government could take them seriously.  
“He told us that once you register an association you can start negotiating with the 
institutions and they will not be able to kick you out or deny you, they will have to talk to 
you. So we first registered the association here in Shtip, they chose me as the president 
and then we began to make our presence known in the media and to branch out in other 
towns. We had branches in 99 percent of towns in Macedonia. They all had a branch 
leader and a membership, with membership cards and so on.” 
Stojanov also told me that reporters had found the laborious moniker of the Association 
too impractical and were responsible for coining and popularizing the much shorter term 
stechajci (стечајци – pronounced ste-chay-tsi) – which can roughly be translated as 
“the bankrupt ones”10.  The term stechajci had already been in use for some time to 
refer to all workers made redundant in bankrupt socialist enterprises. As such it carried 
significant symbolic weight that the members of the association had serendipitously 
monopolized with the help of the media in their search for a catchy label.  
 
                                                          
10
 The term is a derivative of the noun stechaj (стечај) meaning bankruptcy and the plural suffix –ci, 
which transforms the noun into another kind of noun that attributes relational properties to persons: e.g. 
Astibo (name of a factory) – Astibovci (people working in that factory); stechaj (bankruptcy) – stechajci 
(people associated with bankrupt firms) (see Geertz 1983: 65, for a similar discussion). 
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6.2 Pleading the Nation 
It was already in use during their first important media appearance at the end of 2005. 
On December 31st around five hundred stechajci from Makedonka and Astibo organized 
a public New Year’s Eve celebration on the main city square in Shtip. With homemade 
foods and drinks spread out on improvised tables workers organized a spectacle of irony 
for the country's media. Workers brought instruments to form the “bankrupt orchestra” 
(стечаен оркестар) and sang popular folk songs thematically chosen to express sorrow, 
misery and destitution. The songs drew on the rich symbolic pool of a Macedonian 
national ideology replete with narratives of historical injustice, martyrdom and 
endurance against great odds. Songs such as “Macedonians where are you now” for 
example narrate and lament the exodus of Slav Macedonians from Greek Macedonia in 
the aftermath of the civil war in Greece11. They highlight themes such as the loss of 
one’s homestead and the fate of the exiled forced to roam the world with no secure 
social ties as the pinnacle of suffering. As such they relate to workers liminal 
experiences of abjection and are invoked to appeal to the wider moral community of the 
nation to recognize their plight. The reporter who covered the event highlighted two 
more songs that workers jointly sung, those being “Mother why was I born so poor” and 
“Mother why have you given birth to me”. Both are popular and well known folk songs 
that question the purpose of existence itself in the context of material deprivation and 
the separation from one’s homestead: 
Oh mother, why you have given birth to me, 
Your whole life you haven’t seen me, 
A male child you’ve born, 
And given joy to another, 
                                                          
11
 See Danforth & Boeschoten (2012), for a detailed account of this complex historical episode. 
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Day and night I wonder, 
I sing, I dance, I play and I cry, 
And I always see your face, 
Your debts I must return, 
Debts upon debts I must return, 
 
Be joyful dear mother, 
For you’ve born a lucky star, 
I will shine mother like glitter, 
For my homeland mother, 
For my homeland 
 
The song is commonly referred to as “migratory” (pechalbarska), and is referring to the 
hardships of having to leave one’s homestead in pursuit of employment that became a 
common practice at the turn of the nineteenth century. The opening question frames the 
account of suffering that follows later as devoid of meaning. It questions the purpose of 
existence itself when separated from loved ones and the tragedy of a child deprived 
from a mother’s embrace and affections. The second stanza carries this questioning 
foreword by reflecting on kinship as both the object and subject of loss. The migrant 
both longs to see his kin but also knows that it is precisely for their material safety that 
he is away, i.e. to supply remittances for the family. In the third stanza the singer at last 
fully identifies with his pain and finds joy in his longing and sacrifice for his homeland.  
It is tempting here to follow Geertz (1973: 104) and interpret this blending of suffering 
and the communal life of the nation as mainly a quest for meaning. Or that the question 
is not how to avoid suffering but how to frame it in “systems of meaning” that enable 
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“patterns of sociality” to take place for the sake of an assumed “teleology of community 
life” (ibid; see also discussion by Herzfeld 2001: 221). However, pain and suffering are 
not perceived by workers as randomly produced by the contingencies of everyday life 
but as the willed project of human structures of power. If workers are un-eased by their 
liminality and abjection it is not for the sake of reintroducing “order” or a certain 
cosmology in which they can “know how to suffer” (Geertz 1973: 104). The voice here 
is not in the passive, as in Job’s plea, patiently awaiting for meaning to reveal itself. It 
tears suffering away from debilitating passivity and tosses it into action, blending 
suffering with protest.  
As in virtually all nationalisms, there are strong structural links in Macedonia between 
the logic of kinship and that of the nation-state (see Herzfeld 2001: 120). The nation-
state is most often spoken of metaphorically through the idiom of kinship. As such, the 
song does well to express the laments of workers whom the state first embraced and 
then rejected from its care and nurture. Its priorities and affection have now shifted 
elsewhere pushing workers to seek their fortunes abroad, far from kin and home where 
they will have to redeem the wrongs of others. Additionally, the metaphor of kinship 
offers a widely shared symbolic content that is not just used for political sloganeering 
but also to bring in the wider national community as answerable to the moral 
transgression taking place. Through the public display of destitution the stechajci could 
thus open up and explore “the tensions inherent in the fact that they belong to a 
community, yet may not share equally in its benefits” (Herzfeld 2001: 211). In taking 
the centre stage they were not only asking for the reassertion of order but exploring 
alternative possibilities (ibid). This is seen in their mobilization of the discourse of the 
nation in support of economic rights, following the loss of currency of the language of 
class in the new political economy.   
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6.3 The “Right to Live” 
One participant told the reporter "We're not really in the mood for celebrations. But 
what can we do at home? This way we can at least clear our dark thoughts a bit. I'm 56 
years old and have 33 years of work experience. The new owners simply won't employ 
older workers and I won't be eligible for a pension for another eight years. We live, if 
you can call that living, with my wife's salary of 6000 denars [EUR100] and we have a 
student child to support as well.” Two former female workers from Makedonka and 
Astibo complained that “some of us cannot afford to buy bread anymore. The 
government, as they promised before the elections have to secure some kind of financial 
help so that we can survive until retirement.” Stojanov made one of his first addresses to 
the government: “We are poor but our spirit cannot be broken. We are expecting the 
prime minister ... who is supposed to meet with us on the 5th of January, to give us 
specific solutions to regulate our status. Otherwise we will start playing a different 
tune.” (Dnevnik 2006). 
Majhoshev, present in his capacity as the local Union branch president told the reporters 
that “these people built the factories, for years their contributions filled the budget and 
it’s not right for them to be on the street now.” (ibid). Stojanov echoed these words 
when he stated a few months later that “This is not about privileges and benefits, but 
finding some new way to survive, a right we have earned with our long years of 
labouring in the firms that were ruined through no fault of our own” (Dnevnik 2006b).  
What Stojanov articulated here was a moral claim on the “right to live” that drives the 
life-saving interventions of the welfare state (Li 2009: 79) but also undermines the 
imperatives of neoliberal capitalism by threatening the emergence of a “free” market in 
labour (ibid). For the stechajci however, the “right to live” was not just a matter of 
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securing material resources but also the right to be recognized and valued as moral 
persons within some larger system of social relations. Their claims did not go 
unchallenged in public debates as citizens and economic commentators in the media 
questioned why exactly should a special category be carved out for them from the 
general mass of the unemployed (see Gorgevski 2008). Legal experts considered the 
constitutionality of such a move and World Bank and IMF representatives disputed the 
very idea of burdening the state with such obligations and disrupting the market 
regulation of labour, or dismissed the demands as an anachronistic remnant of the rotten 
socialist legacy that ruined the economy in the first place.  
Stojanov told me that the Minister for Labour and Social Policy had on one occasion 
asked him why he did not sell his house and use the money to start his own business, a 
suggestion that left him bewildered: “Sell my house? Wait a minute. Is he mad I thought 
to myself?” This statement captures the incredulity produced by the idea that everything 
could in theory be subsumed by self-interested short-term exchange. Households in 
Shtip are not inimical to exchange, but they are usually associated with “long-term 
exchange”, concerned less with the individual pursuit of wealth, and more with the 
reproduction of long term social order (Bloch & Parry 1989: 2; Carrier 1995: 203). 
They are the central loci where normative aspects of gender are reproduced and 
obligations to kin are objectified (Rheubottom 1980). Most households in Shtip are 
inherited from past generations and are to be passed on to the next. Converting the 
household into an object of short-term exchange for the purposes of acquiring 
individual wealth represented not only a transgression, but a further slide towards 
abjection that Stojanov, and many like him, were not willing to entertain.   
Determined to reclaim their social value, members of the movement from Shtip and 
three other neighbouring towns began another wave of disruptions. All major roads in 
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the area were blocked along with various government buildings in the towns. One 
representative stated that “these people are protesting so that their suffering can be 
heard, to which the government has turned a deaf ear” (Dnevnik 2006c; my emphasis). 
The prime minister remained silent but the president of parliament offered to meet with 
the Association to discuss the possibility of passing a law for their case. Within a month 
victory appeared at hand as parliament voted in favour of a law to secure financial 
support for the stechajci. Ironically, the law was proposed by no other than the newly 
formed party of the former Prime Minister Georgievski whose government had five 
years before annulled a law in place that guaranteed state money for workers of 
bankrupt state firms until their reemployment. Concerns crept up as many feared this to 
be yet another pre-electoral scam.  
Such worries turned out to be justified when only two days later the veteran politician 
and incumbent President of the Republic, Branko Crvenkovski refused to sign the 
passing of the law at the request of the Social Democrat government12. The official 
explanation was that the government had not checked the exact numbers of workers that 
would have to be compensated through the law. The Association had insisted that the 
number was no more than 6,000 but after conducting their own estimates the 
government concluded that over 17,000 workers would become entitled to financial 
support with the passing of the law. The IMF had immediately threatened to break off 
the stand-by arrangement it had with the government prompting panic among 
politicians. The minister of Labour and Social Policy announced that the law “goes 
against Macedonia’s international obligations and threatens to undermine the reforms 
                                                          
12
 Crvenkovski was also the long standing president of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, the 
party in office and prime minister during the years of privatization from 1992 to 1998.  
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and arrangements with the World Bank and the IMF. It also brings into question the 
opening of negotiations for full EU membership.” (Dnevnik 2006d). 
The government had made itself clear: this is simply beyond us and that appeasing the 
stechajci would not only offend the gods of international capital but disturb the 
geopolitics of EU integration. The more grounded stechajci demanded to speak to 
representatives of the WB and the IMF to explain themselves and asked the president 
not to succumb to their pressures. Georgievski claimed that the government’s 
explanations were insubstantial and that at any measure they should be more concerned 
with the plight of their people than the IMF (Kanal 5 2006). He also sent a reminder that 
his government had done precisely that six years earlier when it decided to give state 
assistance to victims of the pyramid scheme (whilst ignoring the very same people 
whose interests he was championing now as an opposition leader).  
The government offered an alternative plan to assist the stechajci to find employment 
by subsidizing all contributions and tax related expenses of firms that choose to employ 
stechajci. This was swiftly refused by the Association as an inefficient measure as it 
would leave them dependent on employers reluctant to hire aging and unskilled 
labourers.  The proposal was also criticized by the Union of Employers whose 
representative complained that the government had not consulted them even though “we 
are the ones that have to do the employing” (Dnevnik 2006e), which only seemed to 
confirmed fears that the stechajci were an undesirable surplus in relation to capital.  
After auditing the lists of workers from bankrupt enterprises that the law would consider 
the government came up with a new definite number of approximately eight thousand 
stechajci and offered various levels of support corresponding to the economic and social 
position of each family unit rather than the flat 100 Euros per worker. It had also 
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reduced the maximum sum a person could receive to 80 Euros which according to the 
new regulations would mean that fewer than five hundred workers would receive the 
maximum amount. What proved to be even more controversial for the stechajci was the 
government’s decision to distribute this money through the department for social care 
rather than the employment agency as demanded by workers.  The offer was expressly 
turned down. “The way they treat us is humiliating, as if we were not the people who 
built the factories for decades which they ruined. To get a little money for a piece of 
bread we now have to ask for charity in the centers for social care”, said Stojanov. This 
refusal left the government somewhat puzzled and in a position to claim that the 
stechajci simply did not want a solution. But their refusal should not be so puzzling. 
 
6.4 Seeking Dependence 
Following Mauss (1990), state assistance can be seen as a form of exchange that is not 
merely expressive but constitutive of a particular social relationship between two parties 
(in this case “workers” and “the state”). We can extend the argument to suggest that it is 
constitutive of the self in relation to others. Social aid however is popularly perceived in 
Macedonia as a form of charity and being a “social case” is an extremely demeaning 
label, indicating a socially inept and helpless individual that is incapable of meaningful 
interaction. It is an unreciprocable gift “that makes the person who has accepted it 
inferior, particularly when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it” (Mauss 
1990: 83). The trouble with charity then is that it is a completely one-sided relationship, 
in the sense that it imposes no enduring social ties or mutual obligations between giver 
and recipient (Graeber 2011b: 109). The charitable giver expects nothing in return and 
is in theory, free to walk away and discontinue the transaction at any point. In other 
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words, charity fails to recognize the related person and can instead only recognize an 
abject, and leave the stechajci hanging in their liminal social space and in a continuing 
crisis of personhood. It would also fail to recognize them as able bodied wage earners 
with at least the potential for eventually finding some sort of formal employment, which 
is particularly important for male workers due to their traditional role as breadwinners 
(cf Ferguson 2013: 235). In short, social aid could provide some material assistance for 
the stechajci but would fail to attend to their “social and moral needs” (ibid).  
By contrast, channelling money through the employment agency can be seen as a form 
of redistributive exchange, that once again establishes a hierarchical relationship of 
dependence between non-equals, but in a way that involves obligations for both parties. 
Receiving aid from the employment agency implies, at the very least, that the recipient 
is an able bodied person who is expected, at some point in the future, to reciprocate part 
of the aid she is receiving (by earning a taxable income for example). It also recognizes 
people as past contributors with a history of relations; i.e. as social persons with the 
ability to make claims on those they are dependent on. It would mean recognizing their 
previous labours (“we built the factories”) and the webs of mutual obligations these 
generated.  
The Association therefore offered its own version of a settlement according to which the 
monthly payment would come through the employment agency until an opportunity for 
employment is offered. The amount would depend on the years of work experience of 
the worker, the lowest being 60 Euros for those with 25 years of experience and 70 
Euros for those with more than 35 years of experience. The government, however, 
refused and the negotiations came to an end with threats of further protests in the 
capital.  
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When Vlado Netkov dismissed the stechajci as lazy loafers from “another time” in an 
interview for a local daily, the Association immediately gathered in protest in front of 
his garment factory in Shtip with the entire town’s membership. He was informed by 
the leadership that that he should either give them all work in his factory that very 
moment or keep his mouth shut. A publically humiliated Netkov apologized and 
promised to refrain from making derisive comments about the stechajci from thereon 
(Bojadziski 2007). This episode is fondly remembered by workers in the town as one of 
the few occasions where the new employers were put in their place. But what was their 
place? Once again we see employers rather than “markets” being envisaged as directly 
responsible for allocating resources, in this case labour. Netkov and the Association 
were clearly speaking a different language. Netkov was criticising the stechajci for 
seeking dependence instead of acting as autonomous individuals on the free labour 
market and taking charge of their autonomous economic destinies. The stechajci refused 
to subscribe to a model that reduced them to abjection in the first place.   
The association was prompted into further action when Pero Eftimov, a former 
Makedonka worker, took his life by hanging himself in his home. The newspaper 
reported that Eftimov had taken his life “from great grief because he was unable to 
afford to pay for his daughter’s wedding” (ibid). Once more the language of kinship 
illustrated the deep cutting social effects of economic decline and provided the symbolic 
platform to speak out to the wider community. A wedding is usually a costly event, not 
least because the bride’s father is obliged to endow her with an adequate dowry. The 
dowry is traditionally given as compensation for the maiden’s contributions to her natal 
household (Rheubottom 1980: 230). More than a gift, it is a debt owed to her, whose 
payment symbolizes the bride’s passage to another household. Eftimov’s death 
highlighted the tragic extent to which changes in economic conditions were disrupting 
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the most intimate forms of kinship obligations and disabling the ritual performance of 
important life-cycle ceremonies (see Rio 2014: 178).  
Within a few months the workers had decided to make a permanent display of their 
suffering bodies by pitching tents on the lawns opposite the parliament building in a 
repeat of the tactics that failed six years before. Raised in the middle of the capital’s 
new burgeoning business district, the makeshift tents, sometimes consisting of little 
more than a few blankets tossed over wooden poles, that housed the worn out yet 
determined figures of the stechajci stood as a painful reminder of the “other side” of 
economic reform. Workers lined up to give their statements to reporters. When asked 
how they were supporting themselves workers told reporters that nearby residents 
sympathetic to their plight gave small donations as well as food and drinks and even 
children on their way to school gave parts of their lunch money. “The suited 
businessmen with leather shoes and briefcases haven’t given us a penny and stare at us 
as if we were criminals.” (Tomikj 2007). An image was being painted of suffering 
industrial workers, sympathetic co-citizens and caring youth on one end, with villainous 
politicians and that iconic vanguard of the new order – middle class professionals 
donning mobile phones and computers, occupying “clean” office activities and 
garnering the attention of the media (cf Kideckel 2002: 123-4) - on the other.  
In an interview Stojanov complained that they had been subject to frequent attacks in 
the park. “We asked the police to send some people here for our protection and the 
interior ministry told us that they’re not a security agency. Can you believe that? Are 
they a security agency when they send hundreds of police officers to guard the houses 
of the [factory owners] whenever we stage a protest?” (Jovanova 2008). Fifty eight year 
old Dragi Zdravkov from a bankrupt porcelain and ceramics factory stated “I have two 
sons with university education both with no work. My wife works but she hasn’t 
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received her salary for a year. I want to work, I feel healthy enough. I show up at the 
employment agency regularly but they’ve never offered me a job. Who wants to employ 
pensioners? I hope the government will be virtuous and find a solution for us, if not we 
are going all the way.” Other workers shared their histories and spoke of the “criminal 
privatization process” by rampant profiteering businessmen, unpaid salaries and layoffs 
as the only rewards for a lifetime of labouring in the factories (ibid).  
These statements were no longer addressed to the Social Democrats who had once again 
lost the elections in late 2006 to the conservative IMRO-DPMNU now led by Nikola 
Gruevski. Initial responses from the new government were not encouraging. The prime 
minister reiterated that the stechajci can only be helped by promoting employment 
opportunities (ibid). Stojanov told one reporter that some time ago already, the 
Association announced that they are willing to accept a loan of 3000 Euros per workers, 
and pool this money in order to start up a business. The government however, would 
have to provide the management team to set it up and run it for the stechajci. Stojanov 
added: "We are not capable of that. We cannot be businessmen, but we can and we want 
to work" (Jovanova 2008). This suggestion in effect sought to replicate a socialist style 
moral relation of mutual dependence between workers and managers with the necessary 
know-how to organize economic activity for the benefit of everyone. As such, it did it 
was not even considered by a government committed to the implementation of market 
reforms and eager to erase any remaining vestiges of “socialist mentality”. The stechajci 
however continued to occupy the space opposite the parliament building as a stubborn 
iconic reminder of the failed “transition”. The frequent appearance in the media of their 
shabby tents, ragged clothes and worn out hungry faces in the heart of the country’s 
political and business district gradually transformed them into a genuine political 
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nuisance. They stood as a lingering reminder and iconic representation of the failed 
Macedonian worker and the pitfalls of the new economic order.  
 
Fig. 7. The stechajci in front of the parliament building 
6.5 Legality or Morality 
Faced with early elections after less than two years in office the government was pushed 
into reassessing its hard line approach. In a bid to secure votes Prime Minister Gruevski 
made an offer to the leadership of the association that should his party win the 
upcoming elections the state will pay 80 Euros a month for all workers who worked at 
least twenty five years in SOEs where the state was the dominant shareholder at time 
they were laid off and only if that occurred in the period between 7th of April 2000 and 
31st of December 2004 (Dnevnik 2008). The initial estimates of both sides included no 
more than six thousand workers which mirrored the original estimates of the 
association. The agreement was signed by Gruevski and Stojanov who remained 
sceptical in the light of previous broken promises they had received.  
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Much to everyone’s surprise, after winning the local and presidential elections, 
Gruevski’s VMRO expressly approved the law in parliament on the 14th of July 2009 
and the following week the Prime Minister personally attended the ceremony in the park 
where the long standing tents were being dismantled by jubilant workers eager to return 
to their families after seventeen months of camping in front of parliament. Gruevski 
promised that the government agencies would immediately start preparing the lists of 
workers who are to receive welfare and all the necessary documentation. The occasion 
reeked of a small but significant victory for the working classes.  
The celebration however was short lived. Only two months after the tents were 
dismantled workers from Makedonka in Shtip where Stojanov himself had worked, 
were up in arms as none of them had received positive notifications. Workers from 
Astibo were more fortunate. Stojanov stated he did not know where the problem might 
have arisen while others were already accusing him or treason. The government assured 
Stojanov that the reason they are late with processing the applications lay in the 
difficulties of gathering all the necessary documentation that would determine the 
ownership status of firms at the time of their liquidation.  
The government commission did eventually manage to clear all the lists and instead of 
six thousand they produced a list of slightly over two thousand workers. The 
Association demanded answers. After a meeting with government representatives 
Stojanov made a somewhat resigned public statement that differed from his usual 
defiant approach: 
“The meeting with the prime minister was meant to give us answers to the questions that 
trouble the stechajci, about how far the new law has been implemented with which these 
martyrs of the transition were meant to receive a minimal social security. We asked for 
this meeting because the biggest part of our membership is showing signs of great revolt 
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after learning that, instead of six thousand, this law will cover only between two to three 
thousand workers. The government is constantly looking for ways to reduce this number 
which is a cause of revolt among us. I must admit that we carelessly fell into the 
government’s trap by signing up to a law that allows the government to interpret and 
implement it in ways that suit them. [The workers] knew that the law only covers those 
firms that at the moment they were liquidated were dominantly state owned. But with the 
government’s analysis it turned out that in half of those firms [on our list] the state was 
not the dominant shareholder, and that the workers in them owned the shares! The irony 
is that none of those workers had any idea that they were shareholders, not even when 
their firm was liquidated” (Tomikj and Bojadziski 2008).  
This turn of events only showed the profound conceptual differences between aging 
workers and the new state. The government skilfully took advantage of the worker’s 
lack of legal literacy and familiarity with the legal maze of property rights and 
ownership that arose during the privatization. Even though management buyouts 
dominated the privatization of large industrial SOEs, oftentimes managers who found 
themselves unable to muster the required capital were forced to expand the number of 
shares and distribute them to workers before going bankrupt (Slaveski 1997: 39). “At 
the same time” Drakulevski writes “shareholders were not in a position to intervene” as 
“in most cases management of the firm does not allow access to data on capital 
structure” (2002: 12). In the case of Makedonka, Stojanov put the blame precisely on 
the management structures and told me that the board of managers had decided to 
transform Makedonka into a joint-stock company with each workers receiving a certain 
amount of shares. All this without explaining to workers what it meant to have “shares” 
in a firm, nor how that differed from the socialist rhetoric of self-management in which 
workers were likewise symbolically referred to as “owners”.  
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From the point of view of workers, owning shares in a virtually bankrupt company with 
no interested investors in sight was of little economic or political consequence. Not only 
could they not trade them for a profit but the privatisation of the firm was being 
managed by state appointed officials. As Stojanov said, “There were some firms that 
were joint-stock but had nothing, no assets. Workers did not get anything and the state 
was selling them. How were they supposed to know they were the owners?” As far as 
workers were concerned the state still had a responsibility towards them and the firm. 
These were unsettled debts that the state had a moral obligation to recognize. In other 
words, workers were mainly operating on a moral logic in which the finer legal 
distinctions between socially owned, state owned, or worker owned meant little in 
contrast to the social obligations of the state and employers vis-à-vis themselves. 
In any event, those left out of the deal were outraged. Nikola Poplazarov, a former 
worker in Makedonka told reporters “Makedonka went bankrupt on the 31st of 
December 2001 and was then liquidated. All five thousand workers were on the 
employment agency’s list and we received eighteen months of support after the 
liquidation. The factory was state owned, and with that meets all the conditions for 
financial support. Our plant was later on privatized and the new owners kept only 
twenty workers. No one told us that we were shareholders, nor gave us any money like 
[in other transformed firms]” (Shatevski 2008).  
Trajan Markov, the branch leader of the Association in Sveti Nikole near Shtip wrote a 
public letter accusing Stojanov of selling them out. The firm in which he had worked 
for twenty five years had also been privatized in the last two years of its existence, 
which disqualified him from the scope of the agreement with the government. In his 
address through the media Markov made one more appeal to the state to uphold its 
responsibility towards those that the new economic order refused to recognize: “With 
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this law they have tricked other members as well who together with me, fought for the 
realization of their rights with protests in front of the Parliament of the Republic. We 
demand that the law is altered so that all of us with over 25 years of work experience 
can be covered by it. Otherwise, we no longer have the strength to protest and put up 
tents again, but we will express our outrage in front of international monitors and ask 
them to help in the pursuit of our right to life and a piece of bread” (Utrinski Vesnik 
2008).  
 
6.6 Aftermath 
Thompson is certainly right in arguing that the disenfranchised do not simply absorb the 
ideology of the ruling elites and are capable of formulating their own “moral 
economies” that challenge the dominant. But it is difficult to maintain that this 
antagonism necessarily pours out of and represents the larger dynamics of class 
struggle, or that it was a manifestation of workers autonomy in the strictest sense. The 
stechajci never fought for autonomy but to be recognized by the big Other as moral 
persons with a “right to live”, and thereby mitigate the deleterious effects that labour 
commoditization had on their lives. In articulating their plight they borrowed 
indiscriminately from the Marxist rhetoric of self-management as well as the more 
reactionary symbolism of the nation and a patriarchal understanding of gender, both of 
which reify certain hierarchies whilst challenging others. Ultimately, the stechajci were 
consciously separating themselves form the larger body of the working classes in order 
to wage a battle that they saw as uniquely theirs. As Stojanov told me “One has to be 
reasonable when making demands from the government. One can’t just ask for 
everyone.” On other words they were decidedly not speaking from the vantage point of 
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class but from that of the liminal abject, detached from social webs of mutuality and the 
wider moral community.  
This conceptual frame both provided them with a unique moral advantage over the state 
and employers but also exposed them to the politically neutralizing effects of state 
bureaucracy. Markov and others ended up feeling betrayed by Stojanov and the 
movement in general. Once more the government had managed to split an already 
exhausted and beleaguered movement in half and demobilize most of its leadership. 
Stojanov himself had ended up on the lists of those receiving support and disappeared 
almost entirely from public life. In spite of the indignation shown by many members of 
the association the government had managed to score a considerable political victory. 
Stojanov personally took part in a number of media campaigns to celebrate the “joint 
victory” of the government and the veteran workers.  
He was not short of self-praise when I spoke to him in his house in Shtip. “People can 
say what they want, but we managed to secure the subsistence of over two thousand 
people. No one else managed to do that. Not even the unions. They did nothing 
compared to us. Was I supposed to turn down the offer after all we went through? It was 
better for half of us to get something than all of us to get nothing. People will remember 
this. They’ll remember what we achieved all by ourselves.” 
Back in the factory my co-workers were not too eager to eulogize the achievements of 
the stechajci. Some saw them as the archetype of the lazy loafer, parasitic on the state 
and unwilling to look for work. “I’ve never seen them come here looking for work. Not 
a single one of them” said one of my colleagues. Vanya, another colleague I befriended 
was similarly disenchanted with Stojanov. “The government just bought him off. Now 
he’s keeping his mouth shut and shooting campaign ads for them.”  
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It should perhaps be unsurprising that for many of the workers who remain stuck in the 
daily grind of underpaid assembly line work the relative successes of the stechajci 
appear to be of little value. After all their victory had little if any repercussions on the 
larger worker’s movement as a whole. If they had once shared the same context of 
hardship and suffering and partook in the same collective recognition of the 
transgressive moment, now it appeared that the stechajci were no longer part of it. For 
the government and much of the public they became a problem solved, and for other 
workers a problem sold.  
Intermittent appearances of “the plight of the stechajci” in the media can still be seen, 
but lack political force and are quick to fade away as “illegitimate”. By gradually 
sucking the association into ever more complex bureaucratic categories politicians had 
managed to transform and bracket what started off as a fluid and politically volatile 
social movement into a neatly taxonomized cohort which could then be simply ticked 
off the list. As media subjects they became symbolically ossified and no longer in a 
position to participate in the making of the context in which they appeared. In Austin’s 
terms we might say that their language had been robbed of “performative force” and 
that it became “infelicitous” and out of context.  Their claims on the “right to live” 
persist to this day and continue to performatively constitute their identity as moral 
dividuals by stretching the “boundaries of [the imagined] community” (Zivi 2012: 90). 
But their case also exposes the limits of subjection and the tactics of resignification 
within a context that by definition involves multiple interlocutors occupying unequal 
positions of power.  
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6.7 Losing the State? 
On other fronts employers have continued to be very successful in influencing policy 
discourses in a bid to involve the state into getting more workers in the factories. In 
2010 Utrinski Vesnik interviewed a number of textile factory managers in Shtip who 
claimed that the main reason for the shortage of labour was the recent opening of the 
new university in the town which absorbed the vast majority of high-school graduates 
and so greatly reduced the working population of the town. The opening of the 
university had been part of the national strategy of extending tertiary education 
opportunities beyond the capital and raising the educational profile of the working 
population (Ministry of Education 2004). The strategy has come under heavy criticism 
from the local industrial business community in a familiar format. “We have plenty of 
vacancies … but everyone wants a degree and a job in administration”, said one, while 
another complained that “there are 250 students in the faculty of philosophy and only 
twenty studying textiles. Are we going to live from philosophising or from production?” 
(Bojadziski 2010).  
In stark contrast with events back in 2006, in 2011 the local mayor stood in unison with 
the owners of the five largest garment factories in the town made a joint statement that 
“an inaccurate picture has been created in the public about the working conditions in the 
garment industry ... and this has had an impact on the decision of many young people to 
avoid enrolling in the secondary school for textiles. Young people should know that the 
work in the garment factories is on a European level, in well-lit and spacious shop 
floors, with perfect cooling and heating systems and with the latest technology 
machines that are easy to handle ... and that wages are within the town’s average.” 
(Bojadziski 2011). It was once again reiterated that the opening of the university has 
had a negative effect on the economy.  
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The pressure seems to have had an effect and by 2013 the government announced that a 
portion of the latest World Bank loan will go towards developing the capacities of 
vocational secondary schools in response to the needs of the economy. The Ministry of 
Education announced the implementation of special programs to connect vocational 
schools with employers who will provide opportunities for practical experience 
(Utrinski Vesnik 2014). The President of the Parliament of the Business Chamber of 
Macedonia, Antoni Peshev, described this program as burdensome for the companies 
and instead suggested the state should subsidize companies for training workers at the 
cost of 500 Euros per worker. “If foreign investors have been promised cheap labour, 
and the latter is deficient or overvalued, then it is inevitable that we should start 
thinking about subsidies” (Tomikj 2014).   
Peshev’s message to the government is quite clear: the market needs cheap, skilled 
labour in the form of welders, electricians, bricklayers, locksmiths and it is the state’s 
responsibility to produce such labour:  
“I would like to issue a warning that the level of education and the size of income do not 
always go hand in hand. We can see that very well in our current situation. We have a 
deficit of workers with vocational skills, for which is offered high remuneration, opposed 
to an existing highly educated workforce that cannot find employment. Globalization, 
rising regional competition, new technologies and the development of the economy all 
point to a merciless conclusion. In the times that lie ahead there will be no room for the 
lazy, the unschooled and the privileged. Competition will be tougher not just here but in 
the whole world. This is why we have to invest all our efforts to have a strong, 
competitive young generation, ready to deal with the challenges of the economy” (ibid).  
The state’s response came a few months later through the Minister of Education who 
urged parents to encourage their children to choose vocational secondary schools and 
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prepare graduates for immediate entry into the labour market. The current government 
of Gruevski has also accepted the practice of subsidizing training programs for new 
employees as a form of state support for new foreign investments in the country’s 
Special Economic Zones (but not for domestic companies).  
The outstanding feature of Peshev’s comments is that he recognises, in an almost 
common sense way, that the “market” by itself does not generate the “right kind” of 
labour, in this case meaning cheap, skilled, flexible and willing. The latter is nothing but 
a promise that the state has given to both foreign and local investors that it must fulfil. It 
is implicitly stated that labour is not really a commodity whose value is determined by 
self-regulating markets but a social relationship that must be engineered by a concerted 
social effort involving all the available mechanisms of a state that is placed in the full 
service of international capital (see Polanyi 2001: 239). Peshev’s is thus able to both 
reverently invoke the cruel realism of the market as the overarching determinant and the 
need for state intervention. His is certainly not an isolated occurrence and it is quite 
common practice for industrialists to both pressure governments for subsidies, whether 
for technological investments or training, and invoke self-regulating markets whenever 
they have to negotiate wages with workers. Market ideology here becomes selectively 
deployed as the handmaiden of new industrial interests, and rather than diminishing, the 
state has found new ways to increase its regulatory role (Polanyi 2001: 147).  
These developments are certainly not limited to Macedonia and the transformation of 
the state as an agent mediating the relationship between markets and workers has been a 
trend in many European countries as the hallmark of market reforms. Such links 
certainly did exist during socialism but whereas the promise of the socialist state was 
employment, the neoliberal state promises employability (Bacevic 2014). But it has also 
been part of the strategy against the refusal of large numbers of potential wage-
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labourers to participate in the capitalist economy on asocial terms by avoiding the ranks 
of assembly line workers. It has been an attack on the moral discourse of mutuality and 
the legitimacy of non-participation. With the stechajci out of the limelight, the 
unemployed have been even more firmly repositioned as “the lazy, the unskilled, and 
the privileged” for which there is no room in society, i.e. as “matter out of place”.  
 
6.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this section, I have outlined the larger context and some of the major transformations 
taking place in Macedonia by analysing concrete changes in the dominant economic 
ideology, the role of the state and the subjective remaking of “free” labour, especially 
the efforts made towards its greater commodification and “disembedding” to use 
Polanyi’s term. Indeed, as Parry (2005: 146) has noted, much of Polanyi’s masterwork, 
The Great Transformation, is a consistent analysis of institutional revolution in England 
that made labour a “free” commodity on the market. However, the picture emerging 
from my analysis is not a binary one, with uniform “market forces” at one end and 
“society” at the other, tugging in opposing directions. Nor can we speak of a moral 
economy of the dispossessed shaping political praxis along class lines. Such an image 
would not do justice to the multiplicity of actors, voices and ideologies as they come 
together in a specific social situation, in which they may invoke a variety of historical 
traditions or symbols and deploy them in often unpredictable ways.  
Workers are clearly and quite consciously not only not acting as a class, but are also 
ambiguous about their relationship to the dominant. Their actions and strategies can be 
seen to operate through existing structures of power rather than outside of them, or in 
direct opposition to them (Rofel 1999: 32). Both the condition of operating “outside” of 
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webs of dependence or in “opposition” to them appears to hold little value for workers 
both practically and imaginatively. Whereas direct, and particularly class based, 
opposition is seen as futile or unworkable, individual autonomy is seen as the equivalent 
to ruthless exposure to the detrimental vagaries of free market capitalism.  It is in the 
interstices of these two poles of power that strategies of dependence seeking are 
resorted to as a means of rearranging the operations of power in ways that allow 
workers to edge closer to their social, moral and economic needs. Such are the pleas to 
both the “social capitalist” and the “social state,” whether uttered by the skilled, the 
unwanted surplus, the aging, the young and the variously gendered. 
Liminality and abjection are important concepts which I have used to show the 
subjective and symbolic ambiguity which workers were thrown into by the remaking of 
labour. The very process of remaking underscores the process of unmaking of previous 
social relations and of their corollary systems of signification and modes of personhood. 
The transition did not simply impose a new cosmological blueprint from above. It 
opened up existing categories and meanings that became the ground for competing 
moral discourses where ideologues of the self-regulating market are never alone. I have 
suggested that the language of criticism deployed by workers can be usefully analysed 
in its “performative” dimension, or as an attempt to create their own collective (moral) 
definition of the social context. Or, in Bourdieu’s language, to rattle the habitus and 
wrestle part of the symbolic power from the dominant who define the “rules of the 
game” (2005: 201).  
But how successful was this strategy and what does it tell us about political agency? In 
summarizing Gramsci, Parry writes that “in order to win others to its view of the world, 
to its social, cultural and moral values” the working class cannot “triumph by confining 
itself to ‘corporate-economic’ struggles – to its own class interests. It must forge 
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alliances … and patiently build up its own counter-hegemony” (Parry 2009: 176). 
Similarly, Parry goes on, “Polanyi stresses that for a class to act as an effective 
historical agent it must stand for something more than its own interests. It must 
persuade other classes that it represents the interests of society” (ibid).  
In many ways the various discourses of workers have tried to do precisely that.  They 
have drawn upon the symbolic capital of kinship, the “moral society” and the “national 
community” in order to represent their struggles as part of a much larger whole. Dunn 
(2004: 133), describes a similar process in Poland where workers relied heavily on 
kinship metaphors in order to articulate such moral claims and thus re-contextualize 
labour relations in ways that are seen as more advantageous for workers. This is of 
course hardly new or limited to the context of post-socialism. For example, using 
kinship morality to challenge working class poverty and demand higher wages in the 
name of the family, resulted in the nineteenth century concept of the family wage (May 
1982: 401). In the case of the stechajci, and in spite of the fact that they became the 
subject of political intrigue and manipulation, the very fact that they imposed upon the 
government the need to extend some kind of recognition for their status suggests that 
such strategies can produce change.  
However we must not idealize such cosmologies as effective political platforms. Neither 
the government, nor the new capitalist elite have at any point been reduced to “the 
prisoners of the people”; or subdued by a “moral economy of the poor” (Thompson 
1971: 79). Kinship or family morality can often be appropriated to serve as a 
mechanism for establishing effective control over the workforce and to reinforce forms 
of gender and age discrimination (May 1982: 418; also Narotzky 1997: 88). For 
example, appeals to employers that overtime labour does not allow working women 
sufficient time to “care for their children” may lead to a reduction in labour time spent 
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in the factory, but also reify the division of labour in the household to the detriment of 
women and their political role in society. Owners can often position themselves as 
protective patriarchs who “care” for their workers and the latter are often perceived as 
“little children” who often fail to comprehend processes designed “for their own good”. 
The kinship networks that are ubiquitously used in recruitment strategies by employers 
can create a docile workforce and circumnavigate the real difficulty of finding labourers 
for an industry encumbered by a reputation of economic cruelty (De Neve 2008: 218). 
In other words, overreliance on kinship metaphors often comes at the expense of 
narrowing the possibility of class based strategies and a failure to recognize a “common 
interest” for workers as a corporate group. Even though workers share a common 
refusal to become little more than labour commodities governed by market forces, they 
have not been united in themselves as “workers”.  
As such they have not been entirely without results, as seen in the production of a 
reluctant labour force and the constant necessity of investing great efforts in maintaining 
a pool of available workers in conditions of severe unemployment. But the historical 
tide seems to be pulling in the direction of business interests as seen in the growing 
resolve of the state to stand firmly on the side of capital. The odds, today more than 
ever, appear stacked heavily against labour and their fight against commodification. It is 
this complex social situation that will be the object of further analysis in the following 
chapters, which explore the unfolding of some of the themes already introduced at the 
more intimate, ethnographic level: the lives of ordinary workers inside the garment 
factory. This will allow us to have a closer look at the technologies by which a non-
consenting workforce is ushered in and managed on the assembly line.  
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Chapter VII: Alienation and the Asocial Division of Labour 
7.1 Introduction 
In this section I will discuss through an ethnographic analysis the ways in which 
workers and management employ conflicting, if often overlapping, values and practices 
that shape work regimes in the factory, and more generally, the social experience of 
work. The conflicts that arise from these different views are mainly about imposing a 
certain understanding of the workplace, by defining what work ought to be about and 
what kinds of persons and social relationships are allowed to thrive and persist in the 
working environment. This chapter will explore the modes of control and discipline that 
take place on the shop floor, and more particularly the process of alienation and 
separation that is thereby established in the workplace and the development of new class 
distinctions in post-Yugoslav Macedonia. Such differences often become objectified in 
bodies as symbols of distinction and are performed daily in rituals of separation that 
play out along class lines. Class distinctions do not, however, automatically lead to class 
awareness in the strict political sense; instead, they often lead to a splitting of the social 
world into contradictory moral zones where workers negotiate relations with their peers 
and superiors according to a fluctuating set of rules. The moral value placed on 
horizontal ties of solidarity and mutuality between workers often gives way to 
individual strategies for establishing closer social ties with influential superiors (i.e. ties 
of dependence). Such strategies always carry the risk of translating vertical conflicts 
between workers and management into horizontal ones between workers, but can also 
score temporary advantages for workers.  
These debates are certainly not new, nor peculiar to the Macedonian context. In his 
study of machine operators in Chicago, Illinois, Burawoy has famously argued that the 
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introduction of new production techniques and the promotion of individualism on the 
shop floor acted in ways that reduced worker-management conflicts, but exacerbated 
lateral antagonisms between workers instead (1979: 72). Key to this was the practice of 
“making out”, i.e. improvising with the available tools and materials, or forging tactical 
informal alliances with co-workers in order to increase outputs and individual wages 
(ibid: 57). The rules of the game of “making out”, Burawoy argues, are “experienced as 
a set of externally imposed relationships” that provide the “framework for evaluating 
the productive activities and the social relations that arise out of the organization of 
work” (ibid: 51). The shop floor culture arising from this practice inevitably leads to 
horizontal conflicts between workers (ibid: 65) and in addition structures their consent 
to the overall management policy of increasing production and surplus value. 
The more controversial point made by Burawoy was that the consent thus generated was 
produced at the workplace rather than being imported from the outside (ibid: 135). He 
did not entirely dismiss outside factors, which may, for example, determine the position 
one comes to occupy within the relations of production. But the labour process does, in 
his view, enjoy relative autonomy, in that once workers enter the labour process it is the 
latter that determines what the effects of “imported consciousness” will be. In his 
analysis of the effects of race for example, he tries to show that even though racial 
prejudices persist on the shop floor and manifest themselves in the attitudes of workers, 
this does not affect production relations (ibid: 145). In other words, attitudes do not 
necessarily lead to activities. Burawoy keeps a neat distinction between the two in order 
to show that while external attitudes persist in the shop floor, activities within it are a 
result of the specifics of the internal labour process (see also De Neve 2008: 243). 
In my own ethnographic material, I found this to be a difficult distinction to maintain. 
Few would disagree that discrepancies between what people say and think and what 
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they actually do abound in any social setting, and Shtip is here no exception. But as I 
hope to show in the pages that follow, the labour process in Stichko can in no way be 
disassociated from the larger spatio-temporal social context in which its activities are 
located. A good number of workers ‘consented’ to work in the factory only after 
exhausting other possibilities such as running their own business, pursuing a career 
through education, migration and even petty crime, all of which accumulated 
experiences that influence the specific way in which they not only “perceive” the 
working environment but the way in which they act in it. In addition, entry into the 
factory workforce is always channelled through relationship with friends or kin already 
employed in Stichko. These extra factory social relations play an important part in the 
subsequent positioning of workers in the labour process and their specific relationship 
to superiors and co-workers (see also De Neve 2001: 160; 2012: 13).   
Additionally, the daily experience of work is haunted by memories and narrative 
reconstructions of socialism coupled with ‘expectations of modernity’, or narrative 
constructions of an imagined future (the latter usually embodied in the common 
signifier “The West”. I will say more on this point in the next chapter). I will argue that 
this directly impacts on the way in which workers in the factory articulate notions of 
personhood. As already suggested in the previous chapter, one of the main contests 
taking place in the factory revolves around the diverging understandings of personhood 
deployed by workers and management. Management tends to project a model of the 
workplace that operates as a small scale market society where free individuals exchange 
their possessions. For workers however, instead of free individuals freely exchanging 
commodities (properties) through an impersonal market, personhood extends into “the 
past and the future” and the person “is intelligible only as it is related to the external 
world and to other [persons]” (Taussig 2010: 37; Radin 1927: 273-274).  
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What all this points to, is that work is not experienced as the impersonal exchange of 
labour for cash mediated by the market, but as a set of socially embedded material 
practices that partake in the everyday construction of the moral cosmology of the self 
and its alignment to what work ought to be about. By investing their labour workers 
accumulate a shared awareness that firms are built by actual flesh and blood people and 
their labour, and that their ultimate value and purpose resides in providing these same 
people with a dignified means of subsistence (cf. Dunn 2004: 171). For the workers, life 
in the factory is not so much about producing things (although it certainly is that as 
well) but about producing people. Only in this sense can we discuss production as 
material, i.e. not ‘the actual factory minus the human element’ but, to use Rofel’s 
reading of Marx, the ‘social relationships that simultaneously produce and are produced 
by concrete activities’ (1999: 176). In fact, Dunn has argued this to be a particular 
property of socialist systems, where labouring was seen by people as investing an object 
with a part of themselves, thereby creating an ‘enduring property right to the product 
and an enduring relation to coproducers’ (2004: 128).  
This has particular implications for the way in which we discuss the concept of 
alienation. Mauss took commodity exchange as the starting point for an understanding 
of alienation in industrialized society. For Mauss relations established via commodity 
exchange remain impersonal in the sense that the exchange of objects carries no notion 
of future or past relations between the transactors (Carrier 1995: 21). In contrast, gift 
exchange is personal in the sense that it establishes an enduring social relation between 
transactors which usually implies a culturally specific set of mutual obligations. The 
notion of gift here refers to anything from immaterial things to physical objects that is 
transacted as part of social rather than a purely monetary considerations (ibid: 19). 
Alienation is therefore a corollary phenomenon of the process of commoditization. In 
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the classical Marxist sense this would mean drawing a clear line between two creative 
spheres: the production of people in the household and the production of commodities 
in the workplace. Alienation occurs when the two circulate from one sphere to the other 
through the market which functions as a force of social amnesia. We therefore get the 
objectified consumption of people at the workplace (human labour power reduced to a 
commodity) and the personified consumption of commodities in the household (the 
products of labour acquiring properties and values of their own, see Graeber 2001: 79-
80).  
In his celebrated critique of work regimes in 20th century industrial capitalism, 
Braverman (1998) tried to outline the way in which the division of labour in the 
workplace contributes to experiences of alienation. More specifically, he investigated 
the rise of Taylorism and the concept of “scientific management” as applied to 
industrial production. The latter is a form of bureaucratic control that entails the careful 
division of production activities into a sequence of minute, measurable, observable and 
purely mechanical tasks as set and defined by management. It rests on the notion that 
the complex problems of modern production can be resolved with the aid of scientific 
methods (such as counting and measuring) that objectively determine the most efficient 
way of organizing production (see Braverman 1998: 59). To fit into this model, human 
labour itself must be reduced to purely mechanical operation and disassociated from the 
social totality of the person. In his analysis of the rise of “scientific management”, 
Braverman suggested that the main obstacle to establishing managerial control was that 
workers simply had superior knowledge of the production process and control over the 
tools of production (ibid: 69). Imposing managerial control therefore required precisely 
the kind of redirection of knowledge and expertise away from workers and towards 
management. The main result of this process of separation is the deskilling of shop floor 
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labour which increases its hierarchical dependence on “scientific” managerial guidance 
and alienates producers from each other and the objects produced (see also Carrier 
1995: 51). 
The self-managing firm was in many formal ways the very antithesis of Taylorism and 
its explicit goal was to reduce alienation. Even though management and technical 
directors (the experts) did usually have the final word in terms of how production was to 
be organized they could not bypass having to explain in detail any proposed changes to 
the workers councils, who could in theory oppose them. Their bigger problem however 
was the institutional protection of workers’ rights to employment and the ability of 
workers’ councils to influence wages. Factories were not merely places of work or the 
production of commodities – they were quite visibly and explicitly linked to other 
spheres such as political participation in society and the wellbeing of workers. A great 
number of workers lived and still reside in social housing constructed with funds from 
socially owned firms for workers and went on vacation in camps built and owned by 
these same firms. Work, life, leisure and politics all become visibly intermingled with 
producing things. This legacy still resonates strongly in the political imagination of 
workers that mediates the social experience of work and produces critical commentaries 
on what are acceptable practices in the workplace.   
The ideology of the ‘market’ with all its underlying assumptions about human nature is 
far from absent on the shop floor, or in the wider Macedonian public discourse for that 
matter. As already argued, it is often strategically invoked as a socially neutral force of 
legitimation whenever politically controversial decisions are being made by 
management but is far from being accepted as the “natural” order of things. The 
production process, by and large, fails to “obscure” the manner in which surplus value 
is “secured” (see Burawoy 1985: 35). The power of market ideology does not derive 
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from its capacity to indoctrinate workers in the virtues of “self-regulation”, but in 
effectuating social distance between non equals, so as to limit and control the scope of 
mutual obligations between workers and management that otherwise might arise. As 
much as this interplay is structured by what goes on in the factory, it can hardly be said 
that workers’ “consciousness” becomes the product of its internal dynamics. Workers 
neither internalize the culture of individualism nor do they nurture ideals of class 
politics. Instead they seek to rearrange existing hierarchies in ways that may ameliorate 
some of the more deleterious effects of marketization. They do this by producing their 
own understandings of personhood and economic activity as embedded in a wider 
network of moral relations, a process shaped both inside and outside the factory (Dunn 
2004).   
In his analysis of capitalist forms of control, Burawoy rightly stresses that the question 
of discipline is not necessarily a one-dimensional product of de-skilling, which may or 
may not take place on the shop floor. Any workplace setting involves not only an 
economic dimension (the production of things), but also a political dimension 
(production of social relations) and an ideological one (the production of the experience 
of those relations), all of which are closely interrelated (1985: 39). I part ways with 
Burawoy however in his assertion that all three dimensions are “objective” in the sense 
that they are “independent of the particular agents of production”, that is, the people that 
come to work (ibid). Once more this assertion is predicated on the idea of the relative 
autonomy of the workplace and the capitalist mode of production. Power and control 
appear as purely reproductive, their task being to reconstitute the wider relations of 
production (relations of exploitation between classes) by operating on the relations in 
production (the technical division of labour). Insofar as workers come up with their own 
“ideological effects” these only become “the focal elements in the operation of capitalist 
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control” (ibid). Contrary to this, I hope to show that the control of labour in the factory, 
insofar as it exists, is always tenuous and never complete. It rests on multiple strategies 
and requires constant efforts to maintain at all three levels where it is ceaselessly 
challenged.  In order to tease out this point we will need to focus more firmly on the 
social and cultural aspects of the workspace and the symbolic disconnection between 
workers and management in terms of how production is ideologically experienced and 
defined, and the specific ways in which inherited values and ideas from the past are 
deployed and reworked in new contexts. In what is to follow I hope to explore this 
tension in order to shed further light on the central theme of this thesis, i.e. the process 
of remaking of labour.  
 
7.2 Introducing Stichko 
By the time I started working in the factory in 2013, Stichko had been stitching 
garments for just over thirteen years. The company itself however had a longer history. 
It was started up in 1994 as a trading company by the current owner Mr Svemojski. 
During its first years of operation it acted as a broker, whose main activity consisted in 
seeking out and managing potential clients for Astibo’s male shirts production plant, 
and made its profits from provisions. Mr Samorich had joined the company during this 
period, briefly after getting his university degree in Nothingtodowithgarments. By 1997 
however it became clear that Astibo was no longer able to meet its obligations to both 
its workforce and the buyers. “The trouble with Astibo” Mr Samorich explained, “was 
that they were unwilling to change and adapt to the times. So often we had problems 
with people in production, with quality and delivery, and they simply could not 
understand that the buyer has to come first.” Many workers however did not feel that 
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the primary role of the factory was to satisfy the whims of buyers, but the needs of 
producers. Unpaid or late wages would often result in spontaneous protests with 
workers refusing to finish shirts on time, let alone agree to overtime labour, which made 
the enterprise particularly ill prepared for the necessities of “just in time” production 
cycles that dominate global chains of garment production.  
Faced with this reality, Stichko’s owner decided to open its own production line in 
1999, and use the network of contacts he had built up through his work with Astibo to 
track down potential buyers. The main challenge then was not so much finding 
interested clients but establishing a reliable and controllable production line that would 
deliver on time. The trouble once again was finding skilled workers and Stichko faced 
the same issues already described by Danica in the previous chapter. With the town’s 
almost entire experienced workforce stubbornly clinging to Astibo, Stichko opened its 
first production line with about 150 mostly male trainees. They were drafted from the 
pool of unemployed labourers created by the wave of total economic decline that 
unfolded throughout the nineties. Many of these “veterans” are still employed in the 
factory; however, with the closing of Astibo, Stichko began to absorb the largely female 
skilled labour force that entered the labour market. As a result, today more than eighty 
percent of the roughly four hundred strong workforce in Stichko is female. The cutting 
section, where I worked, was an exception to this trend and employed around eighteen 
men and ten women of various ages and backgrounds including former Makedonka and 
Astibo employees.  
Mr Samorich’s experiences in Astibo play a great part in his perception of what a 
garment producer ought to do in order to remain successful. He identified the main 
cause of Astibo’s decline in its “inability to change and adapt” and described it as “too 
big” and “not flexible enough.” In other words, he pictured Astibo as a non-manageable 
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workspace, with an impossible to control workforce that refused to submit to 
determinants of market logic and was therefore destined to collapse. In short, it was a 
labour force with the potential to defy and periodically escape managerial control. The 
organization of production in Stichko, under his managerial guidance, is intended to 
avoid precisely the kinds of problems that in his view ruined Astibo. Given the overall 
ideological re-categorisation of socialist practices as economic absurdities, the 
organization and management of Stichko has evolved in direct opposition to such 
conceptions. It is therefore heavily geared towards maintaining a clear separation of 
conception and execution, as well as fostering an ambience of precarious dependence on 
volatile markets. This means maintaining high levels of control over the workers, a task 
which, given the general reluctance by workers to internalize market models of 
personhood and social interaction, is never easy and always requires creative 
compromises.  
In the sections to follow I shall investigate in more detail some of the main mechanisms 
of control and discipline deployed in the factory by management and analyse in turn the 
responses by workers. I will pay particular attention to the organization of the 
production process itself and the division of labour in the factory. I will deal with both 
of these in turn in order to tease out the effects of control and the extent to which such 
disciplinary practices can in fact prevent workers from shaping their own interests, 
identities and relationships on the shop floor.  I suggest that the separation of conception 
and execution does not so much produce a deskilled workforce, but a cultural and moral 
separation between “downstairs” manual workers, and “upstairs” office workers or 
management, that allows the latter to assume control over the terms of interaction 
between workers and management. 
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7.3 Conceptualizing Production: Culture vs Nature 
I spent my first three weeks in the factory in the upstairs planning office where eight 
clerks (seven women and two men) busied themselves with administering production. 
Mrs Peppa, the director of production (and second in command after Mr Samorich), also 
held a desk even though she spent virtually all of her time instilling discipline on the 
shop floor, especially the stitching section. Yana, a former English language teacher in 
her early thirties, acted as the communication officer and busied herself with 
transmitting information between foreign buyers, Mr Samorich and the shop floor 
foremen. Milica and Ana prepared the production plans they received from the buyers 
for use on the shop floor that included all the details for each type of garment. Once the 
trucks arrive at the warehouse with the materials and the CD with the order details, they 
are responsible for organizing all the stages of the production and providing all the 
necessary information for producing the order, such as what materials are to be used, 
what quantities, the design particularities etc. Their work also includes communicating 
with the partners and ordering additional materials for production and communicating 
with other departments and assembly line staff. They say their job is very stressful as 
they can only relax once the shirts have reached their destination and the buyers are 
satisfied with the results. Borka is in charge of quality control and, even though she has 
a desk in the office, spends most of her time on the shop floor inspecting garments at 
various stages of the stitching process (a task she shares with the two more quality 
control agents with offices in the factory but actually working for two of Stichko’s most 
important foreign buyers).  
Spaska was in charge of accounting the wages of workers in the stitching section and 
spent most of her time reading numbers from sheets and punching them in a computer. 
Tereza was in charge of setting the piece rate quotas and would spend a great deal of 
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time on the shop floor measuring worker’s outputs with a stopwatch in order to set the 
“appropriate” quota for an eight hour working day and determine the piece rate value 
for each task. Marko and Filip were in charge of dealing with customs and 
transportation and had a particularly good insight into the goods coming in and out of 
the factory and consequently the profits made from production. The team would work 
together in presenting Mr Samoritch all the financial and technical details he would 
require to negotiate a deal with prospective buyers. The work of Tereza, Milica and Ana 
is particularly important in breaking down the various operations required to produce a 
specific garment and calculate the time and labour required to produce them. Based on 
this information Mr Samoritch can then proceed to negotiate a price and delivery date 
for any new orders.  
We can easily discern from this brief expose that planning depends a great deal on the 
ability of management to fit labour into these initial calculations and minimize the 
capacity of workers to influence and define the planning model or skew the calculations. 
In other words, the conception of production needs to stand firmly above and beyond 
the execution of production. This philosophy is clearly reflected in the attitudes 
expressed by office workers towards manual labourers. In fact, one of the most 
recurrent themes that grabbed my attention during discussions with the office workers 
were the antinomies of “manual” and “intellectual” labour in the factory. On one 
occasion I asked Tereza to compare office work with shop floor work in terms of 
difficulty. She said “It is ungrateful to make any judgement on these things. You have to 
do a job to know best how difficult it is. But I think that working on the shop floor is 
less stressful. You can just focus on one thing and you don’t have to think about 
anything else and you can just wait for the time to pass. The responsibility is much 
higher in the office and your work depends on information you receive from others.” On 
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another occasion, Milica also suggested that shop-floor workers are different because 
they “don’t have to think about anything. You know I read somewhere that people with 
low education are better equipped for manual work because they mind doesn’t wander 
and they are more focused. They don’t have anything to think about so they can just do 
the work!”  
 
This idea that shop floor labour requires less mental effort and is therefore “easy” and as 
opposed to office work was of course a caricature that failed to capture the actual reality 
of either.  To begin with the obvious, the question of whether or not one has acquired a 
university degree has absolutely no bearing on one’s capacity to engage in creative 
thought. In fact, as Graeber has noted, in many hierarchical systems, the burden of what 
he terms “imaginative labour” more often than not falls on the back of the 
disempowered who have to spend a great deal of time trying to understand what exactly 
is expected of them by the dominant (2012: 51). Secondly, even though certain 
individual tasks on the shop floor require a relatively brief period of learning before 
they could be performed, becoming a proficient and experienced worker requires a great 
deal more (in addition to being physically taxing). It involves a long period of learning 
(certainly longer than the nine months I spent on the shop floor) in order to grasp the 
process of production and the delegation of responsibilities in their entirety. One must 
also develop the techniques and dexterity to perform a wide variety of tasks, since the 
majority of workers are almost never entirely committed to the performance of one task 
in the line only. Conversely, the work done in the office is not necessarily “mental”. 
Much of it is pretty mechanical and repetitive and consists of little more than long hours 
of copy-pasting and data entry (see also, Freeman 2000: 229).  
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Such utterances are not without their effects, however, even though they are, strictly 
speaking, false representations of reality. They legitimize the separation of conception 
from execution by framing both within a hierarchy of value, in which the “mental” can 
look down upon the “physical”. In the process of planning, shop-floor workers are 
robbed of sociality and reduced to a sheer physicality that can take its place alongside 
all the other material aspects of production that require organization. In other words, 
shop floor workers are being actively construed as “things” to be managed, or as the raw 
materials of nature being shaped and dominated by culture (Ortner 1996: 25). This is 
hardly surprising, given that office workers spend most of their day interacting with 
shop floor workers through data-sheets where the latter appear in a partial form as 
labour-tasks with numerical values.  
 
There is also a cultural separation being introduced that sees manual workers as 
“different sorts of people” from office workers that need to be kept apart from the latter 
(Carrier 1995: 50). Oftentimes, manual workers were viewed as a source of pollution. 
For example, when Spaska developed herpes on her lower lip, she insisted that she 
probably contracted it from handling the pay sheets of shop floor workers all day long. 
“Who knows who has been touching those papers” said Spaska as the other women 
grimaced in disgust. It is, of course, pointless to look for the medical rationale behind 
this assertion; its effects on reality operate through the symbolic. As Ortner notes (1996: 
26), drawing on Douglas (1996), pollution usually partakes of the natural, and left to its 
own devices always threatens “contagion”-–hence, disorder--which in turn only further 
increases the imperative to control it and reintroduce order.  
On other occasions, office workers would stress differences in dress, tastes or 
mannerisms between themselves and shop-floor workers. Such commentaries are meant 
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to reify their own perceived identities as “middle class” by projecting onto manual 
workers certain elements that stand in opposition to middle-classness, such as shabby 
clothing or hygiene deficiency (Dunn 2004: 92; Said 1979). We might therefore say, 
pace Bourdieu, that class is here not reducible to the economic (office workers in the 
factory earn on average the same amount as shop-floor workers), but always requires a 
certain level of embodied cultural capital as a marker of distinction (see Freeman 2000: 
52).  
 
In turn this also produces a moral separation as seen for example in the refusal of office 
workers to identify with complaints made by shop-floor workers. Yana for example 
made this amply clear one day in the office. She had gone down to the packing section 
to check on progress and came back saying “I can’t listen to Vera complaining anymore 
about how she has to stay long hours to finish the work. If she thinks that counting 
shirts and stuffing them in a box is a difficult task she should go ask Mr Samorich for a 
raise so I don’t have to listen to her anymore.” On another occasion we were discussing 
complaints by shop floor workers who did not appreciate occasionally having to come 
to work on Saturdays. Ana found no reason for complaints since according to her they 
earned extra money for it and the work involved “only physical exhaustion. You just 
stand there all day long and move the iron left and right.” If complaints are meant to 
evoke a sense of moral community for the listener by creating empathy (Peteet 1994: 
32), they seemed to be falling short of achieving that end. For office workers alienation 
means recognizing manual workers not in their totality social persons, but in a limited 
aspect that focuses only on one of their alienable properties, i.e. their (manual) labour. 
Insofar as giving it up has been duly compensated by a wage, there are no other morally 
legitimate grounds for complaint. In other words, office workers project onto shop floor 
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workers the normative image of the possessive individual. This however, as will 
become apparent, does more to shape the attitudes and perceptions of office workers 
themselves than the actual way in which shop floor workers experience and 
conceptualize themselves. 
 
 
7.4 Spatial Organization and the Control of Bodies 
This organizational division of labour is reflected in the actual organization of the 
factory’s physical space as a kind of panopticon. Mr Samorich’s office is strategically 
positioned on the second floor of the office building adjacent to the shop floor with a 
large tinted window looking straight down on to the cutting section and beyond to the 
stitching brigades. The tinted glass allows for a clear view of the shop floor from the 
office but from the opposite direction one can only just about make out the silhouette of 
someone standing behind the glass, though it is impossible to make out who the person 
is exactly and in which direction is their gaze employed. Power is here both “visible and 
unverifiable” (Foucault 1995: 201), in the sense that workers can at all times see the tall 
structure from where they can be observed, without knowing whether or not they really 
are being observed at any point in time. To the right are two more clear windows. One 
is from the small kitchen and another from the meeting room from where the various 
clients and business partners that visit the factory can see the production line in full 
display.  
 
The shop floor is a large single shared space housing all the different sections of 
production (the warehouse, embroidery and printing room are separate enclosed spaces 
on the same level). It has a hangar-like appearance with its twenty meter high ceiling, 
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from which various metal structures hang and support the lighting, electricity cables and 
air-conditioning tubes. The surrounding walls and parts of the hanging metal 
construction also support an increasing number of video cameras used for surveillance. 
They transmit the image directly to Mr Samorich’s computer screen in his office. On 
occasion, the cameras can be relied on to thwart workers’ effort to skew the piece rate 
quotas. I witnessed one such event when Mr Samorich came to the office to consult 
Tereza about the quotas. Tereza complained that one of the seamstresses was acting out. 
“Every time I go to time her she slows down.” Mr Samorich’s solution was to move the 
cameras so that she could be observed without her knowledge, and then do a 
comparison with Tereza’s measurements from the shop floor. It is hard to determine 
how often this particular technique was used by management to set the quotas, but it is 
safe to say that Mr Samoritch was unhesitant in pursuing this strategy. And after all, the 
cameras are there to help exercise control over the production process. 
 
On the shop floor, the video cameras did contribute to the overall sentiment that one is 
being observed, even though they were somewhat superfluous since the cutting section 
was located just under Mr Samoritch’s office, fully exposed to his ominous gaze; 
moreover, Mr. Zeko, the cutting section foreman, was constantly roaming the tables. 
The open plan floor also allowed for other senior management figures like Mrs. Peppa, 
who usually spent her time in the stitching section, to observe from a safe distance what 
workers were doing. All this adds to the constant pressure on workers to be continually 
aware of their movements and behaviour during the working day and the awareness that 
they are never alone. At first glance, there certainly is a sense in which constant 
surveillance as a technique for disciplining results in self-regulation and the 
normalization of relations of power. Moreover, as Kelly-Fernandez encountered whilst 
210 
 
conducting her own research in a garment factory in northern Mexico, the 
interconnectedness of tasks across the shop floor further contributes to the self-
regulation workers impose on themselves (1983: 127-8). There is a certain awareness 
that the person next to you depends on the quality of your work in order to meet their 
piece rate quotas, and few workers are indifferent to this responsibility. 
 
The acceptable and unacceptable bodily movements and gestures during working hours 
are also explicitly defined by management in relation to individual productivity and 
efficiency. Workers are expected to look only at the piece of cloth they are handling and 
not at the other workers or their surroundings. Laughing and chatting are strictly 
prohibited during work. All the more so with forms of gesticulation that reveal one 
might be so engaged in narrating a story to other workers that mere words do not suffice 
to capture the experience. A worker is then in great danger of revealing a lack of focus 
and concentration, but more importantly, that her hands are in the wrong place. A 
mistake might be made, a wrong cut, a moment of weakness and a whole pile of parts 
can be ruined for which no spare materials are available. Even if spare materials are 
available, the long procedure of accounting for the loss of fabric, getting a new roll 
approved from the warehouse and having it delivered can result in considerable delay. 
To avoid this, an intense battle over the control of bodies takes place on a daily level on 
the shop floor. And the focus is precisely on bodies, on the actual physical dimension of 
performing work. The nature of manual labour is, as I already argued, perceived by 
management and the office workers in general to be strictly mechanical and to require 
no thought beyond that of coordinating the body through a set of physical motions 
necessary for cutting, stitching, ironing and packing fabric. It is precisely this 
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philosophy that allows the body to be gazed upon as something to be regulated, 
controlled and subdued.  
 
Periods of work scarcity were moments when discipline got a little lax. I took the fact 
that there was simply next to no work to be done as an opportunity to engage in banter 
with the other workers, as well as ask some extra questions. The results were not always 
benign, as I learned on one occasion whilst having an engaging--too engaging--
conversation with Prasho whilst trimming cuffs together, only to be abruptly interrupted 
by a screaming Mr Zeko coming from right behind us: 
 
“Prasho I don’t wanna hear another word from you. Don’t let me see you open your 
mouth! Mrs Peppa saw you from the other end waiving your scissors and explaining 
something to Aleksandar. I don’t want to get calls from her saying that you’re all chatting 
here instead of working. (Turns around and shouts to everyone) I don’t want to waste my 
time and interrupt my work because of all of you! I’ve had enough of this! Stop talking 
and get to work! And be very careful what you do from now on because you all know we 
have more workers than we need! Don’t give Mrs Peppa any ideas!” 
 
This episode demonstrated that even in cases where chatting did not necessarily affect 
overall productivity (i.e. there was very little work to be done to begin with), discipline 
still had to be enforced and sociality repressed. Everyone immediately went quiet and 
tried to appear fully concentrated at the task at hand. Prasho was sent off to clean 
threads in the stitching section. Later on Grigoriy contrasted this incident with how 
things worked when the worker’s councils still existed: “Back in the day if someone 
started shouting like that you would just look at  him and say 'Shut up you! Where do 
you think you are?' Haha. Imagine that. Imagine Mr Samorich coming down here to 
212 
 
scream and someone telling him 'Shut up you! This isn't your daddy's factory!'” No 
reminders were needed though that things were now decidedly different and workers no 
longer have a say.  
 
I should also point out Mr Zeko’s emphasis on Prasho’s uncontrolled bodily movements 
(waving the scissors). Management finds this particularly threatening on the assembly 
line where machine like coordination is the desired ideal. “Look at this” Mr Samoritch, 
once told me in his office, pointing a garment technology magazine he had picked up at 
a fair in Germany. The page contained a pie-chart of supposed productivity rates. “Of 
the eight hours workers spend here no less than forty percent of the time is lost on 
passing items from one line to the next. This is a timed objective study. And they’ve 
invented this system of suspended hooks going over the workers heads where they can 
hang the garment and it will be automatically transported to the next production line 
saving all of that time. Imagine how much we would gain in productivity?” Paul 
Valery’s remark that “modern man (sic) no longer works at what cannot be abbreviated” 
(Taussig 2004: 44) acquires a degree of truth here, in the sense that the actual 
production of goods in the factory is rarely separated from the production of greater 
“efficiency” and the pursuit of new ways for extracting an “ever-greater surplus from 
the labour process” (Cross 2010: 362). Timing, measuring and controlling the bodies of 
workers becomes the sine qua non of the rational, productive and efficient deployment 
of labour. It is here that the latter becomes a detachable commodity and a replacement 
for the social person. Laughter, chatting and gesticulation are all in direct collision with 
this model of the worker - an affront to the efforts of controlling bodily movements. It is 
also, an affront to the idea of the worker as “possessive individual”, with labour as 
“their” alienable property.  
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The second important point to be highlighted here is the explicit reminder of workers’ 
precarious position in the factory (“We have more workers than we need”). The 
disciplining practices of management here are not so much designed to normalize the 
situation and produce a consenting workforce but precisely the opposite: create and 
maintain an ambience of abnormality, precariousness, and instability as a means of 
fragmenting dissent and enclosing it within the privatized interior of the individual 
(Taussig 1990: 219). This is done through constant reminders that the industry is not 
doing so well, the frequent termination of contracts for employees, the stops and gaps in 
production, the volatility of global markets and the lack of an effective welfare safety 
net, all of which contribute to an overwhelming atmosphere that ‘everything hangs by a 
thread’13. The way the experience of precarity reverberates across workers in the cutting 
section can easily be discerned from their commentaries. Following the shouting 
incident, I said to Mitko that it was unfair to send Prasho away like that. He agreed and 
said: “He’s been shuffled around too often for the past two years that he’s been working 
here. It doesn’t look good. On top of everything the industry is not doing too well. 
Factories are sending workers on holidays because there’s no work. Even here we’ve got 
more people than we need.” 
 
7.5 Commoditizing Labour 
The disciplining principles of precarity are also reflected in the valuation of labour. 
Whereas the office workers are paid a fixed salary of roughly 200 euros a month, shop 
floor workers are subject to wildly complicated piece rate regimes designed to increase 
                                                          
13
 Most workers are hired on temporary contracts that are usually renewed (or not) every three months. 
Legally, an employer is not obliged to offer an employee a permanent contract for the first five years (see 
Saveski 2010).   
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their productivity. Article 37 from the Collective Agreement for the Garment Industry 
between the Union of Syndicates of Macedonia and the Union of Employers, does state 
that “in the case that 50% of the workers are achieving less than 70% of the quota the 
syndicate can make an initiative for its reevaluation.” However, considering that the 
Union has absolutely no presence in the factories it is difficult to see how this 
“initiative” can be made, notwithstanding the fact that the regulations in article 37 are 
already hardly favorable to workers. Consequently, owners and managers are at liberty 
to arbitrarily set the piece rate quotas without consulting any form of organized labour. 
 
As such, the quotas are subject to frequent fluctuations, although for Mr Samorich they 
reflect objective measurements of individual value. The stitching section is a particular 
case in point. In a month with regular orders, meeting the daily quota alone will secure 
an average of 200-220 Euros. The precise number of sleeves or collars one will have to 
stitch can vary depending on management decision. Absenteeism is not compensated 
for by the factory. If workers are away on sick leave, the factory is obliged to give out 
only the minimum wage as agreed in the collective agreement with workers in the 
garment industry, which in 2013 stood at roughly 90EUR14. Workers are allowed, when 
orders are high, to work overtime. And there is a twist. For the first three days of 
overtime workers are paid the standard rate per each extra piece they stitch. After three 
days of continuous overtime however they start to receive a 50 percent bonus on each 
piece they stitch during overtime hours. If for example a worker does two straight days 
                                                          
14
 Even though a minimum wage of 8,050 Denars [EUR130] was introduced in January 2012, it came 
with special exemptions for the garment, textile, leather and shoemaking industries who were meant to 
adapt to the new changes gradually and fully implement the minimum wage by 2015. In January 2014, 
the still in power conservative IMRO-DPMNU raised the limit to 10,080 Denars, again to be fully 
implemented in the abovementioned industries by 2018. Given that the current average wages in Shtip’s 
larger factories already match, and often slightly exceed this amount, and taking into account the steady 
annual rates of inflation, the raising of the minimum wage will have very little effect on the town’s 
industrial population and is nothing short of political marketeering. 
215 
 
of overtime and a regular shift on the third day she will lose her right to the bonus. The 
result is an explosion of income differences in the stitching brigades. Women who have 
to juggle garment work with household responsibilities are particularly at a 
disadvantage and end up earning less than the men. On one monthly income sheet I 
noted a lowest salary of EUR90 and the highest of nearly EUR1000, for which the 
worker in question had to put in almost two and a half months’ worth of working hours 
into one month.  
 
There was in fact much talk about this particular worker whom I will call Bojan. He was 
a young married man and in the habit of pulling off two full shifts a day, six days a 
week whilst keeping his good spirits about him. For office workers he was proof that 
one could indeed earn good money on the shop floor. Such comments were made on the 
assumption that in theory, everyone could pretty much do the same, which was strictly 
speaking untrue as there is simply not enough work available throughout the year for 
everyone to follow the same pattern. But even if there was, few workers would find the 
idea worth considering. In the cutting section, Bojan was seen as slightly mad and 
“possessed by money”. “There’ll be nothing of him left in a few years. He’ll wither 
out”, said Mandana, a former Astibo employee. The young women questioned his 
ability to be a good husband. “So what if he earns all that money if I have to look for 
someone else to sleep with because he’s too tired or never there.” For most workers, 
earning large sums of money is, in and of itself, of little value if in the process one 
becomes separated from the webs of mutuality that constitute the moral person. 
Ignoring these is not only immoral but provokes immoral behaviour in others, such as 
infidelity. This has a direct effect on how workers perceive the piece rate quotas.  
 
216 
 
The cutting section itself has only recently been subjected to a piece rate regime; 
workers were previously receiving a fixed salary. The change happened after workers 
organized a minor “strike”, or a stoppage in production, and demanded to negotiate with 
management for higher wages. The confrontation happened before I joined the factory. I 
could therefore only get a reconstruction of events from different people in the cutting 
section. Their accounts were more or less similar. Workers had initially gathered in the 
canteen and demanded to speak to Mr Samoritch. They explained to him their demands 
for higher wages and Samoritch explained that there was no money for such things. 
Making a direct reference to Astibo he reiterated that factories that arbitrarily raise 
wages quickly become bankrupt and made it clear to workers that they are “free” to 
leave the factory if they are unhappy with the conditions. The confrontation ended with 
a promise from Mr Samoritch to make some changes and to continue with talks and 
consultations. The changes, however, were not necessarily what workers were hoping 
for and Mr Samorich saw the problem in an entirely different light. From his point of 
view, workers resembled a bunch of boisterous adolescents who had to be “disciplined 
and reformed through carefully supervised labour” (Graeber 2007: 41): 
 
“Their demands are not reasonable. They are like little children when they come up here 
to complain. But we made many changes in the cutting section as a result of those 
discussions and things have improved a lot. They were far worse off before and had 
worse valuing. They didn’t have quotas and they did not have a sense of how much 
they’re worth individually. And we had a situation where those who were hard working 
were valued as much as the lazy ones. And then the hard workers became lazy as well. 
And there was discontent, so we spoke to all of them. Now the interesting thing is that 
they did not see the solution in having a healthy competition, so we can see how much 
everyone is worth. Instead all they wanted was ‘give us more money’. Let us work the 
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same way, leave everything the same just give us more money. So we had plenty of 
discussions, first they all came up, then we spoke individually, then in groups: you know, 
the cutters, then the layering workers etc. And the end result was that we changed the 
system of valuation. Before, regardless of how much they worked, they got paid the 
same. So what I wanted to do was avoid subjective evaluation of the workers. No matter 
who the person is, no matter how skilled they are, you can never have a correct opinion of 
how much they’re worth. Some people can leave a very good impression. You know we 
usually react to these impressions and some people can [fool you] into thinking that 
they’re God knows who. It’s best if the evaluation is objective and based on some 
measurable indices. I want to eliminate subjective evaluations. Whoever it is, they can’t 
get away from work. And that’s what we have achieved. We know how much work each 
worker has done. And now, I think, they have far fewer conflicts and disagreements down 
there.” 
 
I mentioned that a lot of the workers feel that not everyone is being treated equally as a 
result of these changes but this did not offset Mr Samoritch who expanded on his 
philosophy of work: 
 
“Not everyone should be equal and not everyone is equal. Even the fingers on one hand 
are not equal. The world is made to be different, with many variations and that is its 
beauty. What we need to ensure is that everyone has the same conditions, an equal 
starting line.  We cannot treat everyone equally but we need to make sure everyone gets 
an equal chance and an equal starting line. What are all those races about and all those 
competition? If everyone should be equal then let us [Macedonians] be equal with the 
USA. What are the Olympic Games about? People want to compete to prove to one 
another who is better. But there are rules. If you respect the rules and do better by playing 
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by the rules then you really are better. Here’s your start line and start racing. If you’re 
fast, you’ll get there first. If you’re no good you’ll be the last.” 
 
This final statement is a standard glorification of the rationality of neoliberal capitalism 
(“equal opportunity”) that could have easily rolled off the pen of a Milton Friedman (as 
it often in fact did; see Friedman 1962: 107; 1980: 128). The question that is not asked 
is, of course, who defines the rules of the game? For Mr Samoritch, the rules are the 
doxa of rational economic behaviour. They are presented as an external set of objective 
economic truths that must be dispassionately applied and cannot be questioned. For 
people in the cutting section however, the rules appear as a set of arbitrary measures that 
correspond to nothing more than the arbitrary whims of management. To begin with, all 
important decisions regarding the worth of individual tasks, the actual distribution of 
work, and the position of a worker within the process of production, ultimately reside in 
the hands of management - a reality the workers are distinctly aware of. As Mitko told 
me: “How can they decide that layering should be paid less than the design work? Do 
you know how exhausting it is to do that job? You have to stand all day long and drag 
those sheets to a point where your legs are giving up on you. But they’ve decided that 
it’s worth less. How can they decide that when they’ve never tried doing these tasks.”  
 
The second problem, as workers saw it, was the distribution of work. Contrary to 
Beynon’s experience in Ford in the late sixties, production in Shtip does not require a 
“good continuous effort” to meet a “reasonable workload” and produce the number of 
shirts that management knows can be produced (2009: 133). Unlike Ford, production in 
garment factories in Shtip is simply never “continuous”. The workload increases and 
decreases according to seasonal variations and producers are entirely dependent on 
direct orders from European buyers. Periods of intense activity are followed up by 
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idleness when workers struggle to find something to occupy themselves with. Usually 
the third table on which I spent most of my time was considered an auxiliary table by 
Mr Zeko and in times of work scarcity we would receive very little work when 
compared to the other two. Allocating work was, in other words, very clearly a matter of 
human politics instead of an “objective” or disinterested allocation of resources. 
 
7.5.1 Socializing Labour 
Mechev for example, who was regularly earning the highest paycheck of all the power 
cutters, made no secret of the fact that the owner was a very close friend of his first 
cousin, and that he could always “make a call” if he had any problems. Consequently 
his high wages were always discussed as stemming from his privileged relationship to 
management, not from his work ethic and individual productive capacity. “Of course he 
makes more money when they give more work on his table. I’d like to see him make 
more money on Zhare’s table” Mitko told me. It was generally agreed that if Mechev, or 
anyone for that matter, received more money, this reflected a specific social 
relationship and had nothing to do with individual merit. In other words, differences in 
personal income were seen by workers as variations in degrees of social proximity with 
those in power, whom they in turn held responsible for ensuring a “fair” distribution of 
profits. The obvious problem this caused was that there was no way to unambiguously 
determine the fair price of a social relation. Consequently, there was no way it could be 
squarely compensated, which creates a situation of permanent mutual indebtedness. For 
workers this implies mutual obligations, and, the right to make claims on their 
superiors.    
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It is important to highlight that this attitude is not just produced in the factory, but 
corresponds to the way workers perceive the wider organization of society and the 
social (mutual) obligations between dominated and dominant, which is to say by an 
external “moral economy”. In addition such attitudes also influence the way in which 
workers “act” on the shop floor. For example, the managerial insistence on establishing 
measurable indices that determine the individual “worth” of employees failed to 
produce the requisite culture of competitiveness or “making out” among workers. This 
is best seen in periods of severe work scarcity when one might expect precisely an 
increase in competitive behaviour over decreasing resources. Instead, workers would 
offer “gifts” to each other, such as the odd pile of cuffs which they would trim at a 
greatly reduced pace. This allows them to “look busy” and thus avoid reprisals from 
management for appearing idle. Some workers would start layering pieces only to mess 
them up whenever a safe moment so allowed and start all over again until the end of the 
shift.   
 
But perhaps a more telling indicator was the refusal displayed by many workers to heed 
Mr Zeko’s advice to write down all the work that they did (that was not preassigned), if 
they wished to get paid for it. The few workers who did diligently write down 
everything they touched, such as Kirkov and Mechev, were dismissed as petty misers. 
As if their claiming payments for the actual work they had done represented some kind 
of obscene transgression. Mechev in particular was meticulous in calculating every 
Denar earned and would often frequent the wage accountant’s office to double check if 
their calculations squared. He was also the only one to openly brag about his monthly 
earnings whereas most people preferred sharing the information on their payslips only 
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with their closest friends. I asked Mitko why wasn’t he doing the same thing and his 
reply was to dismiss Mechev as being “pathologically obsessed with money”.  
 
This reference to pathology is not accidental, for in a sense, self-auditing and keeping 
accounts did constitute a moral abnormality. Such behaviour is seen as dishonourable 
and evokes negative images of petty miserliness. In contrast, honour is usually 
associated with open handed generosity. Additionally, self-auditing threatens to reduce 
the relationship between workers and employers to an exchange of labour for cash. It 
implies a recognition that once the “goods” have changed hands all accounts have been 
squared and there are no withstanding mutual obligations (see Graeber 2011b: 92-94). 
In short, it terminates the social relation, and the workers would have none of that. 
Refusing to self-audit was in a very real way an attempt to create mutual obligations 
based on mutual indebtedness, i.e. to transform an empty asocial form of inequality into 
something thicker and more social (and perhaps, generous).  
 
Ruzha and Jasna also made explicit their reluctance to audit themselves throughout the 
month, and saw the whole exercise as a pointless waste of time. They even made a 
monthly ritual that expressed their refusal to submit to “objective” valuation. As soon as 
they could see Mr Zeko distributing the monthly payslips, they would both write down a 
certain amount on a piece of paper and then exchange the papers. The point was to try to 
guess the amount contained in the payslip, and then see whose guess was closer to 
target. The question was never “how much do you think we earned?” but “how much do 
you think he’ll give us?” In other words what the Ruzha and Jasna were evaluating was 
not their individual productivity but their relationship to Mr Zeko for that month. A low 
amount would mean they’ve fallen out of favour with him and that they need to improve 
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their social standing, rather than their skills and productivity. Kocho for example 
refused to audit himself in order to maintain a thicker relationship with Mr Zeko that 
would allow for his social needs to be recognized. More specifically, he considered 
himself a “young person” and told me that sometimes he likes to “have a drink on the 
weekend” and maybe not show up for work on Monday. “So I don’t write things down 
and Zeko will turn a blind eye when I miss a day of work.” In short, Kocho treated his 
labour in the factory as part commodity and part gift exchange. He would “offer” part of 
his labour as an uncalculable gift and thereby maintain a delicate web of obligations 
with his immediate superior (Graeber 2011b: 122).  
 
7.6 Management and the Problem of Skill 
The attitudes of management towards workers on the shop floor are not so much 
concerned with deskilling as with reminding them that they have no skills to lose to 
begin with, which is to say they are perfectly and totally expendable. I was an 
uncomfortable party to one such occasion during my very first week on the shop floor 
when Mrs. Peppa, the technical manager, approached me out of curiosity regarding my 
‘descent’ from the office into the cutting section. Everyone else immediately went very 
quiet as soon as she arrived and became focused on their work. I was in the middle of 
trimming a pile of cuffs and was not too happy to be singled out by a friendly 
conversation with management. 
 
"So you’re down here now? Are you done with the office work?" she asked me. "Yes" I 
replied, "time to see what goes on in this part." Her reply was "not much", as I could 
apparently see for myself. She went on to describe herself as a qualified biochemist who 
only reluctantly joined the factory after failing to find work in her field. She continued: 
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“This work you know, textiles (sic) it’s nothing special. It’s a bit of a no brainer, I mean 
you would need a few days to be proficient in most of the tasks here. You don’t need to 
use your brain most of the time. This is a notch over agricultural work.” I felt a bit 
embarrassed as she was making those statements in front of the other workers and tried 
to make a point that you do need to concentrate a lot, and know what you are doing, but 
also, that I would not be able to do the work without supervision. This, she assured me, 
was not the case and as a “fellow intellectual” I would soon realize she was right. I 
never quite came to agree, but what I did realize was that the point of making such 
statements in front of workers was not to accurately describe the nature of shop floor 
labour, but to accentuate the hierarchical separation of conception from execution and 
define management and manual workers as different sorts of people. It was a kind of 
“symbolic violence” that tried to impose upon workers a sense of their own devalued 
cultural resources and social limits (Sancho 2012: 7; Schwartz 1997: 89).  
 
For all their experience and dexterity, shop floor workers are never consulted on matters 
related to improving the efficiency of production. This can be seen in production 
problems that arise in the cutting section from having to work with poor quality fabric. 
If the fabric has a chequered pattern things can get particularly messy. Once layered, the 
pile of fabric is handed over to the bandsaw cutters who can follow the printed pattern 
on top and cut all the layers at one go. For this to work however the layers need to be 
piled up in such a way so that all the parts come out looking the same, which is easy 
enough to do when using plain coloured fabric, but extremely tricky when using poor 
quality chequered fabric which requires a certain technique. This is usually done by 
using special pins that are fixed on the table in an erect position, and then layering the 
fabric on top of them so they can keep it in place. Each layer has to be pinned down so 
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that the chequered pattern matches the one beneath it. In the case of yokes or cuffs, the 
finished parts must also be symmetrical which makes the task even trickier. When the 
materials are stretched or just poor quality the squares simply do not match and the 
materials have to be tampered with as they are being layered. This usually involves 
stretching them additionally before being pinned or picking a different crosspoint for 
some layers. It is by definition a matter of creative improvisation that one gets better at 
with prolonged handling of different types of fabric (see also Cross 2011: 131). But no 
matter how skilled, if the quality of the fabric is too poor there is very little to be done.  
Once the pile is arranged it is handed over to the cutters on the bandsaw who need to be 
very careful not to unsettle the pile while cutting it which may result in the pieces being 
cut unsymmetrically. If this happens the parts in question are rendered useless and a 
team of people need to get involved in finding additional material, creating the 
paperwork, reprinting the pattern, layering the fabric, rough cutting it and layering it 
using the pins once more. The shirts lacking the parts remain incomplete and the 
seamstresses or seamsters assigned to stitching that particular part may not reach their 
quotas for the day. I noted precisely one such occasion where a serious problem in 
production arose from pieces being cut unsymmetrically. They were part of an order 
that I, among others had been working on for a few days. As usual Mr Samoritch came 
down to inspect the problem and find a solution. He, Mr Zeko and one of quality 
controllers hovered over Badev as he was doing the cutting and discussing the process 
between them. Badev remained silent throughout. After a certain amount of deliberation 
Mr Zeko approached our table and asked if there are any more finished piles ready for 
the bandsaw. I quickly wrapped mine up and handed it over. After some joint 
inspection, it was given to Badev to cut who had to operate the bandsaw with the entire 
management team observing him. Once cut, the team reassembled to examine the 
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pieces. As we were looking at them Jasna commented with a soft voice: “What are they 
talking about there? Look at them they seem as if they’re inventing a rocket. How did 
they become the experts all of a sudden. Isn’t cutting the pieces our job?” As far as 
management was concerned cutting and layering was Jasna’s job, but figuring out how 
to best do it, was certainly not.  
After a second round of examination Mr Samoritch asked for a third pile of yokes. He 
then told Badev that most likely the pieces get a little unsettled when he is moving them 
on the bandsaw. He should start cutting them more slowly, take greater care and avoid 
pressing the pile too much against the bandsaw. How they arrived at this conclusion no 
one was certain, least of all Badev, who only commented with a dose of sarcasm “I 
guess they found the problem in my cutting.” The possibility that the yokes were not 
symmetrical because of the simple reason that the fabric was of poor quality did not 
surface, and in any case, it may have been due to my poor layering. This could not be 
fully verified without unsettling the entire pile and removing the pins which the 
examination committee obviously did not do. Only later did I find out from the office 
workers that the same day they had contacted the buyers and shown them sample 
pictures, explaining that there were difficulties in production due to the poor quality of 
the materials they had sent. This information, however, was not shared with workers nor 
were they allowed to assess the quality of the fabric or participate in identifying the 
problem in any way.  
Back on the shop floor Badev was only was only too happy to cut the rest of the pieces 
slowly and go back to his usual routine. “I know how to do my job. I don’t know why 
Samoritch had to come down for this” was his comment in the aftermath. Tome, one of 
the senior workers in the cutting section frequently complained to me about the fact that 
the management do not listen to the workers and that they do not value their opinion. He 
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thought that it was owed to pure arrogance and a conviction that they know best. 
“Maybe they do for some larger things but we’re the ones who know the little details.”   
A similar event took place a few months later when we again had the same problem 
with layering some poor quality chequered fabric. Mr Samoritch once again descended 
to the shop floor to see what the problem was. Given that this was a problematic and 
time consuming fabric, management had thought it necessary to devise a time saving 
strategy. Jasna and Ruzha had been trying in vain to tell Mr Zeko that they will have to 
do it the standard way but were only told to give him advice when he asks for it and to 
get back to work. When Mr. Samoritch arrived the very possibility of even trying to 
share their opinion vanished. After some quick consultations with Mr Zeko, Mr 
Samoritch decided that the best thing we can do to save time is to layer one pile for each 
size, cut it in two symmetrical parts and then flip one part on top of the other to make 
one thicker pile. The bandsaw cutters would then cut two piles in one go and we would 
improve our efficiency by 50%. Having heard the plan I gathered the courage to 
intervene: 
Me: We already thought of that but the problem was that when flipping the pieces on top 
they get slightly unsettled and don’t match the ones underneath and then we had to waste 
even more time to rearrange them from scratch.  
 
Mr Samoritch: It will work. Just take these two clips (hands them to Mr Zeko) and fix 
both ends so the pieces stay in place and flip them over. Ok get to work. 
 
After he left I tried using the clips only to find out that they made very little difference. 
They were bulky and inefficient as they only fixed the pile in the middle and I ended up 
with the same result when flipping it over. I told Mr Zeko that this will simply not work 
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but he came up with the idea to place some cardboard over the pile and fix it using the 
clips to keep the pile steady and then flip it over and once positioned just pull out the 
cardboard from underneath and voila! We shall have our pile! This also did not work as 
the cardboard blocked our view of the pile underneath and we could not match the 
pattern. Moreover, since the fabric was sticky extracting the cardboard was impossible 
without again unsettling the pieces. Nonetheless, Mr Zeko set out to get someone to cut 
him some cardboard that would match the shape of the pieces so that it didn’t block the 
view of the pile underneath. We resumed our work and Mr Zeko never returned.  
Jasna: Did you see that? As if the sky will fall if he lets us say anything about how to cut 
them. 
Me: I know. Maybe I can try and speak to them about this. 
Stevan: They’ll probably listen to you. You’ve got a university degree. We’re just with 
high-school education. They won’t even look at us. 
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
This final comment reveals that, to an extent, workers do end up developing a sense of 
their “inferior” cultural resources that impose very real limits upon their capacity to act 
in the factory. This, however, does not mean that they cannot try to define how those 
superiors who can act with a larger degree of autonomy, ought to relate to those who 
cannot. Needless to say, such efforts do not lead them to question the fundamental 
politics of the actual division of labour (see Ourousoff 1993: 294). This is because 
workers see nothing problematic in the idea that the factory as a whole ought to be 
governed by the "experts" in possession of the appropriate cultural and symbolic capital 
(education, knowledge and authority), which they themselves lack. What they do see as 
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a problem, however, is the failure by management to recognize them as more than 
inanimate tools of production who are not allowed the opportunity to reflect on even the 
most basic tasks of production with which they are entrusted.  The end result of this 
managerial meddling was not to deskill workers, who in fact retained their superior 
grasp of specific production techniques. Rather, it created a sharp sense of separation 
between upstairs and downstairs and reinforced a different kind of experience of 
personhood between them. Whereas managers (and to a lesser extent, office workers) 
see themselves as free individuals with the ability to control the world around them, 
workers see themselves in terms of their inferior position within an overarching web of 
social relations (cf Ourousoff 1993: 294; Carrier 1995: 197). Both end up having a 
different experience of personhood within the labour process and project these different 
experiences onto each other.  
From the point of view of “upstairs”, manual workers are just a different and inferior 
kind of possessive individual defined by one dominant property – physical labour. This 
view also plays into “upstairs workers” conceptions of themselves as members of a 
superior class endowed with the requisite cultural and symbolic capital to manage this 
labour. From the point of view of “downstairs”, managers are the selected elite whose 
main responsibility is to ensure a harmonious workplace environment that satisfies not 
only the economic needs of everyone involved, but also their social and moral needs. 
Shop floor workers do not think that management and hierarchy are superfluous or that 
they themselves should run the factory. What they do think is that hierarchy should be 
of a social kind that recognizes workers in their totality as moral subjects, instead of an 
asocial one that sees in them only one partible aspect: their labour. In this sense, the end 
result is often a mismatch between reality and expectations and a continuous struggle of 
views over what the workplace ought to be about. The question of valuing labour is 
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another example of these struggles where workers refuse to internalize and adhere to the 
market model that tries to interpellate them as monadic individuals competing over 
scarce resources. In response, workers bring into the factory their own ideology of 
labour and value, neither of which can be reduced to a technical operation or precise 
measurement of individual activities, and is instead, a multi-layered social relation 
between non-equals. Shop floor discipline is secured neither by manufacturing consent 
nor by deskilling but rather, by the ongoing process of social and cultural separation and 
alienation that structures the possibilities and limits of social interaction in the 
workspace, and thereby the prevailing form of hierarchy and inequality. I will explore 
this conclusion more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
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Chapter VIII: Manners, Personhood and the New Class 
 
8.1 Introduction: Joking and Avoidance 
To better understand how emerging class distinctions and forms of hierarchy on the 
shop floor are inhabited, regulated, and reproduced we can briefly turn to two old 
anthropological concepts, namely “joking relations” and “avoidance relations” 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1940; Mauss 2013).  Joking relations are, despite their name, not 
primarily about humour but refer to “a relationship of playful aggression” (Graeber 
2007: 16) predicated on a suspension of formality and the “intentional invocation of the 
very things that would be most likely to cause embarrassment in other situations” (ibid: 
17). Joking partners are continuously engaged “in sham fights and sexual horseplay, of 
lewd accusations and scatological jokes” through which mutuality and equality of status 
is both emphasized and challenged (ibid). In other words, even though joking can 
involve power plays and the renegotiation of status of persons or groups vis-à-vis each 
other, the very possibility of entering into such relations implies a certain level of shared 
commonality between all parties involved.  
Avoidance relations on the other hand are often, but not always, hierarchical in nature 
and defined by a formidable degree of formality to the extent that one party is usually 
placed in a position from which they cannot speak or even gaze upon the other. In other 
words one party is obliged to pay respect, and avoid such things as establishing contact, 
speaking first or manifesting aggressive physical behaviour. In a sense joking 
relationships and avoidance relationships are polar opposites of each other which would 
allow us to position any relationship between two people on the continuum between 
them (ibid: 16). In this sense they are not mutually exclusive and neither can be said to 
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exist in their pure form, which is to say that there is no social situation where either pure 
hierarchy or pure equality is on display (Weiner 1992: 99). Joking and avoidance are 
simply taken to represent here two opposing tendencies that allow us to frame and 
analyse certain forms of social interaction in the workplace in order to investigate how 
certain distinctions between groups and individuals develop into more or less stable 
forms of hierarchy. 
I will not enter debates here about the cross-cultural applicability of such concepts 
(Brant 1948), nor am I interested in refuting old structural-functionalist myths that saw 
joking as but one more ritual for stabilizing social structure (Johnson & Freedman 
1978), or for identifying possible marriage partners (Sykes 1966).  The point of this 
chapter is to investigate the way in which everyday shop floor practices that roughly 
correspond to “joking” and “avoidance as defined above, shape the social terrain on 
which class distinctions and notions of personhood are shaped and contested, and to link 
these practices to the wider context of privatisation, property and marketization. I 
suggest that joking allows workers to maintain horizontal networks of mutuality that 
recognize the embedded, relational self and also to nurture, at the imaginative level,  the 
possibility of alternative social and moral worlds. Avoidance on the other hand allows 
elites to control the form and content of their relations with workers and also to 
minimize the chances that the familiarity generated by joking might diminish the 
impressions created by their “ritually managed appearance” (Scott 1990: 13). What we 
see in avoidance then is the “varied art of marking distances” (Bourdieu 1996: 66) 
through which moral and social disconnections become legitimized and symbolically 
reified.  
This operative distinction between avoidance and joking corresponds largely to the 
distinction Bakhtin made between the logic of the medieval “feast” and that of 
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“carnival” in his study of Rabelais. The role of official religious feast was, Bakhtin 
writes, to invoke the past in order to “consecrate the present” and assert “all that was 
stable, unchanging, perennial: the existing hierarchy, the existing … moral values, 
norms and prohibitions” (Bakhtin 1984: 9). As such the feast was “monolithically 
serious” and sought to eliminate laughter from its performance, but only to have it 
reappear in the popular sphere of the marketplace in the form of carnival. There, 
carnival stands in opposition to the official feast as a “temporary liberation” from order 
and a suspension of “all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions. Carnival 
was the feast of becoming, change and renewal” (ibid: 10). Carnival, Bakhtin writes “is 
the people's second life, organized on the basis of laughter. It is a festive life” (ibid: 8).  
 
This is of course a mirror image of Turner’s understanding of liminality, but the 
important point here is Bakhtin’s suggestion that the subversive power of carnival 
consists in its rituals of embodiment, or the way in which the “high, the ideal and the 
abstract” are brought “down to a strongly emphasized bodily level of food, drink, 
digestion and sexual life” (ibid: 20).  I believe Bakhtin’s distinction between feast and 
carnival teases out an important feature of joking relations. They are in a sense 
carnivalesque, festive, filled with laughter and emphasize mutuality and connectedness 
by treating the body as a kind of “common substance”. Unlike Bakhtin however I see 
joking relations as subversive not so much of rank and hierarchy, but of the attempts by 
management to define the nature of relations in production. In other words, joking, if 
and when deployed does not threaten to subvert hierarchy as much as it threatens to 
“socialize” an impersonal or “asocial” form of inequality but also to foster more 
intimate horizontal social relations between workers on the shop floor (cf. Osella and 
Osella 1998: 199).  
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8.1.2 Corollary Modes of Personhood 
The other suggestion that I will be trying to put forward here is that the joking and 
avoidance correspond to, and simultaneously reinforce two different forms of 
understanding personhood. Whereas for workers personhood is defined in terms of their 
relation to others within a larger moral community,  owners and managers are defined in 
terms of their own “properties”, both in the sense of possessions and qualities (see Dunn 
2004: 125; Graeber 2007: 21). If joking bodies are immersed in the social world and in 
touch with each other, avoidance places them in an abstract, impersonal and highly 
formalized level where contact is mediated by abstract market forces.  
Avoidance relations however, are not necessarily generalized by the marketization of 
society and joking relations still permeate the social space of the shop floor. If 
avoidance is closer to the person as a “possessive individual” (McPherson 1962) joking 
does quite the opposite, i.e. people in a sense become “dispossessed dividuals.” As 
already argued, workers imagine themselves as anything but free to dispose of their 
“properties” as they see fit (including their labour-power). Both the larger context of the 
privatization and their immediate experiences at the workplace imply that they are more 
likely to see themselves as forcefully dispossessed and dependent on the good will of 
powerful others upon which they must operate. The challenge therefore lies in eliciting 
this good will, and getting those who are “above” to act as benevolent coordinators and 
distributors of shared abundance (see Thompson 1991: 345).  
The different types of personhood associated with joking and avoidance are pivotal in 
this struggle for realignment. Avoidance threatens to limit the relationship between 
owners and workers to an exchange of labour for cash, whereas joking has the potential 
to embed dividuals into social networks of mutual obligation. One appears conducive to 
the logic of impersonal market exchange whereas the other directly challenge its 
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underlying assumptions. Controlling where exactly on this continuum a relationship will 
unfold is crucial for regulating structures of power and domination in the workplace. 
Strathern makes the point that in Melanesian gift economies “those who dominate are 
those who determine the connections and disconnections created by the circulation of 
objects” (Strathern 1988: 167, also in Dunn 2004: 129). What she is referring to are the 
social relations created by acts of gift exchange, but in equal measure we might assert 
that within the factory, power can be seen to reside with those who determine the 
connections and disconnections between people created during the daily exchange of 
labour for cash. After all, workers come to the factory in order to earn wages in 
exchange for their labour. This activity can take the form of an impersonal relation 
mediated by markets and disconnected by rituals of avoidance but it can also become 
embedded in relations of mutuality that are animated by the informality of joking. The 
question is how, and when, does one form prevail over another and who gains (or loses) 
in the process. 
My analysis of emerging class distinctions and the reification of symbolic capital in the 
figure of the owner paints an ambiguous picture. On a certain level the owners, and their 
managerial proxies, are certainly able to control and determine the kinds of connections 
that can be established between workers and themselves as their immediate superiors, 
often by acquiring and maintaining the requisite symbolic capital. Workers however are 
more than able to operate outside the narrow limits of the impersonal market model and 
reproduce forms of sociability that emphasize commonality and mutual obligations. One 
might say that workers simply refuse to internalize the figure of the possessive 
individual of market society and are more than capable of imagining a different kind of 
economic model, one that is populated by embedded dividuals, interacting in 
accordance with socially defined norms of morality and mutuality. However, this also 
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leads to a recognition of their status as subjugated and to a deferral of political agency to 
their immediate superiors. If the dividual who “acts on the world by acting on others” is 
very much alive in the market society she does not necessarily stand as an impediment 
to the reproduction of structures of economic extraction that concentrate wealth in the 
hands of a selected elite. In fact, recognizing those in power as uniquely responsible and 
capable of restoring moral order, often does the double work of legitimizing economic 
inequalities and transforming them into distinctions of an “acceptable” and depoliticised 
symbolic order. At this point, let me turn to some ethnography to illustrate what has 
been said thus far.  
 
8.2 Joking Between Men and Women 
If we work our way upwards we can start from the relationship between the workers 
themselves. The first thing one notices on the shop floor is the extent to which joking 
relationships permeate the social space between persons during the working day. The 
content of “joking” is intensely vulgar in nature and usually revolves around sexual 
acts, marriage, reproduction or personal intelligence. Jasna and Ruzha are a common 
target in the cutting section as they are both young and unmarried, as well as Zhare, one 
of the power cutters who is also regularly exposed to teasing and abuse on account of 
his, often unorthodox, conceptions of romance. In general though, almost any utterance 
being shared in the shop floor environment can quickly be seized upon to engage in 
teasing and joking of this kind. 
On one occasion we were discussing my experiences from living abroad. Vanya in 
particular was asking me about what kind of work one can usually find in countries like 
Malta and the UK, where I had lived. At some point Ruzha joined the conversation as 
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well. While I was listing the sorts of jobs people from ex-Yugoslavia usually end up 
doing, Kocho interrupted me and turning to Ruzha shouted: “Stop asking about all these 
jobs, why don’t you ask if there’s something from your specific trade. Ask if there’s any 
work for strippers there.” Everyone burst into laughter, earning a stern look from Ruzha 
in the process. Some days later both Ruzha and Mr. Zeko arrived late at work within ten 
minutes of each other, prompting immediate remarks from Panche: “Ruzha, how was it 
with the boss eh? You two are very suspicious?”  
The teasing is not unilateral and Ruzha and Jasna often make fun of the men. This is 
usually done by implying that they are either poor husbands who are unable to “satisfy” 
their wives, or that they are unable to get wives to begin with. Married men were often 
teased as being “useless”, in the sense that they are of no interest or have no value for 
single women. Pointing at me, Badev would regularly tease Jasna saying in front of 
everyone: “I think Jasna finally found a bachelor here to hang on to! Is that right Jasna, 
you’re going to hang on to this guy now?” (The fact that I was engaged mattered little.) 
Jasna would restate their sexual uselessness: “They’re all married, except for Kocho 
here, he’s a little punk, too young to be married yet, nobody will take him.” This time 
the young women began to laugh while Kocho was shaking his head. He did not wait 
too long though for an opportunity to retaliate. He complained that he was thirsty and 
Jasna took out her bottle of water and gave it to him, immediately generating an 
exchange: 
Kocho: Thank you. 
Jasna: Thank you? What good do I get from your thanks? (In colloquial Macedonian this 
expression usually implies in a teasing way that one would benefit more from material 
gifts instead of intangible gratitude.) 
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Kocho: Ok I’ll give it to you then. (This expression implies offering sex with which 
Kocho is “materialising” his gratitude in the shape of is sexual organ.) 
Jasna began rolling her eyes in disbelief. Kocho however took the abuse even further 
and began explaining to Strasho how he had read somewhere recently that “deep down 
inside, a lot of women dream of being raped.” After that statement I began to feel 
somewhat uncomfortable but Jasna, failing to display any sense of feeling threatened 
looked at me and said in a loud voice “It’s a shame that you will only get to hear stupid 
and immature things in the factory. Can you see what kinds of idiots I have to deal with 
every day here?” Sometimes however, acts of teasing and ridicule could produce cross-
gender alliances. I noted an incident when Strasho had a massive toothache to the point 
that he was barely able to work and his face was twitching in agony. Jasna took out 
some painkillers and handed him one saying “Take this it’s really strong, I take it when 
I get my period.” Strasho swallowed one immediately but despite his lamentable 
situation Kocho could not let such an opportunity pass. “You’ll get your period now 
Strasho!” Ruzha caught on saying: “Don’t worry Strasho I’ve got sanitary napkins with 
me as well”, at which we all started laughing. 
Some of these exchanges were facilitated by fact that the young women were 
unmarried, in spite of being well into their twenties. Consequently they still occupied an 
unstable liminal position of immaturity which opens up the space for commentaries that 
would prove far too socially embarrassing for married women. For example, one of 
Jasna’s regular rituals was sharing sexual jokes that she had read on the internet that 
were anything but repressive, such as: “This girl says to her friend ‘Yesterday I put 
some eye drops in my eyes and then I put a few down there as well.’ Her friend asked 
her why did she do that and the girl answers ‘Because she hasn't seen anything in a 
while as well.’” Such jokes formed part of her regular complaints that she was not 
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getting enough “sex”, which were never made by married women. Marriage operates as 
a marker of social status and imposes certain limits on the “joking relationship.” This is 
not to say that married women were never teased, but that sexual teasing could only be 
done by proxy, that is, through the figure of their husbands or other indirect objects.  
During the lunch break for example, Bache would regularly tease Rodna and Blaguna 
about their sexual relations with their spouses but would never in their presence place 
himself as the protagonist. Rodna was a regular target as she had been married for some 
years but had difficulties conceiving. Whenever we sat down on the same table Bache 
would begin teasing her about how she and her husband are not having enough sex and 
give her suggestions of how and when to “do it.” On most days he would also pack a 
banana in his lunchbox and would invariably make sexual insinuations to the women on 
the table by offering them to “have a bite”. Rodna would giggle like a little girl out of 
embarrassment and urge him to stop.  Even though direct, the banana exercise still 
maintained the necessary social distance required by married women as a penis-by-
proxy. He would place himself in the lead role only when sharing hilarious details about 
his sexual activities with his wife.  
There is no doubt that joking relations between men and women draw upon established 
gender norms and inequalities, but it also unsettles them through the playful aggression 
structured around sexuality. Frivolous offers by the men to sexually “penetrate” the 
women are met by a variety of responses. They include ridiculing the men’s capacity for 
sexual performance, manifesting a humiliating indifference to their advances or even by 
feminizing male bodies. Such exchanges should not be seen as attempts to preserve 
some level of female sexual modesty, but as precisely that kind of “sham fight and 
sexual horseplay” in which we can see the “breaking down of normality, and of distance 
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and hierarchy, and a necessary prelude to the fostering of intimacy” (Osella and Osella 
1998: 199).  
 
8.2.1 Joking and Ethnicity 
Ethnicity is another social marker in the shop floor and is most visibly seen in the 
relationship between Macedonian and Roma workers. Roma workers are considered 
relative newcomers in the privatized garment industry. Due to their social marginality, 
relatively low educational levels and exclusion from most spheres of public life, they 
were among the first categories of workers to end up being a "surplus population" 
during the first wave of privatization15. Most ended up in the informal economy as street 
vendors or smugglers. Recent efforts by the government, however, have made it 
attractive for employers to hire Roma workers whose wages are in part subsidized by 
the state. By the time I arrived in the factory there was already a small “Gypsy brigade” 
in the stitching section and another six Roma workers (two men and four women) 
employed as cleaners and sweepers. Their entry into the factory however has had 
ambiguous reactions from other workers given that they occupy the very bottom of 
Shtip’s ethno-cultural hierarchy. They are often stigmatized as the “polluting Other” and 
most Macedonians tend to structure their relations with the Roma along the lines of 
avoidance.  
On one occasion I had mentioned to Jasna and Ruzha that the Roma in Shtip look far 
more integrated that in Skopje, the capital: “There a lot here working shoulder to 
shoulder with the Macedonians and earning their bread.” Jasna immediately replied 
saying “Yes and we’re shoulder to shoulder with them too.” This seemingly tautological 
                                                          
15
 See study by the European Roma Rights Centre (1998: 52).  
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commentary was meant to indignantly point out that the status of Macedonian workers 
had dropped to such historically low levels that they were now economically and 
socially commensurable with the low ranking “Gypsies.” However, this daily 
intermingling in the workplace did open up a new space in which Macedonian and 
Roma workers could engage in the same kinds of playful aggression and sexual 
horseplay typical of joking that both operated through and unsettled hierarchical 
distinctions between the groups.  
The cleaners, Usnija and Esma were the most common participants in such exchanges, 
both on the shop floor and the upstairs office. Much of it took the familiar form of 
“offering” brides and sexual teasing involving their husbands. Curiously enough, sexual 
horseplay sometimes extended even between men. On one occasion whilst we were 
working, Fadil, the sweeper, had been sweeping the leftovers from the cloth we were 
cutting when Kocho shouted out at him: “Fadil, my friend! What did I tell you? Ten o-
clock sharp wait for me in the kitchen, I want to see you bent over in the kitchen and I’ll 
come and give it to you nice. I’m gonna fuck you!” I was rather stunned by this 
outburst, but later on I learned that it was part of a mutual homosexual aggression 
between some of the Roma workers and the Macedonian ones. Fadil for example would 
shout back to Kocho: “I found someone in town that can do you real well!” and keep on 
sweeping. On another occasion while I was working on layering I suddenly heard 
Strasho laughing really loud behind me. When I turned around I saw him next to Ali, 
the other sweeper, who was holding his broom and looking a little bedazzled. Strasho 
walked towards Kocho still laughing and began explaining, “Oh man you should’ve 
seen Ali! I stuck this pen up his bum and he jumped like a scared rabbit it was so 
funny!”  They continued laughing together whilst Ali kept on sweeping and shaking his 
head in disbelief.  
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It is worth noting that this kind of teasing and sexual aggression was never present in 
relationships between male Macedonian workers. More than gender, these minor abuses 
revolved around sexuality and the definition of the dominant sexual partner. In other 
words, sexuality operated as the terrain on which hierarchical distinctions of class, 
gender and ethnicity were being renegotiated through acts of playful aggression (see 
also Lambevski 1999; Yelvington 1996: 329). On the one hand workers reaffirm 
established hierarchies between men and women, or Macedonians and Roma, that are 
brought into the shop floor from the “outside” and released through the content of the 
joking. But at the same time there is a tacit understanding that on the shop floor they all 
stand “shoulder to shoulder” as assembly line workers, which gives everyone licence to 
engage in joking relations. This means that even though the isolated instances of joking 
rely on existing social inequalities, the reciprocal nature of the relationship means that 
“such attacks can be expected to more or less balance out in the end” (Graeber 2007: 
19). The point here is that sharing this social space could lead over time to closer ties. 
Esma for example, who had been in the factory the longest, was able to forge a strong 
enough relationship with Mitko for him to agree to stand as her guarantor for a bank 
loan. This in itself is a highly sensitive issue and failure on her part to meet the monthly 
bank payments would transfer the burden to Mitko which would almost inevitably bring 
him total financial ruin. Such favours are usually granted only to people with whom one 
shares an intimate relation of trust, developed over time. 
To this I would add that the conditions of reciprocity that allow for this balancing to 
occur mainly exist in the social space of the factory. Such joking relations between 
Roma and Macedonians, or men and women are rarely replicated in outdoor situations. 
It is within the factory’s wage labour system, where they all stand in relation to each 
other as homogenous “exchange values”, that workers acquire a heightened sense of 
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their social commensurability (Lapavitsas 2003: 25). On the inside, workers share the 
same liminal position as a precarious and highly unstable labour force which allows 
them to engage in status competitions with one another. But whilst the commoditization 
of labour imposes a certain level of equivalence between workers, at the same time it 
generates status distinctions in relation to persons that appear unaffected, or beyond the 
determinants of commoditization. I am, of course referring here to the new elites, 
whether owners or managers, who really are able to act autonomously. It therefore 
suggests to me that, “commodity production and exchange … can generate social 
identities in terms of the position of social categories in relation to the market” (Stirrat 
1989: 101); and that this is in turn reflected in the modalities of joking and avoidance. 
This raises some important questions about the relationship between mannerisms, 
personhood and class identities that I will explore in the rest of this chapter. 
 
8.3 Avoidance and Management 
We saw in the brief discussion on joking the extent to which social relations are very 
vividly “brought down” to a bodily level. The form and content of joking involves a 
constant exchange of “substances”, i.e. “stuff flowing in, or flowing out” such as semen, 
blood or food (Graeber 2007: 21). These substances mark the presence and immersion 
of the body in the social world. Relations of avoidance however, tend to “set the body 
apart from the world. To a very large extent, the physical body itself is negated, the 
person translated into some higher or more abstract level” (ibid). Before I get into more 
detail regarding what this might mean I will illustrate the way in which avoidance 
relationships come to life as soon as one begins to move upwards in the hierarchy of the 
workplace.  
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The immediate superior to workers in the cutting section is Mr Zeko, the shop floor 
boss, who does engage in minor joking relations with the other workers. Up until 
recently, Mr Zeko had also been “shoulder to shoulder” with the other workers, before 
getting promoted. Additionally he is a regular and familiar figure on the town’s korzo 
where he engages in similar movement patterns as the other workers. In his absence, he 
was a regular object of ridicule and forms of abuse that included the usual references to 
sexuality. In fact every time Mr Zeko fell into one of his tantrums the usual explanation 
was to suggest that his wife is probably tired of him and that “She’s not giving him 
any.” His anger was thus embodied as an unreleased bodily urge, a contained substance.  
Needless to say such joking would never take place in Mr Zeko’s presence. Some minor 
banter might occur but bodily fluids and sexuality were not acceptable topics. 
Sometimes the young women would be able to use this to their advantage and place Mr 
Zeko in an uncomfortable position, especially when making excuses about missing 
work. In the first weeks of my presence on the shop floor I witnessed an exchange 
between Mr Zeko and Ruzha that captured this. We were layering with Ruzha on our 
usual spot when Mr Zeko arrived to give Ruzha grief for not showing up at work the 
previous day. “Where were you yesterday? You think just because you texted me to say 
you can’t come everything is fine?” Ruzha immediately fired her reply “Boss I really 
couldn’t make it. My period pains were killing me. If you only knew how much blood 
came out of me yesterday! My tampon was soaked.” 
“Ok, ok just stop. Don’t tell me any more I don’t need to know this”, Mr Zeko replied 
as his face grimaced in disgust and walked away in a different direction, leaving Ruzha 
with a self-satisfied smirk. Aretxaga writes that menstrual blood is often experienced as 
a “polluting substance that must be hidden from discourse as it is from sight” because it 
stands as a metonym for both motherhood and sexuality and “the dangerously 
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uncontrolled nature of women’s flesh” (1995: 139). Whereas this may have been true in 
catholic Ireland, relations among workers in the factory in Shtip suggest that female 
sexuality is anything but “repressed”. My own interpretation is that the reason for Mr 
Zeko’s reaction lies not in the threatening nature of “women’s flesh” but in the 
disruption that the introduction of bodily substances bring into the formality and 
hierarchy of avoidance relations. Mazni for example often compared Mr Zeko to the 
dreaded miser and spoke of him as someone who’s “never bought anyone a drink even 
though he’s loaded.” Mr Zeko’s refusal to engage with workers at the “bodily level”, 
whether through sexual horseplay or the sharing of drinks, separates him from the social 
body of shop floor workers and the thicker bonds of mutuality and indebtedness that are 
thus generated.  
Things however get a little bit more straightforward when it comes to Mr Samoritch, the 
general manager. Mr Samoritch enjoys genuine power over social relations in the 
factory and his presence on the shop floor instantly generates an ambient of avoidance. 
Workers would never, unless absolutely necessary, make eye contact with him when he 
descends on the shop floor to run his check-ups. Even in his absence, I could hear 
nothing but mild and isolated attempts at ridicule or abuse. Mr Samoritch was never 
discussed in terms of his bodily substance but exclusively in terms of his excessive 
authoritarianism and capacity to get things his own way. On some occasions I heard 
commentaries that both undermined and reaffirmed his position of power such as: 
“Samoritch is making at least 120k per month [EUR2000] but for what? He hasn't gone 
on holidays for one day. All that money and not one single trip to Spain or Greece.” Mr 
Samoritch’s body is here depicted as non-sensual, or lacking the capacity for worldly 
enjoyment. His is a closed, disciplined body not immersed in the everyday festivity of 
bodily substances and is literally above them. His is an austere lifestyle, defined by his 
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work discipline and unwillingness to engage in acts of conspicuous consumption. Such 
qualities position him outside the workers’ moral economy of redistribution and closer 
to the reviled figure of the miser. This directly influences the kind of demands and 
claims that workers feel they can make (or not) in his presence.  
On one occasion, we were having a coffee break in the gazebo outside the factory, when 
a woman from the stitching section started complaining.  Apparently, she had made an 
error that caused a minor delay in production and her line manager told her to go 
upstairs and explain her actions to Mr Samoritch: “Why the hell do I have to go 
upstairs? I made a mistake OK, I’ll get fined, but why do I have to go and get 
embarrassed and change colours in front of the manager?” Kocho, who was calmly 
listening and smoking a cigarette replied “What? Do you want him to come 
downstairs?”, after which we all burst out laughing at the very impossibility of Mr 
Samoritch coming down to her level to explain things. It was a laughter filled with both 
mockery and indignation with the unfairness of the arrangement. But even more 
interesting is the explicitly stated preference to maintain a bodily distance from Mr 
Samoritch. In his presence, she remains a body, but a submissive one, “changing 
colours” out of embarrassment and denied the possibility of establishing a reciprocal 
joking relationship with him, as he is in a sense body-less. Instead, she locates the more 
appropriate response to her mistake in simply being “fined”, thereby modelling the 
relationship along the lines of an impersonal monetary exchange that is strictly 
analogous to the logic of avoidance.  
We need to look at this specific relationship in the context of the changing political 
economy of the town. My argument, in short, is that the reduction of labour to an 
“exchange value” and the larger efforts to reorganize society around market principles, 
is refracted in the way that joking and avoidance relationships are shaping the social 
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hierarchies of the workplace. Much more than a dynamics of interpersonal relations, 
avoidance relationships in the factory can also be one way in which “a whole social 
class or stratum marks itself off from those it considers below it” (Graeber 2007: 27). In 
doing so, an entire array of arbitrary hierarchical distinctions between workers and 
employers (or their representatives) become naturalized and objectified in the body at 
the same time they are being challenged (Bourdieu 1996: 68).  
 
8.3 Embodying Social Difference 
To better illustrate what I mean by this we can turn to the figure of the owner of the 
factory, Mr Svemojski and his wife and co-owner Mrs Svemojska. Mr Svemojski is the 
far more frequently discussed person on the shop floor and is usually referred to as the 
gazda (pl. gazdi) whereas Mrs Svemojska is referred to as gazdarica, the feminine 
derivative of gazda. “Gazda” is a Hungarianized version of the Slavic term “gospodin”, 
meaning “lord”, “master” or “gentleman”.  “Gazda” is used in many south Slavic 
languages and carries a variety of meanings, the most common of which are “head of 
household”, “rich man”, “owner”, “employer” or “person of influence” (Zirojević 
2005).  
Factory owners in Shtip are collectively referred to as gazdi.  The term refers to a new 
elite, altogether qualitatively different from the old socialist technocracy. For example, 
when referring to the head of an SOE people would normally use the technical term 
“direktor” or “upravnik”, but never “gazda”. Gazdi are recognized as a distinct social 
cohort, characterterized not only by wealth and property rights, but, as argued in 
Chapter V, by their capacity to act autonomously and control outcomes. But the world 
of gazdi is not just warded off by wealth, power and influence. It is also bracketed off 
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and placed “above nature” as more refined, disciplined and out of reach of shop floor 
labourers. What I would like to do in the rest of this chapter then, is explore the links 
between the emerging regimes of private property and the emergence of a class of 
people “who internalize its logic of exclusion as a way of defining their own social 
persons” (Graeber 2007: 34), and then link this back the discussion on personhood and 
the politics of dependence. 
On the shop floor the gazda is mainly felt through his conspicuous absence, both 
physically and socially. This was not always so. Mitko, for example, who personally 
knew Mr Svemojski, often reminisced about how the gazda used to be much more 
accessible in the early days of the factory. Sometimes he would even lend a hand on the 
shop floor: “I remember when we were starting out he was here with the rest of us. He 
was carrying sewing machines and helping to set up the place.” Mitko told me that he 
also spent time with his workers outside the factory: “He used to play basketball with us 
for a while. But then suddenly he started distancing himself. I don’t know why.” 
Interestingly, this distancing has taken place in tandem with the growth and 
transformation of the factory, from a makeshift and improvised production site, into one 
of the most respected garment factories in the city. Concomitantly, the gazda has been 
showcasing this success by engaging in various forms of conspicuous consumption. 
Workers are reminded of this daily as they have to walk past the gazda’s private car 
park, located on the side of the main entrance, before they can enter the factory. Such 
open displays of the gazda’s capacity to appropriate and indulge in objects of luxury are 
met with an ambiguous response by workers, who see in these displays of opulence a 
potentially powerful patron, but also an increasingly distant one.  
Consumption, however, is not the only sphere where this ambiguity is reproduced. As 
already mentioned, the gazda rarely made his presence felt, but whenever he did in fact 
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make an appearance it was common to dress it up in a ceremony of avoidance. The first 
time I saw the gazda on the shop floor (and in general) was precisely one such occasion. 
His arrival was announced by Mr Zeko who came to our table and told us that the owner 
would be arriving that afternoon with some “important people” to showcase the factory. 
It was our job to make sure we appeared thrifty, coordinated and disciplined. We were 
explicitly told not to talk or engage in any form of banter or frivolous behaviour. This is 
precisely what we did for much of the afternoon in expectation of the visit. When the 
owner finally materialized we immersed ourselves even more thoroughly in our work 
whilst he slowly approached our table accompanied by an impeccably dressed couple. I 
merely managed to catch a glimpse of them through the corner of my eye as they were 
nearing, and could hear the owner explaining the production process in English behind 
me: “This is where the layering is done, and here you can see the fine cutting. And over 
here in the next section…” We maintained our silence as they drifted off towards the 
stitching section before Ruzha broke ranks to comment on how “handsome” and 
“refined” the couple accompanying the owner was. Their finesse was all the more 
augmented when contrasted with our hunched up figures, covered in sweat and threads. 
In comparison we truly appeared coarse, venal and servile, whereas they appeared 
sublimated, aloof and out of reach (see Bourdieu 1996: 7). There was not even the 
remotest possibility of workers being introduced to the “important people” as people. 
(In fact, in the gazda’s description there were no people and only autonomous activities 
such as “layering”, “fine cutting”, “stitching” etc.) 
This fine art of marking distinctions is clearly resonates in the way in which workers 
perceive the owner. I first noticed this in the embroidery room where I was sent by an 
irate Mr Zeko as punishment for accidentally messing up a pile of cuffs. After a bit of 
training I started cleaning threads from the embroidered logos when Vale, who was 
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working next to me asked if I had gotten in the factory because I knew the owners. This 
was a common assumption whenever I mentioned that I was not actually an employee 
but doing research. I replied in the negative and asked whether she knew the owners 
herself. She said no. She had had been in the factory only a few months, during which 
she caught a glimpse of the owner only once. “We were sitting here and someone said 
look there’s the gazda and it was him. He was very well dressed and had a dignified 
figure you know, you could tell he’s the gazda, he looks like someone important. He 
was very handsome too. His clothes and all made him look very dignified 
[dostoinstven]. You could just tell he’s a different level. Not like us working people, we 
are nikakvi.” The adjective nikakvi can be literally translated as “formless” or 
“resembling nothing” and is commonly used to express a lack of aesthetic value in an 
object, and can also mean “worthless”.  
Somewhat taken aback by this strong assertions I said that there are also dignified 
people in the working classes, to which she replied “Yes but you can easily tell the 
difference between him and the rest of us. If you had just seen him you would’ve 
thought the same.” I could hardly disagree with this and I certainly did feel different on 
the two occasions when the owner appeared on the shop floor. A well-groomed and 
suited figure simply stands out in such a setting. I then said that I heard that the gazda’s 
father was also a very important figure in Shtip and that he used to be the general 
manager of one of the town’s most important enterprises during socialism. She said she 
knew about that and that it’s normal for people like the gazda who come from a good 
family to rise above the rest and make it big in life. “The rest of us from poor families 
don’t really have a chance. Very rarely will someone from our ranks get ahead and 
make it in life.” Mazni had pretty much the same to say when descriving the gazda:  
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“I’ve never met him but I’ve seen him when he comes around sometimes, not very often 
though. He’s left the whole thing to the managers here and he doesn’t care about the 
details. He’s a real gazda he doesn’t do anything. You know his father was a big man 
[golem chovek] too and he inherited a lot of money from him. His wife is from Skopje 
and she’s got family connections in [important places], you know it all fits into place.” 
Such comments reflect the growing stabilization of, what are still relatively new, socio-
economic differences, but it also suggests that workers do not see the factory as an 
assembly of free individuals, some of which are more “gifted” than others. Instead they 
deploy a conceptual scheme by that sees a direct link between the position people 
occupy in the wider society and their position in the factory (see Ourousoff 1993: 294). 
Bodies merely provide the “goods to think with” about the wider social relations in 
which they are immersed (see Leach 1985: 45, for commentary on Levi-Strauss’ famed 
phrase). For example, on one occasion during the lunchbreak one of the women spoke 
of how well the gazdarica looked the last time she made an appearance in the factory. 
She had apparently lost a lot of weight and there was talk that she had even gotten a 
facelift. Another woman immediately drew a comparison: “She’s not like us Blaguna! 
When we get old there’s no going back. We’re all spent, it’s the end.” We see once 
more here the way in which class difference is embodied. Whether deformed by age, 
worn out by toil, or poorly clothed and fed by their low wages, workers are exposed to 
the world’s forces that visibly imprint themselves on their bodies. Bodily pain and 
disfigurement are in fact a very common way for workers to reflect on the wage labour 
regime on the shop floor.  
The bodies of the gazdi on the other hand are removed from the world. They are 
translated into some higher level where they are not governed by the same rules and are 
endowed with the capacity to defy nature and aging. We must highlight that it is not 
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merely the gazda’s expensive clothes that make him look dignified. In fact, there was at 
least one male worker in the packaging section that showed up every day at work 
wearing a clean ironed shirt, neatly tucked into his trousers. He certainly did stick out, 
but as an object of ridicule. Other workers would tease him as he passed by, mock his 
“vanity” and ask each other “Who the hell does he think he is?” He could be gazed 
upon, scrutinized and absorbed by laughter. The owner could not. On the shop floor 
workers could only hope to get an illicit sneak-peek of him at a safe distance and so 
recognize a far more fundamental gap in between them. It is through this gap of 
avoidance that the gazda’s body truly becomes different. 
On another occasion I witnessed a similar event when the owner appeared on the shop 
floor with a bus load of European Union diplomats. The diplomats were part of an EU 
mission to Macedonia and led by the UK ambassador charged with the task of 
promoting EU values. I had read in the news, a few days prior to their appearance, that 
they were touring Macedonian towns and acquainting themselves with the different 
municipalities in the country. No one knew exactly how, but somehow the owner had 
managed to come into contact with them and convince them to take the time to visit his 
garment factory. Such promotional visits I later understood were not infrequent and 
made a great deal of economic sense given that the factory often received orders from 
various state ministries from abroad to stitch uniforms for all sorts  of public servants. 
Once more we were similarly prepared for the great event and there was considerable 
excitement in the air at the prospect of such a dignified visit. We were once more at our 
best behaviour, busying ourselves around the cutting tables and looking as diligent as 
possible.  
When the visit did actually take place it turned out to be somewhat of a let-down. From 
our table (which was around fifty meters away from the entrance to the shop floor) we 
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could only get a glimpse of a large group of well-dressed people that were literally 
marched in an out of the shop floor by the owner in little more than five minutes. “Was 
that all?” Ruzha asked. After they were safely out Lachki cynically commented that 
“Maybe they were afraid that if they stay longer they might ask us what we think of the 
factory.” Lachki’s comment is critical of the practice of avoidance, which is precisely to 
limit social interaction so that workers cannot make claims on the dominant. But while 
there was certainly some disappointment with the asocial nature of the visit, it did 
strengthen the general feeling that there really existed an insurmountable barrier 
between the worlds of workers and the esteemed visitors. The following day Lachki 
commented that he had seen the group of diplomats on his way home after work. They 
were seated in one of the town’s best known restaurants and most popular among the 
local gazdi. Grigoriy immediately commented: 
Grigoriy: What did I tell you yesterday? That from here they’ll be off to feast. And those 
people know how to eat. Oh my can they eat! They’ve got experience. They spend their 
whole lives eating. They can eat a whole cow. And they go straight for the meat. Not like 
us. We don’t know how to eat. We sit down and they give us some soup and some bread 
and we start eating like there’s no tomorrow and by the time the meat gets to the table 
we’re already full, we can’t have any more. I remember when we were kids and we used 
to go play volleyball in the next town. After the game they would take us to a restaurant 
and we’d all get stuffed with the soup. Then when they brought the rest we scolded 
ourselves for not being patient. But these people know how to do it. They skip the soup 
and go straight for the meat. And they take their time. That’s why they’re so fat. It takes a 
lifetime of eating.  
As far as social practices go, eating is oddly apt for capturing the rift between the world 
of workers and that of the gazda, particularly as it is perceived by the workers. Class 
difference here is recognized as a difference in manners and acquired taste. Whereas 
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workers appear as uncouth and impatient, in the world of gazdi one finds cultured 
persons whose finesse is acquired through prolonged contact with others like them and 
through a lifetime of practice (Bourdieu 1996: 66). The world of the gazda appears as 
once again disciplined, resourceful and refined, but also filled with abundance. Workers 
on the other hand can only create a carnivalesque simulacrum of abundance.   
 
8.4 The Gazda as a “Big Man” 
Another particularly important mark of distinction in the Macedonian context are 
relations with western Europeans which is a sign of cosmopolitanism and 
connectedness, conferring culture and prestige to those able to forge them (see 
Neofotistos 2010: 897). This careful impression management creates an image of the 
gazda in the factory akin to the Melanesian “Big Man” who accumulates authority by 
demonstrating particular entrepreneurial abilities and social powers that over time 
become incorporated as “fixed properties of his bodily person” (Rio 2014: 171). Mitko, 
for example, said that the owner still says hello to him or waves from his car whenever 
they bump into each other in town, which, given the small size of Shtip, is not an 
infrequent occurrence. What is interesting, however, is the way Mitko interprets this 
gesture from a man who until only recently was ready to “sweat” with him on the shop 
floor or the basketball court. “It’s not much but a simple ‘Hello Mitko how are you’ 
means a lot to me you know. Some people say I’m selling myself cheap, but it’s the 
honour that’s important you know, that he honours me with a simple hello on the street. 
There are some that wouldn’t even look at you and I can’t stand that pretentiousness.” 
He stopped to think and then added, “You know he never says hello to me in the factory 
but always does so when we meet outside.”  
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Mitko’s brief narrative reflects the way in which avoidance practices generate a splitting 
of the social world into distinct domains, i.e. inside-outside, above-below. We could say 
that inside the factory, the gazda frames their relationship through the medium of 
impersonal exchange, hence avoidance. This allows the gazda to strategically deploy a 
market ideology by treating the workplace as a small scale market society comprised of 
individuals freely exchanging their capacities and possessions. I say strategically 
because this ideology is never strictly adhered to. For example the formality of 
avoidance can be temporarily suspended whenever there is danger that an order will not 
be finished on time. In such times both the gazda and Mr Samoritch can make a 
personal appeal to some of the senior workers to pitch in with overtime labour. Such 
personal requests are gladly responded to as they generate the obligation to reciprocate. 
Senior workers like Mitko and Mechev for example were among the few able to 
personally ask the gazda for an interest-free loan from the company and get it. These 
loans would usually be paid back over a long period by subtracting a fixed amount from 
their wages each month. These kinds of loans were common practice during socialism, 
but whereas then they were accessible to all workers by law, nowadays they have 
become a privilege granted by employers. This shift has not only augmented the latter’s 
symbolic capital but has opened the conditions for workers to compete with each other 
over access to the gazda.  
Avoidance then does not unambiguously uphold a market driven model as much as it 
allows the gazda to control when and how the forging of various bonds and mutual 
obligations will take place in the factory, since the burden of avoidance always falls on 
the inferior party. It is in this sense that we can speak of self-disciplining on the shop 
floor. Simply put, the owner can choose when to interact or be informal, whereas Mitko 
cannot. It is no surprise then that Mitko should be so honoured by a mere greeting on 
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the street. Clearly, the value Mitko ascribes to the greeting gesture does not occur in 
spite of their unequal status, but because of it. After all, a personalized greeting from the 
Queen, is given far more value than that coming from a co-worker. 
Indeed workers spend a great deal of effort in emphasizing how unequal and 
disempowered they are in relation to the gazdi. In doing so, they are actively 
participating in the reproduction of the gazda’s social status, which is itself largely 
based on the gazda’s ability to persuade others to recognize him as such (cf. Graeber 
2001: 99). Mitko for example often spoke of the owner as a powerful figure. The best 
thing about the factory, he would say, was that the gazda was a “very well connected, 
influential and powerful person” and capable of securing regular wages. This image of 
the gazda resonated throughout the shop floor in a variety of contexts. During periods of 
work scarcity and decreasing orders from foreign partners, the gazda could be counted 
on to “restore prosperity.” On one such occasion Mechev complained to me saying “I 
don’t recall the last time there was that little work in the factory.” But he was certain 
that the situation would not last too long: “The gazda is a svetski chovek [worldly man]. 
If there’s no work he would not be saying that everything is fine. He would say there is 
no work.” The term svetski encompasses a variety of meanings in Macedonian, such as 
cosmopolitan, sophisticated, respectable and well known or famous. A struggling 
factory does not befit a man of such stature and is surely a temporary crisis. “We’re a 
serious factory after all” Mechev continued, “This place is always been one of the most 
respected in town. It’s embarrassing to say that there’s no work at Stichko when we 
used to give work to other factories.”   
Damev shared a similar conviction when discussing the temporary lack of orders: “I 
don’t think that a man as big as the gazda can go down. This is not his only business. 
He’s got his hands on everything. A bit from here, a bit form there, a fancy car park. 
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He’s got money coming in from more places than here.” Vanya was a little less 
convinced and replied saying “No one ever thought that Makedonka and Astibo would 
close but they did. You never know.” They both agreed though that no matter what 
happens the gazdi will be OK and if anyone gets screwed it would be the workers. 
Nonetheless the figure of the gazda as a svetski chovek did much to offset any fears 
about the future of the factory and the modicum of stability provided by their 
employment there. Such utterances recognize the gazda as a person of considerable 
autonomy and in possession of an altogether different kind of social capital from 
workers. The latter can be said to be limited to a kind of embedded social capital in the 
form of “binding relations” with kin, friends and the local community, whereas the 
gazda’s social capital extends to “bridging relations”, or the autonomous capacity to 
“access economic spaces beyond the community and the region” (Narotzky 2006: 350).  
This leads us to another critical aspect of this interplay that has already been hinted at in 
previous chapters. Pressuring those in power to descend into mundane networks of 
mutuality and reciprocity also means recognizing them as really being somehow special 
and as “uniquely qualified to re-establish order and prosperity” (Greenough 1983: 847). 
“Bringing down” then is not so much a challenge on hierarchy but an attempt to 
rearrange the contours of hierarchy so that “the welfare and the merit of both parties in 
the exchange takes precedence over other considerations such as the profit of the one or 
the other” (Greenough 1980: 207; Dunn 2004: 153). As we saw in previous chapters 
this deferral of power and responsibility is not new and draws on the legacy of the 
political economy of Yugoslav self-management. But the Yugoslav technocratic elite 
operated within the larger context of an overarching moral and political economy of 
institutionalized mutual dependence. Their main source of authority was “expertise”, i.e. 
superior technical knowledge. The general managers of Astibo and Makedonka for 
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example are often remembered by elderly workers as “professionals” who “knew what 
they were doing”, but also as accessible people who would “eat with the workers in the 
canteen”, as Blaguna said once. The new class of gazdi however, can rely on an 
altogether different kind of symbolic capital that allows them to shape and control the 
connections and disconnections during the everyday exchange of labour for cash, in a 
context characterized by high levels of precarity and and thus turn relations of “social 
inequality” into a scarce resource and a sought after privilege. This, I argue, has 
important ramifications for the dialectic between social praxis and the social 
imagination.  
 
8.5 Deference, Hierarchy and the Political Imagination 
It is a very common assertion on the shop floor that the daily injustices suffered by 
workers are the logical outcome of the gazda’s absence, or better said, his 
disconnectedness from the everyday details of running the factory. Below is one typical 
example. I was having a conversation with Mazni and Kocho on our table and Mazni 
was sharing with me a long list of grievances about the way workers are being treated in 
factories nowadays. He spoke of the usual general themes of exploitation and precarity 
and used the factory as an example. He went into all sorts of detailed number crunching 
to illustrate the difference between the costs of production and the profits from sale 
which was another common exercise through which workers demonstrated their 
criticism of the argument of scarcity of resources as a justification for low wages. In 
other words, the argument that there is “not enough money” was seen as a blatant 
manipulation. By contrast, “[Mr Samorich] can ask for whatever salary he wants. He 
runs the place in effect and you see that the gazdi are never here. They make a lot of 
258 
 
money but none of it goes to the workers”, said Mazni. I then asked him, since he had 
been working in the factory for over five years, if he had ever met the gazda.  
[He] once came here and he was asking where’s Mr Zeko’s office. He owns the place but 
doesn’t even know where Mr Zeko’s office is! And that’s why things are so bad here in 
the factory, it’s because the gazda doesn’t know anything about what’s going on here. If 
he knew he wouldn’t allow these things to happen. So what can you do? Sit here and take 
it. Or get a Bulgarian passport and emigrate16. 
Initially, the idea that the person that benefits the most from the comparatively low 
wages offered in the factory, would (in theory) oppose the very system that allows him 
to accumulate wealth, appeared perplexing. One might see in it a textbook case of the 
operations of symbolic power: the gazda is able to obtain symbolic capital by 
transforming “self-interest into disinterest” (acting as if without calculation), thereby 
masking or legitimizing his “interested” position (Bourdieu 1977: 171; Swartz 1997: 
43). While there is much truth in this reading it remains deficient. After all, workers 
were far from oblivious that it was precisely those things they complained about that 
made Mr Svemojski a gazda. I recall one occasion when the gazda appeared briefly on 
the shop floor to have a word with Mr Samorich and Mrs Peppa who were standing near 
the shop floor entrance. As we were peeking from our table Jasna said, “Look it’s the 
gazda. Poor guy he has no clue what’s happening in his own factory.” Vancho, 
displaying his usual scepticism added, “Maybe he wants us to think he has no clue and 
he’s just playing stupid.” I suggested that “maybe he just doesn’t bother with the little 
                                                          
16
 Since joining the EU in 2007, the Bulgarian state has actively pursued the policy of granting Bulgarian 
citizenship to ethnic Macedonian applicants in order to bolster its historic claims on Macedonia. Given 
Macedonia’s international isolation and economic decline following the demise of Yugoslavia, these 
Bulgarian passports have become highly valued documents for people seeking to emigrate or travel to the 
EU in pursuit of employment (see Neofotistos 2009). Unofficial estimates suggest that over 20% of 
Macedonian citizens have so far applied or received Bulgarian passports.  
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details?” To this Vancho immediately responded saying “It’s from the little details that 
he makes his money Alex!”  
This was of course true, and it was no secret that the entire payment and valuation 
system on the shop floor that so often infuriated workers with its arbitrariness and 
complexity, was personally designed by Mrs Svemojska. Yet time and again I 
encountered complaints by workers the where all kinds of daily injustices and perceived 
moral transgressions in the workplace would often be interpreted as the direct result of 
the gazda’s absence and lack of interest in everyday management. In other words, for 
most workers, material deprivation is not about diminishing resources but about 
diminishing social proximity with elites. A vivid example of this occurred each month 
on payday when there was a regular confrontation between Zhare and Mr Zeko 
regarding Zhare’ wages. I noted down one of these incidents that always followed a 
pattern. Mr Zeko would give Zhare the payslip and after a brief look Zhare would go 
into a fit. Mr Zeko’s immediate response to Zhare’s sudden violation of the formalities 
of avoidance is to resort to the market logic of the possessive individual and insist that 
his labour has been appropriately compensated in accordance with the piece rate system. 
I noted down one of these exchanges: 
Zh: It’s nothing! What is this? It’s too little! 
Z: It’s the correct sum. How much have you done this month? 
Zh: It’s too little! What the hell is this? 
Z: How many pieces have you done? I know how many shall I tell you? 
Zh: Don’t tell me how many pieces I’ve done! I know how many! You’re cheating me 
out of my money again! 
Z: Oh stop it already, I can’t go through this every month. 
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Zh: Yeah just walk away again. I’m talking to you don’t run away! You think I’m stupid? 
Do you think I don’t know what’s going on here? I see things here! I know what’s going 
on. 
Z: Oh shut up, I’ve had enough of you! 
Zh: There’s a gazda here! There’s a gazda! I’m going to ask him to come down here and 
tell him everything! 
Z: Go and ask him! Go! I’m not stopping you! 
Zh: Go fuck yourself! I’m going to the gazda! You think I don’t know what’s going on 
here? I see things every day! 
Z: Enough already! I’m sick of you! Every damn month! Start looking for another job! 
That’s it, I’m telling you, start looking for another job! 
Mr Zeko walked away and continued handing out payslips while Zhare stayed behind 
mumbling to himself. Jasna, Ruzha, Kocho and myself just looked at each other and 
giggled. None of the other workers expressed any statements of solidarity with Zhare or 
support for his behaviour, even though, in principle, they agreed that everyone’s worth 
as a labourer, including Zhare’s, was being undervalued. Mitko’s advice to him after the 
scene was hardly encouraging: “Zhare if you decided to work in this industry you have 
to accept that this is it.” Others saw his exasperation as a comic display of his incapacity 
to master the required social artistry for producing social relations with his superiors in 
order to gain concessions. Even before the event Jasna would jokingly say “Get ready 
for the Zhare show!” as soon as she could spot Mr Zeko handing out payslips. Mechev 
saw it as nothing more than hot air: “He’s just barking like a mad dog for nothing. 
You’ll see, he’ll have a go at Zeko now and in a few days it will be as if nothing had 
happened. He just keeps threatening him but never does anything. You think he has the 
courage to go upstairs?” Mechev even felt sorry for Mr Zeko because word might get 
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around that his workers are openly disrespecting him.  
True enough, the peculiar thing about these monthly confrontations was that nothing 
happened afterwards. Zhare would neither go to the gazda nor look for other jobs and I 
could not notice any difference in his relation to Mr Zeko, despite his vitriolic verbal 
attacks. Most of the people in the cutting section who witnessed these regular outbursts, 
speculated that the only reason Zhare had not been fired already was that Mr Zeko felt 
sorry for him and knew that “no one else would hire him with a big mouth like that”. 
Somewhat paradoxically then, the effect of Zhare’ public confrontations with Mr Zeko 
regarding what he saw as wage theft, appears twofold: firstly, it reaffirms the perceived 
power differentials between workers and their superiors and secondly, it opens up the 
possibility that there could be more than just impersonal exchange of labour for cash 
going on behind the transaction on payday. There could just as well be empathy with 
the socially vulnerable other predicated on the existence of an imagined moral 
community, governed by principles of redistribution and mutual benefit. The end result 
is both a revitalized political imagination that longs for an “alternative moral order” 
(Berdahl 2010: 47) and a deferral of political agency to immediate superiors. 
 
8.5.1 Projecting Forwards: the Ideal “West” 
I will try to illustrate this by reference to a few more examples. Much of the above said 
can be discerned from a conversation I had with Prasho on the shop floor. We were 
busy trimming cuffs and discussing the usual hardships of working in the garment 
industry. At some point I asked him whether he thought things would get better in the 
garment industry in the near future and his response was a resounding “No!” According 
to him, things “would not get better in the next fifty years or so.” Even more, he 
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asserted that “The only way for things to improve here is if someone from outside 
comes and takes over everything. We just don’t have the capacity.” According to this 
logic the only way for the overall economic situation to improve would be to reduce the 
country to the status of a virtual protectorate, run by capable “outsiders”. These 
outsiders are invariably located in the developed “West”, usually meaning Western 
Europe and the USA. The choice is not accidental given that in Macedonia the “West” 
stands for an imagined community of abundance, a moral economy of cooperation and 
order where everyone profits (see Neofotistos 2008: 21). In contrast, the lived reality of 
life in Macedonia is experienced as the very opposite. In Macedonia, according to 
Prasho: “People are mean and don’t know how to cooperate. Take this table for 
example. It’s loaded with work and Badev hasn’t been able to catch up and we’re 
running out of space to work on. But none of the cutters on the other two tables want to 
come and help out.” I suggested that this has nothing to do with the moral character of 
the other cutters and that the absence of cooperation was caused by the piece rate 
system. Prasho however, insisted that “that’s not the only reason. They just don’t like 
each other like many others here.” 
Prasho’s interpretation reveals some of the contradictions between the daily realities the 
of piece rate payment system that stimulates competition and the imagined moral 
community that transcends petty self-interest. Economic competition introduced 
through the piece rate payment system creates a conflict between “aspirations” to 
behave ethically with others (perform the moral self) and “real probabilities” (to 
sabotage one-another), that despite itself did not of necessity render the former 
“unthinkable” nor the latter “virtuous” (see Bourdieu 1977: 77). On the one hand it was 
no great secret that there was and economic motive involved. Mandana did try to take 
some work from Badev’s table which led to a bitter quarrel after which Mandana 
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withdrew. The problem however was not that Mandana tried to “steal” from Badev, but 
the externally imposed social context which prevented them from cooperating instead of 
competing, thus souring their relationship. In other words, competition is not so much 
seen as “economically healthy” but as socially and morally “ill”.  
Creating a system that promotes actions that are motivated by the drive for pure 
monetary gain is tantamount to encouraging persons to reach the lowest depths of moral 
decrepitude. Yet this is precisely what workers were encouraged to do through the piece 
rate payment system. Unsurprisingly, time and again I heard workers complaining that 
what bothered them the most about the factory was the poor interpersonal relations 
(megjuchovechki odnosi) on the shop floor. The problem however was never seen to 
arise from the piece rate payment system as such but from the absence of good 
management whose specific responsibility it was to prevent the deterioration of 
interpersonal relations. In fact, when I suggested to Prasho that things could perhaps 
improve if workers had an equal say in how to run the factory he rejected the idea as 
outright unworkable: 
Prasho: But you can’t not have a hierarchy. Then you have an anarchy and it’s going to 
be total chaos. We need to have someone in charge and managing things. I mean I don’t 
mind the way the factory is organised I just don’t think the right people are in the right 
place. Take Mr Samorich for example. What does he know about managing people? He’s 
the technical director and he should be in charge of all the technical aspects of 
production. But you need to have an altogether different mentality for managing people 
and human relations [megjuchovechki odnosi]. You need someone who knows more 
about that. I mean there are people who go to university and get degrees precisely for that 
kind of work. None of them [higher management] know how to handle those things. They 
just don’t have the sense for people management. I think if the gazda knew these things 
he would place someone else in charge of that. 
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Me: Do you think the owner has the same criteria as you do for what makes a good 
manager? 
Prasho: Well probably not. I’m sure that he’s happy with Mr Samorich as long as he can 
see the profits coming in every month. But I think that if people were better managed 
here the company would make even more money and everyone would be happier. 
Once again, it is possible to argue that in his narrative Prasho clearly “misrecognizes” or 
confuses the problem, which, instead of being located in the very structure of economic 
relations (the economic “base”), becomes purely moral, or a question of poor and 
unethical communal relations. In this depoliticised version, (where one can easily 
recognize the myth of CSR) capitalism can “deliver for everyone” and restore moral 
balance. However, for Prasho the very distinction between economic and moral would 
not make a whole lot of sense since they are really two sides of the same coin. The 
phrase “business is business” holds very little currency on the shop floor and is 
tantamount to saying to someone that one would just as soon have nothing to do with 
them, or that one is unwilling to recognize their person in their social “fullness”.  Pure 
business equals bad human relations and moral depravity which by definition equals a 
bad economy.  Consequently, the value placed on “good relations” is really not about 
the effective management of “human resources” but about the creation of a specific 
moral economy where both owners and workers partake of the same imagined 
community where “everyone would be happier.” To achieve such harmony though 
would require a set of resources (knowledge, skill, abilities), or the kind of capital 
possessed by elites that is simply beyond the reach of workers.  
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8.5.2 Projecting Backwards: Socialist Utopia 
Grigoriy made this amply clear when praising the old system. His summed it up thus 
(whilst fine trimming pieces of cloth on the bandsaw): 
“Do you know where the idea of communism came from? The bees. You know what their 
system was? One commands everyone else works. That's how it was here. We had one 
person in command and everyone else working.” “Is that a good thing?” I asked. “Of 
course” he said. “Can I be in command? We can't all be in charge. Then you get the 
bashibozuk that have now. Everyone is in command.”  
Bashibozuk is a Turkish words still active in colloquial Macedonian that workers often 
use to describe the “transition”. It literally means “damaged-head” and was introduced 
by the Ottomans who used it to refer to army-irregulars or paramilitaries. Bashibozuk 
troops were among the most feared during the twilight years of the Ottoman Empire, 
particularly following the onset of revolutionary nationalism in the Balkans. They often 
accompanied the Imperial army (Asker) in their efforts to quell nationalist uprisings and 
in return were left to plunder the towns and villages that offered support to rebels (see 
Brown 2003: 71). Over time, the term has come to signify “chaos” and “disorder” or a 
kind of “free-for-all”, the underlying theme being that “there is no one in control.” As 
an interpretive term it is commonly used by many workers who came of age during 
socialism and aptly captures their experience of neoliberal democracy as a kind of 
officially sanctioned “looting” of the weak; and the complete breakdown of the moral 
order where the new capitalists, much like marauding irregulars, have no interest in 
forming lasting relations with their victims (cf Graeber 2011b: 109). Grigoriy 
continued: 
“Back then there were institutions. If the institute of agriculture said ‘We need to plant 
this seed!’ it was known [accepted by everyone] that it suits the conditions and that it is 
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the most profitable crop. Now they [private entrepreneurs] all do as they please. Back 
then we used to produce everything. This type of work [holds out the fabric in his hands] 
is easy to organize. You get the materials and the designs and everything else. That's not 
production. Production is to get your own raw materials, design everything, produce it 
and sell it. That's production. That's what we had in Yugoslavia. We produced everything 
from trains to planes. One was in command and we all worked. And we worked well and 
lived well. Everyone was buying cars and building houses and going on holidays. Now 
we just scrape by, day by day. That's what you get when everyone wants to be in charge.”  
Grigoriy represents the problem at a much wider scale. For him the main issue is not in 
the immediate management of the factory but in the peripheral position of the 
Macedonian garment industry in relation to the capitalist core. Yugoslavia is portrayed 
as a self-contained system governed by a moral economy of mutual obligations where 
both workers and managers (planners) benefit from production. In a way, the model is 
that of a closed-circuit, household economy of use-values, where the production of 
commodities serves to satisfy the needs of producers. In contrast, the current model 
emphasizes the pure production of exchange values that subsumes and commoditizes 
the producers themselves (see Taussig 2010: 29). Factories receive all the necessary 
materials which are to be assembled according to design and shipped out. Both systems 
follow a clear chain of command. In the new economy though, workers are nothing 
more than outsourced labourers who are morally and socially disconnected from the 
wider system of production. As soon as their labour is remunerated at the agreed price 
the relation is terminated. Exchange in this case implies equality (“we are all individuals 
freely exchanging our properties”) but also separation (Graeber 2011: 122). The people 
in charge are far away in countries like Germany and Switzerland and are as oblivious 
to the social realities of direct producers as are the gazdi. An exchange value economy 
is thus directly related to the widely perceived degeneration of social bonds of solidarity 
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and mutual dependence (producing to sell without any consideration of the socially 
defined “needs” of producers). 
Conversely, fostering solidarity and restoring order becomes homologous with 
reinstating the authority of a centralized redistributive system (central planners, gazdi or 
simply the state). Grigoriy in fact sometimes spoke of socialism as a kind of potlatch 
society. Once during the break he made a performative comment that once “There was a 
time when people would just give out of merak! Now they just grab!” Merak is yet 
another Turkish expression that embraces a plurality of meanings such as “desire”, 
“pleasure” or “hedonism.” To “have merak” for something means to desire something. 
To do something “out of merak” is to do it for the sheer sake of pleasure and without 
calculation. To give something “out of merak” then is to obtain pleasure from the very 
act of giving - to project the self in relation to others through an act of generosity that 
entices some form of recognition from the recipients. Giving gifts of course always 
generates some kind of enduring and usually hierarchical relation between giver and 
recipient by weaving webs of mutual indebtedness. Socialist redistribution, imagined 
here as a kind of ritualized celebration of abundance, is here deployed as a symbol of 
everything that a market economy of exchange values is not.  
 
8.6 Concluding remarks:  
The differences in Prasho’s and Grigoriy’s narratives reflect their generational and class 
distinctions. Grigoriy grew up in Yugoslavia in a working class family of peasant 
origins and first started working in the garment industry in the late seventies just after 
finishing high-school. Prasho on the other hand, grew up in a well-educated middle 
class family and had himself spent some time studying abroad. He came of age in the 
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crisis years of the late eighties and early nineties when the libertarian anti-communist 
rhetoric was at its zenith in Macedonia. If Grigoriy eulogized Yugoslav socialism, 
Prasho saw it as a totalitarian nightmare and compared it to Orwell’s 1984 society and 
sometimes referred to it as “feudalism”. This did not make him less critical of the 
current economic system as deeply flawed and immoral nor from imagining a better 
alternative order.  
Mitko, who is the same generation as Prasho, also liked to blame the current state of 
depravity on the economic failing of socialism and insisted that only the free play of 
supply and demand could guarantee a healthy economy. At the same time however he 
was able to express his admiration for the ‘moral values of socialism’ such as mutual 
care, generosity and equity. “We need to fill this hole now and that’s why I think 
religion is important” he said, referring to the rediscovered national prestige of the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church. Jasna, who was equally tired of her mother’s incessant 
laments about the loss of Makedonka, would often speak about the moral depravity 
prevailing in Shtip today, whether sexual, material or spiritual. If Grigoriy located his 
utopia in a lost Yugoslav past, Prasho projected it into the distant future, modelled on an 
idealized “Western capitalism” where common prosperity is the norm and “human 
relations” take precedence over the profit motive. To borrow from Levi-Strauss, we can 
say that both narratives are therefore similar in their differences with the neoliberal 
economic model that recognizes them as labour-commodities. This similarity allows 
both Grigoriy and Prasho to recognize each other in their longing for an alternative 
world as moral persons, and maintain that space which would allow for social relations 
to operate beyond the narrow confines of self-interested competition. 
For example, in one of the many discussions about the differences between Yugoslavia 
and Macedonia, Rodna spoke nostalgically of Tito’s Yugoslavia as a place where 
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“people knew how to help one another and lived well.” With a heavy dose of sarcasm, 
Ruzha said: “Yeah but now we have things like freedom and democracy”. To this 
Rodna replied without humour: “Fuck this democracy that leaves you without a dime in 
your pocket.” This remark was something no one found objectionable. Much like in 
other post-socialist countries (see Ghodsee 2015: xv), workers in Macedonia make no 
conceptual difference between “democracy” and “free market capitalism”. They are 
often both referred to as “pluralism” and symbolize experiences of political chaos and 
economic free-for-all perpetrated by greedy, asocial, “autonomous” individuals.  “Tito 
Yugoslavia” is symbolically reconstructed out of these experiences and stands as their 
inverted mirror image. It has become for many a moral community of stability, order, 
equity, mutuality and interdependence. It celebrates the embedded person and structures 
the political imagination around more equitable forms of dependence and “social 
inequality”. 
Following Gregory we may say these oppositions revolve around the antagonistic 
contrast between relations of “reciprocal dependence” and “reciprocal independence” 
(1982: 42). Gregory uses the distinction to define a continuum on which objects in 
exchange graduate from gifts to commodities and back. Gift exchange underscores a 
“reciprocal dependence” between parties who are bound together by rights and mutual 
obligations whereas commodity exchange underscores the “reciprocal independence” of 
transactors who are “strangers, aliens” to each other (ibid). The contrast is meant to 
tease out the distinction between the economies of capitalist and pre-capitalist societies. 
But the point I wish to stress is that in contemporary Macedonia one finds both forms of 
reciprocity present at one and the same. On the one hand we have balance, equivalence 
and solidarity, and on the other hand, competition, atomism and individualism (cf. 
Stirrat 1989: 101), neither of which is averse to the emergence of hierarchical 
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distinctions between individuals or classes (however defined). The tension between the 
two then consists in the specific kind of hierarchical relationship each generates and the 
specific understanding of the self it rests upon.  
We can identify in the desire for a “utopian” moral community where “everyone is 
better off” is an imaginary totality of social relations (and totalities are always 
imaginary objects) in which the dividual-relational self can be realized (cf Graeber 
2007: 63). The question is how does such a form of selfhood maintain itself in an 
economic environment objectively dominated by exchange value in which social 
experience becomes a field of disjuncture, filled with contradictions and “resistant to 
univocal interpretation” (Dews 1987: 225)? The disjointed self inhabits this liminal 
space between a past that is forever lost and a future that seems perpetually postponed. 
Active critique follows passive resignation, relations with others toe the line between 
solidarity and competition and the utopian imagination is trampled on daily by the 
systemic features and realities of contemporary garment production (flexible labour, 
piece-rate wages, just-in-time-production etc.). Performing the self in such a context is 
necessarily beset by pitfalls, negotiations, compromises and demands a continuous 
effort of patching-up. Also, insofar as it seeks recognition from the other, the process 
always carries the risk of “destroying that social relation, or turning it into some kind of 
terrible conflict” (Graeber 2007: 64), whenever the required social artistry is lacking (as 
in the case of Zhare for example).   
But is precisely in the open-endedness of liminality that we can move away from the 
closed circuit of the habitus and enter the historical process, rife with contradictions and 
opposing tendencies that may or may not crystallize identity along class lines. We see 
that workers and gazdi already recognize each other as two distinct sorts of people, and 
that these differences are not just assumed but continuously constructed and performed 
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through everyday practices of joking and avoidance. Moreover, we see that this 
distinction is not just cultural but is closely linked to the different ways in which both 
groups relate to the market. We might therefore concede that this process contains the 
seeds and makings of new class identities, if we approach class in Thompson’s terms as 
a fleeting social and cultural formation that receives its shape only in relation to other 
classes (see Ch. I). It is clear that as long as this relationship takes place in the context 
of precarious and underdeveloped labour markets where the possibility of abjection is 
never far removed from sight, its transformation along politically antagonistic lines is 
far from a foregone conclusion. Escape from abjection and the struggle for recognition 
is far more likely to be sought through existing structures of power and inequality rather 
than in collision with them (Foucault). Visions of future hopes often regurgitate the 
calling for the welfare state and are infused with notions of patriarchy, authority and 
domination that for the most part remain unchallenged.  
 
But we nonetheless must remain attentive to the way people orient themselves and act 
in ways that surpass that which is most immanent to their world, and resist the 
assumption that such ideologies can only ever exist as the rusty cogs in the otherwise 
smooth machinery that reproduces exploitation and abjection (Robbins 2013: 457). 
People in Shtip may find the present to be absurd and filled with overwhelming forces 
beyond their control, but this is also a world filled with imaginative human efforts to 
charge it with meanings and values that ensure that structures of alienation and 
abjection are not the only game in town. Even when workers remain subjected, they 
refuse to lose sight of the human relations that constitute their subjection and their 
malleability.  
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Summary of Chapters: 
This thesis started with a number of exploratory questions that sought to expand our 
anthropological understanding of everyday life in Macedonia, by moving away from the 
traditional centre ground of ethno-national identity politics. I specifically suggested that 
a focus on changing labour regimes and economic practices, might provide some 
fruitful insights into how shifting concepts of class and personhood have been shaping 
people’s lives, their cultural values and sense of self. I suggested that these need to be 
analysed in their transformative, historical dimension and through the dialectic between 
praxis and the imagination, or, to put it Marxist terms, between social being and social 
consciousness.  
In Chapter I, I introduced the theoretical concepts of class, culture and personhood, in 
relation to the operations of power and the making of subjectivities that correspond to 
specific economic regimes. I stressed the inseparability of the economic from the social 
and the cultural, and the ability of workers to challenge dominant ideologies and subject 
categories. This was an important first step in the analysis of the neoliberal transition 
and the remaking of labour, where I explore the tensions and wider implications 
generated by the privatization process and the introduction of new labour regimes. I 
suggested that these tensions are less informed by class antagonisms and more by 
conflicting models of personhood. 
In Chapter II I outlined the key characteristics of the ethnographic method of data 
collection, which, along with the historical research, have acted as the main sources of 
information on which my analysis rests. In particular I highlighted the importance of 
long term participant observation and embodied forms of learning in the field. This 
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approach is indispensable for obtaining the required levels of social intimacy, through 
which the anthropologist can begin to develop a sense of the shared and historically 
fluctuating cultural meanings that motivate social action.  
In Chapter III I explored the historical making of an industrial working class in 
Macedonia, within the context of socialist Yugoslavia. I outlined the formation of 
Macedonia as a country within Yugoslavia and the emergence and development of self-
management as the crowning “achievement” of Yugoslav socialism. My analysis of the 
official ideology and praxis of self-management was meant to help us understand its 
impact on how the category of the economic was shaped throughout these years, and 
how labourers came to see themselves in relation to the wider social and economic 
environment. My suggestion was that the true force of self-management was not to 
enable some sort of grass roots workers’ democracy, as its official ideology proclaimed, 
nor was it to merely control labour through ideological indoctrination. Its main effect 
was to establish a fleeting hierarchy of interdependencies between workers, technocrats 
and Party officials, based on a political economy of redistribution and the satisfaction of 
substantive human needs, as Polanyi would say. In other words, self-management can 
be seen as the making of a particular “moral economy” that carried with it a specific 
understanding of personhood, where people experienced (and valued) themselves as 
embedded “nodes in systems of relationships” (Ferguson 2013), rather than as monadic, 
autonomous, individuals. I suggested that this conceptualization of the person became 
increasingly difficult to accommodate in the terrain of the neoliberal market-society and 
the newly emphasized glorification of the “possessive individual” (McPherson 1962).   
This is not to say that market rationality was completely absent during the socialist 
period. On the contrary, a certain commitment to liberal market principles always 
formed part of the dynamics of Yugoslav socialism (Mencinger 2000). Managers were, 
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for the greater part of Yugoslavia’s “market socialism” in a tense relationship with 
political structures (local, republican and federal authorities), due to their middle-of-the-
road position. On the one hand they were expected to rely on markets and run 
enterprises “rationally” and efficiently, but not for the purposes of accumulating profits 
as an end in itself. These were only the means for ensuring the social and political 
imperatives of self-management, i.e. rising living standards for the working population 
and legitimacy for the political order. This double commitment was always at the centre 
of internal Yugoslav debates between the liberal “pragmatists” and socialist “idealists”, 
about, what were often sees as, the conflictive priorities of market regulation and 
democratic planning (self-management). The liberals had their limited ascendancy in 
the 60’s which saw a great rise in productivity as well as economic inequalities, which 
facilitated the turn towards greater “workers’ control” in the seventies. The economic 
downturn and piling foreign debt problem that began to spiral out of control in the 
eighties, put the debate back on the agenda. By 1989 the arguments of liberal 
pragmatists, (backed up by the very influential position of the IMF at that stage), that 
managers must have full rights to hire and fire and complete control over the production 
process, took the upper hand. This marked the rise of a new dominant narrative that 
framed economic failure as the logical and inevitable outcome of too much meddling 
from workers and governments and too little power in the hands of managers to follow 
market cues. It was, for obvious reasons, almost fully endorsed by the managerial elite 
who were later on to become some of the most prominent proponents of “market 
ideology” that did much to legitimize their own ascendancy during the privatization era. 
Chapter IV looked at the process of transformation at a macro level and analyzed some 
of the structural causes behind the decline of the socialist economy, and the particular 
reverberations this had in the garment sector. From there I proceeded to look at the 
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specifics of the process of “privatization” of socially owned enterprises. I looked at the 
recalibration of the role of the state, and its increasing exposure to the dynamics and 
dictates of local and international capital. The purpose of this chapter was not just to 
provide a list of the legal and economic changes that took place, but also to point out the 
kinds of symbolic and conceptual shifts that accompanied this transformation, or to look 
at “privatisation” as “an object of investigation saturated with ideological significance” 
(Verdery 1996: 10). I looked at the process of deindustrialization and total economic 
decline in parallel with the practical and symbolic unmaking of the socialist working 
class as a precondition for the ideological overhaul of the Macedonian state and society. 
This was an important precondition for the introduction of a neoliberal market based 
model and the separation, or disembedding, of economic activity from the moral 
concerns of socialist planners and the socio-economic needs of workers. However, I do 
not treat neoliberalism as a repressive totalizing force, but as a productive site for 
debating the conduct of new and old subjects that always includes a plurality of voices.  
My analysis suggests that the ideal neoliberal model is never unambiguously 
materialised in practice. The privatization process itself had very little to do with 
“market rationality” and was all the way shot through with politics and all sorts of 
improvisation (cf Verdery 1996: 211). This is also seen in the relationship that 
employers have towards the state and their workers. I showed in chapters V and VI, that 
it is not uncommon for employers to demand state subsidies for technological 
modernisation or even for cheapening the price of labour, all the while insisting that 
wages can only be determined by their market value when in dialogue with workers. 
There I wrote about the strategic use of market rationality, before moving this debate to 
the factory where much the same occurs. In other words, the discourse of market 
rationality, individuality and objectivism is merely there to facilitate management's 
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political control over the workplace by legitimizing their authority as the "experts" and 
inhibiting the emergence of shop floor resistance. In this sense, I am very much in line 
with Harvey when he writes that neoliberalism has been far less effective in 
“revitalizing capital accumulation”, and far more effective in the creation of new elites, 
at least as far as Macedonia is concerned (2005: 19).  
But the process of maintaining the legitimacy of elites in the face of dismal economic 
results, endemic precarity and deindustrialization, has not simply produced widespread 
“consent”. Drawing on Turner (1966), I suggested that the transition off workers from 
one social position to another has remained an open ended and questionable process. 
The social and cultural transition to capitalism has left many workers to occupy an 
abject liminal position, as an unnecessary “surplus” in relation to capital. On the one 
hand, liminality has been disempowering, but on the other hand it has allowed people to 
question the legitimacy of the autonomous “possessive individual”. I highlighted the 
lingering presence of a socialist moral economy and the notion of embedded 
personhood; or, as I sometimes refer to it, the lingering presence at the imaginative level 
of a “moral community” of mutually dependent unequals. This imagination is not 
simply “inherited” but renewed and remade in the light of new contexts and challenges, 
not least through the performative uses of language, among other things.  
Chapters V and VI focused on these various manifestations of refusal by workers to 
participate in the new economy, and the struggles to incorporate yesterday’s socialist 
workforce into the emerging private assembly lines. This includes, among other things, 
a collective, if unorganized, strategy by workers to impose their own definition or 
ideology of what work ought to be about in order to pressurize both the state and 
employers, and engage the interests of the wider moral community of the nation. The 
analysis drew on Austin’s conception of performative speech, or the ways in which 
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narrative exchanges and utterances are involved in the creation of this moral 
community. Departing from Althusser, I analysed the uses of language and the shaping 
of a counter-ideology by placing limits on what kinds of economic behaviour is and is 
not morally acceptable. By paying close attention to how performative utterances were 
deployed and dispersed in the local community and the media I looked at the ways in 
which workers imposed their own definitions of the context, without assuming the 
existence of a widely shared consensus.  
My analysis in chapters VII and VIII engaged with the complexity of ethnographic data, 
in order to explore both the limits and possibilities of shopfloor-control in a context 
where consent to neoliberal doxa is, in a very real sense, lacking. In the factory, I 
specifically isolate two important factors: 1) class, not as a strict economic category, but 
in Bourdieu’s sense as a marker of distinction that includes cultural, economic and 
social factors (i.e. different forms of “capital”); and 2) personhood as the focus of 
struggles over what kinds of inequality or forms of dependence can be valued as 
morally legitimate. I looked at all these dimensions in their processual and performative 
aspects; with clear, albeit non-linear, historical trajectories, but also, as open-ended 
socio-cultural formations in the making.  
In Chapter VII, when looking at the technological division of labour and the relations in 
production, I mostly engaged in a dialogue with Braverman and Burawoy. I paid 
particular attention to the question of social alienation in the factory by looking at shifts 
in the internal division of labour and the separation of conception from execution. I try 
to argue that the production process, albeit an important factor, is in itself neither 
determining nor autonomous from the kinds of values and social relations that thrive on 
the shop floor. Against Braverman, I suggest that deskilling is not necessarily the 
logical result of separating conception from execution, and against Burawoy, I suggest 
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that the introduction of piece rates does not necessarily lead to mutual competition and a 
self-regulated increase in productivity on the shop floor. This does not mean that the 
organization of production is not without its “effects”. For example, in the last chapter, I 
look at the ways in which social relations in production are complicit in the creation of 
class identities and how the workplace becomes the site for competing notions of 
personhood, which in turn are traced back to the wider changes in the political 
economy.  
I suggested that through everyday practices of joking and avoidance we can identify the 
manner in which new class distinctions are embodied, performed, reproduced and 
ultimately normalized in the workplace. Whereas joking has the potential for reducing 
social distance, we have to pay attention to its opposite side, i.e. avoidance, where the 
limitations of when and with whom one can engage in such kind of playful behaviour 
begin to emerge. In other words, whereas some hierarchies succumb to joking, others 
remain out of reach. But I have also been careful not to look at hierarchies as static, 
given categories. Avoidance also has to be constructed and maintained through the 
continuous social performance of cultural separation and exclusion. This allows 
economic elites to strategically manipulate the social connections and disconnections at 
the workplace. This is done by alternating between two models of the workplace: a 
small scale impersonal market society, populated by “possessive individuals” who 
“freely” exchange their labour for cash; and an embedded model of the moral 
community, criss-crossed by a hierarchies of mutuality and interdependence.  
But, in maintaining this ambivalence, elites continuously expose the socially 
constructed (arbitrary) quality of the arrangement and thereby undermine the possibility 
of fully reifying or naturalizing their social position (Rofel 1999: 254). Social 
arrangements become recognized as contingencies, which in turn allows for alternatives 
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to be not only imagined but acted out in practice (ibid: 187; Osella and Osella 1998: 
203). Workers never tire of pointing out that whatever ills befall them, they are always 
the result of human action, and that it is on other humans that they must operate in order 
to secure change. Their responses and actions in the face of marketization and 
privatization, fail to internalize the normative categories of neoliberal rationality, 
particularly the emphasis on the autonomous, choosing, maximizing subject and self-
regulating markets. To workers, their lives and selves appear even more regulated and 
markets seem anything but free. On the contrary, they are very visibly dominated by the 
interests of the powerful. Economic activity is not seen as a self-regulating invisible 
system, but as the result of specific human actions. This was, of course, also 
characteristic of socialism and is nothing new in itself. What is becoming increasingly 
invisible, however, are the people behind those actions. In other words, what has been 
changing, or even disappearing, is the social relationship between dominated and 
dominant.  
 
9.2 Alienation or Embedded Exploitation? 
This leads us to an important question regarding the relation between knowledge 
(awareness) and exploitation, and I have had some difficulty approaching it. I do not, 
and feel cannot, make a straightforward claim that exploitation in the factory “bypasses” 
worker consciousness. On the contrary, it is a constant topic of discussion, producing a 
fountain of commentaries on injustice and moral degradation, not just in the factory but 
in Macedonian society at large. As I showed in chapters V and VI, talk of exploitation is 
endemic and in its various guises acts as a language with a performative force that seeks 
to give visibility to the industrial labour force and situate it within the larger moral 
community of, for example, the nation. Talking about exploitation does not just seek to 
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construct a certain understanding of the self in relation to others, but forms an attempt to 
shape the social and moral context in which economic activity should take place; or as 
Thompson might have it, to give voice to the moral economy of the abjected and 
conflate their interests with those of the larger “society”. Additionally, critiques of 
exploitation in the factory often took the explicit form of a labour theory of value, where 
workers calculate the amount of value-profits extracted via surplus labour, after 
accounting for wage expenses. Exploitation is thus not seen as a mystery but as a very 
salient and profoundly negative fact of life arising from a perceived structural 
arrangement that channels and limits the responsibility of the dominant towards workers 
via asocial market mechanisms.  
If I were to speak of “mystification” I would have to trace it to the embedded conviction 
shared by nearly all my informants that it is always possible (preferable even) for elites 
“to rule without, but not against, the working class” (Schierup 1992: 90), in a benign 
sort of  hierarchy. The yearnings of workers in Macedonia are, in a sense, Durkheimean 
rather than Marxist, with a more firmly expressed longing for “organic solidarity” rather 
than “class confrontation”. Talk of “revolution” and class politics, albeit common, is 
never about achieving autonomy and establishing total control and ownership over the 
means of production.  Rather, it is about creating a particular relationship between 
workers and elites (managers, politicians etc.) underscored by their common 
participation in an imagined moral community where everyone's social and economic 
needs are accounted for. In other words, social inequality is not just seen as more 
desirable than asocial inequality, but as the ultimate good that cannot itself be 
surpassed. As Prasho and Grigoriy put it, “someone has to be in charge.” The only 
question is who and in what kind of relation to those she is in charge of. It is here that 
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workers cede the political ground that in turn allows for the reproduction of 
exploitation, precarity and alienated elites.  
But this is not quite the same kind of intervention by management that Burawoy 
identifies in the logic of “making out”. Workers do not end up voluntarily increasing 
their output as a result, because competition, when it occurs, is not explicitly about 
“work”, but over social relationships. I am not suggesting that social relationship are an 
end in themselves, or that they are, as Strathern writes in the case of Melanesia “the 
objects of people’s dealings with one another”, or that they can only be translated into 
(or exchanged for) “other social relations” (1988: 172; my emphasis). Clearly in our 
case, social relations are convertible into (or find their effects in) the production, 
consumption and distribution of things and vice versa. For workers, work is valuable 
only insofar as it is constitutive of, and constituted in, a particular system of social and 
moral relations, and the latter only insofar as they can be translated into a “fairer” 
distribution of goods and resources. This, in turn, reproduces more valuable or “better” 
social (and moral) relations, that, albeit tainted by hierarchy and inequality, are able to 
accommodate their social and moral needs, and uphold the value and integrity of the 
embedded person. What I am saying, then, is that the production of things can never be 
separated from the production of social relations (i.e. the production of persons), and 
that insofar as this is explicitly recognized by workers, we cannot speak of alienation in 
the strictest sense of the word. 
 
9.3 Class, Personhood, and the Politics of Dependence  
There is little doubt in the refusal of workers to absorb and respond to the “possessive 
individual”, as the dominant subject category of the neoliberal creed. This has certainly 
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imposed some constraints on the manner in which the neoliberal turn (both as 
“governmentality” and market liberalization) has unfolded in Macedonia. But I do not 
wish to eulogize, as Dunn does in the case of Poland, the practices of Macedonia 
workers as a “model for” effective “resistance” that can inspire others around the world 
(Dunn 2004: 164). Ferguson (2013) treats such “declarations of dependence”, or efforts 
to reshape the contours of inequality and hierarchy in a more “social” way, with a 
justified dose of ambiguity. He suggests that we should recognize their value as limited, 
pragmatic attempts to address (in the medium term) some of the more deleterious 
effects of contemporary capitalism (i.e. social abjection and material deprivation), 
whilst recognizing that they do very little to alter local and global structures of 
economic inequality in the long term.  
Here I agree with Ferguson, as long as we do not lose track of the real danger that 
strategies of dependence can lead to a new kind of “economic hegemonic culture” 
where classes become bound by a common, if often uncomfortable, project of “making 
capitalism work” (Narotzky 1997: 221), that ideologically obscures and materially 
reproduces systems of exploitation. This is aptly demonstrated in the material presented 
in this thesis. We see the ways in which new class divisions and distinctions are being 
generated and reproduced in the workplace and beyond, which allow dominant others 
(the state, new capitalist elites) to give some breathing space to the embedded dividual 
through various forms of clientelism and patronage, whilst simultaneously undermining 
the legal and institutional position of labour. In other words, we may well envisage a 
point where the “selective hegemony” of neoliberal capitalism becomes parasitic on the 
very forms of sociality and webs of mutuality that seek to challenge it. Some numbers 
certainly seem to vindicate this claim. As left wing activists have been pointing out 
recently, Macedonia has the highest, and continuously growing, levels of economic 
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inequality in Europe, measured by the country’s Gini coefficient movements 
(Jovanovikj 2015). Soaring profits for the 1% are contrasted with stagnating or 
declining wages for the general population (ibid). Such data suggests that we ought not 
to place too much faith in the spontaneous reaction of “society” to protect itself against 
the invasion of “the market”, as a closed Polanyian reading might suggest.  
But that does not mean that strategies of dependence are to be dismissed out of hand. It 
is for example, a common assertion in everyday political discussions in Macedonia (and 
the wider region), that the working classes suffer from a kind of “servile mentality” 
(podanichki mentalitet). This is usually attributed to centuries of Ottoman, but also 
communist rule, where top-down domination was supposedly the norm. As the story 
goes, this produced an endemic population of complacent sycophants, whose warped 
psychology now stands as the chief impediment to progress and modernity. It is striking 
how this view represents one of the few common meeting points of both market 
apologists and left wing activists. Whereas the former decry the lingering attachment to 
“the nanny state” and the lack of free entrepreneurial spirits, the latter bemoan the 
clientelistic “passivity” of the working classes, who look to others for help, instead of 
helping themselves. Dependency is the common enemy, though of course, different 
political commitments emerge from this conclusion: individual entrepreneurialism 
versus class revolt. Neither of these entertain the possibility that dependency can be an 
agentive response to the precarity introduced by marketization, in the absence of 
conditions that might permit, for example, class based forms of solidarity and political 
strategy. Such a view does not presuppose that free markets are “hindered” by 
dependent persons, (they can in fact be an indirect by-product of disinterested 
“selective” markets), nor that dependency is an inherently “passive” game that plays 
right into the hands of the dominant. On the contrary, one can easily imagine, as in the 
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case of the stechajci for example, people in open revolt against what they see as 
economic and moral injustice, and in pursuit of ties of dependency that position them on 
the lower scales of the hierarchy. We should, perhaps, avoid dismissing their struggle 
out of hand, simply because it was not explicitly class based, as if there could ever be a 
straightforward link between one’s position in the relations of production and group 
identity and political activity.  
If political activism and the struggle against economic exploitation is to mean anything 
in Macedonia today, we need a better understanding of the “common sense” of the very 
people whose experiences and practices are most directly shaped by their exposure to 
precarious labour regimes (Gramsci 1992: 330). We might be surprised, however, to 
hear that “class”, in the standard Marxist sense, is not necessarily the most important or 
most salient category that defines and guides these experiences and practices. Rather 
than class solidarity, the struggles and politics of workers are more concerned with re-
establishing the larger, hierarchical webs of mutuality and interdependence that sustain 
and value the embedded person. If we are to “ground” our analysis and make academic 
critique historically relevant, this also means having a more open approach to these 
“common sense” pursuits of dependence, instead of discarding them as anachronistic 
obstacles to “progress” or revolution. This would allow us to ask not only what forms of 
dependence might be preferable to others (Meth 2004: 23), but also what forms of 
“autonomy” expose persons to social and economic abjection? We might also end up 
questioning the “common sense” of emancipatory liberalism and its enduring value-
commitment to the “free” monadic individual of market society. My informants’ are 
already way ahead of this thesis when it comes to pursuing these inquiries. I can only 
hope that this analysis has allowed me to catch up, and lay the foundations for further 
research in this direction. 
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